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INTRODUCTION
More than four years after the 2000 presidential election debacle, a
fierce debate still rages over the machinery used for voting. The Help
America Vote Act of 2002 ("HAVA") promised major changes in
* Assistant Professor, The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law. The author
has served as co-counsel in three cases challenging the use of "hanging chad" punch-
card machines on the ground that their use discriminates against racial minorities and
violates equal protection: Stewart v. Blackwell, No. 5:02-CV-2028, mem. op. (N.D.
Ohio Dec. 14, 2004) (challenging the use of punch-card and central-count optical-scan
voting equipment); Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v. Shelley, 278 F.
Supp. 2d 1131 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.), vacated by 344 F.3d 913 (9th
Cir.), district court affd, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (seeking to postpone
California recall election on the ground that the use of punch cards would
disenfranchise minority voters and deny equal protection); and Common Cause v.
Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (challenging the use of pre-scored punch-
card voting machine). I am grateful to Ruth Colker, Jim Dickson, Chris Elmendorf,
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the infrastructure of American democracy, including funding for the
replacement of outdated voting equipment. Spurred by both
legislation and litigation, states from Florida to California have taken
steps to replace the infamous "hanging chad" punch card with more
modern-and supposedly more reliable- voting technology.2
Contrary to expectations, these changes have not ended the debate
over the machinery used to cast and count votes, but have only
intensified it. In 2004, some nineteen million registered voters-
including approximately 70% in the swing state of Ohio-lived in
jurisdictions that use the punch-card ballot made infamous in Florida's
2000 election.3 Voters affected by the continuing deployment of this
antiquated equipment have brought lawsuits to challenge its use,4
including an unsuccessful attempt to postpone the California recall.5
In addition, citizens with disabilities have brought lawsuits challenging
paper-based equipment on the ground that it fails to allow secret and
independent voting.6
Rick Hasen, Spencer Overton, Bryan Pfaffenberger, Tova Wang, and Michael
Waterstone for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks
also to Matt Bailey, Jocelyn Cohen, and Sam Stoller for their excellent research
assistance. Any errors or omissions are mine alone.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666.
2. John McCarthy, Florida Leads the Nation in Election Reform, Fla. Today, May
21, 2001, at 1 (describing Florida's plan to decertify and replace punch-card machines
by 2002); Henry Weinstein, State Ordered to Replace Old Vote Machines, L.A. Times,
Feb. 14, 2002, at B1 (describing federal court's ruling requiring the replacement of
two types of punch-card voting machines).
3. Election Data Servs., Voting Equipment Summary by Type As of: 11/02/2004
(2004) (on file with author); Darrell Rowland, Punch Cards May Hurt Blacks: More
Votes Went Uncounted in Black Areas in 2000, Columbus Dispatch, Oct. 17, 2004, at
1A (reporting that 72% of Ohio voters used punch cards in 2004 general election).
4. See, e.g., Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. I11. 2002) (denying
motion to dismiss African-American and Latino voters' challenge to punch-card
ballot systems). For a summary of cases relying on the Equal Protection Clause,
including the decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), to challenge unreliable
voting equipment, see Stephen J. Mulroy, Lemonade from Lemons: Can Advocates
Convert Bush v. Gore into a Vehicle for Reform, 9 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol'y 357
(2002).
5. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.
2003), vacated 344 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter SVREP II]. For commentary
on SVREP II, see Vikram David Amar, Adventures in Direct Democracy: The Top
Ten Constitutional Lessons from the California Recall Experience, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 927
(2004); Richard L. Hasen, The California Recall Punch Card Litigation: Why Bush v.
Gore Does Not Suck (2004) (Loyola-LA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2004-17),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=589001; Steven Holtkamp, Expedience v. the
Public Interest: Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v. Shelley, 31 W. St.
U. L. Rev. 371 (2004); and Ninth Circuit Affirms Decision Not to Enjoin California
Recall Election-Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d
914 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (per curiam), 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2023 (2004) [hereinafter
Ninth Circuit Affirms].
6. See Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (M.D.
Fla. 2003).
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At the same time, the replacement of punch cards with
touchscreens and other forms of electronic voting technology has
generated enormous anxiety. 7 Arguing that the present generation of
electronic voting machines is insecure, some advocates have called for
legislation mandating a "voter verified paper audit trail." This
legislation would require electronic voting machines to generate a
contemporaneous paper record of the electronically cast ballot,
something that has until now been attempted by only a few
jurisdictions, with decidedly mixed reviews.8 In addition to pressing
such "paper trail" legislation, electronic voting critics have mounted
legal challenges to the present generation of paperless electronic
voting.9
The controversy over electronic voting pits traditional progressive
allies against each other. It has resulted in a public and sometimes
acrimonious conflict between civil rights organizations supportive of
electronic voting (such as the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
and the American Association of People with Disabilities), and
Democratic-leaning advocacy organizations suspicious of paperless
voting (like Moveon.org and America Coming Together)." Whatever
the ultimate result of the voting technology wars, one thing is clear: It
was not resolved in the 2004 election cycle and is unlikely to be
resolved anytime soon.
This Article examines the ongoing transformation of election
technology from both a legal and policy perspective. It defines core
democratic values that should guide the assessment of different
technologies, placing special emphasis on equal political
7. See, e.g., Jim McElhatton, Touch Screen Voting Faulted, Wash. Times, Feb. 18,
2004, at B1 (describing concerns with the security of electronic voting systems);
Editorial, A Paper Trail for Voters, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 2003, at A28 (advocating
adoption of voter-verified paper trail to address security concerns).
8. Although proponents of this requirement generally refer to this security
measure as the "voter-verified paper trail" ("VVPT") or "voter-verified paper audit
trail" ("VVPAT"), this Article mainly uses the term "contemporaneous paper
record." This is the term that the Department of Justice has used in its guidance on
the subject. See Sheldon Bradshaw, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Whether Certain Direct
Recording Electronic Voting Systems Comply with the Help America Vote Act and
the Americans with Disabilities Act (Oct. 10, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/drevotingsystems.htm.
9. See Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003); Schade v. Md. State Bd. of
Elections, No. C-04-97297, mem. op. (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 1, 2004) (denying preliminary
injunction in a case challenging Diebold electronic voting machines); see also Rachel
Konrad, Assoc. Press, Critics Sue E-Voting Company, Monterey County Herald, July
11, 2004, at B7 (describing a whistleblower lawsuit brought against Diebold for its
activities in California); Jeremy Milarsky, Court Rejects Touch Screen Suit, Sun-
Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Aug. 7, 2004, at 7B (describing the appellate court
decision in Wexler v. LePore, 385 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2004), brought by Florida
congressman opposed to paperless electronic voting).
10. See Madaline Baran, Progressives Split over Electronic Voting Machines, New
Standard, Aug. 1, 2004, available at http://newstandardnews.net/content/
?action=showitem&itemid=765.
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participation-a value that I have previously argued is embedded in
the First Amendment as well as the Fourteenth Amendment.1 After
describing the equality norms germane to the voting technology
debate, this Article considers the sometimes competing values of
security and transparency.
As I explain, the public discourse over electronic voting has focused
mainly upon the potential for fraud, with little attention to voting
rights protected by federal law. 12 This debate has also paid relatively
little attention to the different roles that the multiple institutional
players in the area of administration-including courts, legislatures,
administrative agencies, and state and local election officials-should
play in the transformation of voting technology. 3 This Article seeks
to add a different perspective, by putting the value of equal political
participation at the center of its analysis rather than the periphery.
Informed by the legal protections for the franchise that exist under
federal law, I identify four equality norms that are encompassed
within the value of equal political participation: (1) racial equality, (2)
multilingual access, (3) disability access, and (4) inter-jurisdictional
equality. These four norms, I contend, should guide the assessment of
different voting technologies. 4
11. Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion,
Inequality, and Participation, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2409, 2501-07 (2003) [hereinafter
Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection]; Daniel P. Tokaji, Political Equality After
Bush v. Gore: A First Amendment Approach to Voting Rights, in Final Arbiter: The
Consequences of Bush v. Gore for Law and Politics (Christopher P. Banks et al., eds.)
(forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Tokaji, Political Equality]; see also Abner S. Greene,
Is There a First Amendment Defense for Bush v. Gore? 80 Notre Dame L. Rev.
(forthcoming May 2005).
12. Media coverage of the electronic voting controversy has predominantly
characterized it as a debate between technology experts concerned with security
vulnerabilities on the one hand, and election officials concerned with administrative
burdens on the other. See, e.g., Kathy Bushouse, Printers Draw Fire and Praise, Sun-
Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Feb. 2, 2004, at 1B; Alison Hoffman & Tim
Reiterman, State Tells Counties to Establish Paper Trail on Electronic Voting, L.A.
Times, Nov. 21, 2003, at B10.
13. In his recent Harvard Law Review Foreword, Professor Pildes urges that
judicial review of the democratic process be conceived as a "functional problem in
institutional design," which "requires [an] understanding [of] the interlocking
relationships of the institutions and structures that organize the democratic system."
Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 29, 41 (2004). When it comes to the technology used for voting, those
institutions include Congress, state legislatures, administrative bodies, state election
officials, and the many local election officials responsible for administering elections.
In keeping with this suggestion, this Article attempts to understand the proper role of
the courts in the area of voting technology alongside that of the other institutional
players that have responsibilities in this area.
14. This is not meant to be an exclusive list of the equality principles that should
govern election law generally, but is instead meant to define the ones most pertinent
to the debate over voting technology. For a discussion of core equality principles that
should guide judicial decision making, see generally Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme
Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore
(2003).
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Organizing the debate around these equality norms yields a very
different picture of the electronic voting controversy from that which
has commonly been painted. Empirical research conducted since 2000
shows that electronic voting can significantly advance racial equality,
compared to at least some paper-based systems. 5 It may also have
considerable advantages from the perspective of disability and
multilingual access.
1 6
Equality is, of course, not the only democratic value that must be
taken into consideration when it comes to the machinery of elections.
Security and transparency are also important values implicated by the
transformation of voting technology. But there is still great
uncertainty over the best means by which to promote these values.
While courts have an important role to play in eliminating
technologies that harm certain groups of voters, I conclude that they
should not require uniform technology statewide. Likewise,
legislative bodies should avoid mandating any particular technological
fix, such as the contemporaneous paper record or "voter verified
paper audit trail."' 7  A likely effect of that sort of mandate is to
disadvantage minority, disabled, and non-English speaking voters. It
can also be expected to stifle innovation by locking in a particular type
of security enhancement, while discouraging other possibilities that
may be more effective and easier to implement.
Instead of mandating a particular solution, courts and legislative
bodies should recognize that the decentralization of our election
systems-whatever its costs-provides an opportunity for innovation.
With respect to the implementation of new voting technology, this
Article thus recommends that HAVA be given a chance to work.
This means affording state and local jurisdictions some room to
experiment with different technologies, while giving the newly created
Election Assistance Commission ("EAC") 18 the time and resources
needed to develop guidelines that will promote the democratic values
of equality, security, and transparency.
Most important, it is imperative that election reform no longer be
thought of as a once-in-a-generation occurrence. Instead, we should
consider the improvement of voting systems an ongoing process, one
15. See generally Michael Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting
Equipment Affect the Racial Gap in Voided Ballots?, 47 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 46 (2003)
(finding that the use of electronic voting machines virtually eliminates the black/white
gap in uncounted ballots that exists with punch-card and optical-scan systems).
16. Naumi Feldman & Julie Hyman, Am. Ass'n for People with Disabilities,
Voting Technology for People with Disabilities, at http://www.aapd-
dc.org/dvpmain/votemachines/downloads/Manhattan%20voters%20experiences.pdf
(Mar. 2003).
17. For one discussion of the "voter-verified paper audit trail," see Kevin Shelley,
Cal. Sec'y of State, Ad Hoc Touch Screen Task Force Report 21 (2003), available at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/taskforce-report.doc.
18. 42 U.S.C.S. § 15321 (LexisNexis 2004) (establishing the EAC).
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in which the judicial, legislative, executive, and administrative
components of government all have important responsibilities. This
process was not completed in 2004 nor will it likely be completed in
2006 or 2008. It will instead continue for as long as voting technology
continues to improve.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the
infrastructure of American democracy, providing an overview of the
types of voting systems currently in use and summarizing
developments between 2000 and 2004. Part II describes four core
equality norms that should guide assessment of different voting
technologies, taking into account the considerable social science
literature since the 2000 election. Part III considers the values of
security and transparency, which have figured prominently in the
debate over electronic voting. Part IV suggests how the multiple
institutions with responsibilities in the area of voting technology
should reconcile these values, protecting equality while also
promoting security and transparency.
I. THE STATE OF ELECTION SYSTEMS
A. Paper or Plastic?: Types of Voting Equipment
While it is common to speak of the United States' election system
as a unitary entity, authority over elections actually lies in the hands of
thousands of state, county, and municipal officials scattered
throughout the country. Nationwide, there are approximately 13,000
local jurisdictions with responsibility for administering elections.19
The United States thus does not have a single election system, but
many election systems. The technology used to cast votes is,
moreover, only one component of those systems. 20 But it is an
important component, one that can dramatically affect the right to
have one's vote counted.
Making sense of the present debate over voting technology requires
an understanding of the multiplicity of equipment used in different
parts of the country, often varying from county to county within a
state and sometimes within counties. Part I.A describes the five basic
types of voting equipment presently used in the United States. From
the oldest to the most recently developed, they are: (1) hand-counted
paper ballots, (2) mechanical lever machines, (3) punch-card ballots,
19. See Robert A. Pastor, Improving the U.S. Electoral System: Lessons from
Canada and Mexico, 3 Election L.J. 584, 585 (2004) (stating that the U.S. election
system is "dysfunctionally decentralized, fragmented into 13,000 sovereign counties
and municipalities, each one designing its own ballots, organizing its own electoral
register, and counting its votes in its own way").
20. See Douglas W. Jones, The Evaluation of Voting Technology, in Secure
Electronic Voting 3 (Dimitris A. Gritzalis ed., 2003).
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(4) optical-scan or "Marksense" ballots, and (5) direct record
electronic or "DRE" machines. 21 While there is significant variation
within these general categories,22 all the voting equipment currently
used in the United States can be placed within one of these five major
headings.
As set forth below, the five basic types of equipment vary
considerably in their operation and their susceptibility to error. They
also differ in their capacity to prevent inadvertent "overvotes" (voting
for more than the allowed number of candidates) and "undervotes"
(voting for fewer than the allowed number of candidates). Perhaps
most important, there are significant differences in the capacity of
different technologies to provide feedback to voters, by notifying
them of mistakes and providing an opportunity to correct such
mistakes. These differences exist not only among these five general
categories but within some of them.
1. Hand-Counted Paper Ballots
The least commonly used type of voting equipment is the old-
fashioned hand-marked and hand-counted paper ballot.23 During the
first century of American democracy, this was the only type of voting
equipment used.24 Until the late 1800s, voters typically obtained pre-
printed ballots with the names of the candidates for which they wished
to vote.25 Vote-buying scandals led to the adoption of the Australian
secret ballot, which was developed in 1856.26 Under this system, the
21. According to an August 2001 survey, the percentage of voters using these
systems in 2000 was:
Punch card 34.4%
Optical scan 27.5%
Lever 17.8%
Electronic 10.7%
Paper 1.3%
Mixed (different equipment used within counties) 8.1%
Nat'l Comm'n on Fed. Election Reform, To Assure Pride and Confidence in the
Electoral Process 51 (2001), available at
http://millercenter.virginia.edu/programs/natl -commissions/commission-final-report/
3_chap_5_pp50-59.pdf (2001); see also R. Michael Alvarez et al., Counting Ballots and
the 2000 Election: What Went Wrong?, in Rethinking the Vote: The Politics and
Prospects of American Electoral Reform 34, 39 (Ann N. Crigler et al. eds., 2004).
22. See David C. Kimball, Assessing Voting Methods in 2002, at 7 (July 2004),
available at http://www.umsl.edu/-kimballd/dkmpsa2.pdf.
23. Henry E. Brady et al., Survey Research Ctr. and Inst. of Governmental
Studies, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Counting All the Votes: The Performance of Voting
Technology in the United States 10-11 (2001). Although optical-scan and punch-card
systems are also paper-based, I use the term "paper ballot" to refer to systems in
which voters mark their choices on pieces of paper that are then counted by hand.
24. Eric A. Fischer, Voting Technologies in the United States: Overview and
Issues for Congress 2 (2001).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3.
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names of all the candidates are listed on ballots, which voters mark in
privacy.27
Voters using this system make marks next to the names of their
preferred candidates on pieces of paper, which are then counted by
hand.28 Although used in 12.5% of jurisdictions in 2000, only 1.3% of
people voted with hand-counted paper ballots in 2000.29 They are
used primarily in rural jurisdictions.3 ° Errors can occur due to paper
ballots that are not clearly marked, or mistakes made by those who
decipher and count them.31
2. Mechanical Lever Machines
Subsequent to the development of the Australian ballot, the first
major alteration in voting technology came with the advent of the
lever voting machine.32 Invented in 1892, this system was designed to
address the possibility of tampering with paper ballots, since there is
no document to tamper with.33 The machines have levers next to each
ballot choice.34  Though less common than paper-based voting
equipment, lever machines were still used by 17.8% of voters
nationwide in 2000.35
To cast a vote, the voter enters the voting booth and turns levers
next to his or her choices. After doing so, the voter may visually
confirm those choices and then pull a large lever, which counts the
votes. Problems with mechanical lever machines can occur if the
machines are improperly configured, or if the counters fail to register
voters' choices.36 The age of these machines, and the difficulty in
obtaining replacement parts, can also lead to problems with this
system. Thus, over the past two decades, many jurisdictions have
abandoned them.37
3. Punch-Card Ballots
The most common type of voting equipment in 2000 was the punch-
card ballot, used by one out of every three voters nationwide.38
Introduced in 1964, the punch card was the first technology to use
27. Eric A. Fischer, Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems (DREs):
Analysis of Security Issues 2 (2003).
28. Brady et al.,supra note 23, at 10; see also Alvarez et al., supra note 21, at 36.
29. Alvarez et al., supra note 21, at 39.
30. Caltech/MIT Voting Tech. Project, Voting: What Is, What Could Be 18
(2001).
31. Brady et al., supra note 23, at 10.
32. Fischer, supra note 24, at 3.
33. Fischer, supra note 27, at 3; Fischer, supra note 24, at 3.
34. Brady et al., supra note 23, at 10.
35. Nat'l Comm'n on Fed. Election Reform, supra note 21, at 51.
36. Brady et al., supra note 23, at 10.
37. Caltech/MIT, supra note 30, at 20.
38. Id.
2005] 1719
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computers to count votes.39 There are two basic variants of the punch-
card system: pre-scored or "Votomatic" style punch-card ballots
(used by 30.9% of voters in 2000),40 and non-pre-scored or "Datavote"
punch-card ballots (used by about 3.5% of voters).4"
Votomatic-style punch cards are the ones that became infamous
during the Florida 2000 election controversy. This system relies on
cards with pre-scored perforations, or "chads," and small numbers
imprinted on the card associated with each chad.42 At the time of
voting, the voter places the punch card in a slot at the top of the
punching device. When properly placed in the device, the pre-scored
perforations on the card line up with the names of candidates or ballot
measures, which are printed on pages attached to the device. A stylus
is used to punch through the perforations in the card, corresponding
to the candidates and other choices selected by the voter. If the ballot
is not placed in the correct place on the machine, then the candidates'
names or ballot choices will not line up properly, resulting in an errant
or invalid vote.43
After the voter makes his or her choices, the Votomatic punch card
is placed in a box, and counted with a vote-counting machine that
reads the ballot based on the passage of light through the spaces.
Errors can occur if the chad is not fully removed, or is punched in the
wrong place due to misalignment." Running the ballot through the
counter or handling of the ballot can cause the chad to be dislodged.45
Also, because the candidate names and ballot choices do not appear
on the punch card itself, voters cannot easily tell from looking at the
ballot whether their votes were cast as intended. Votomatic style
punch-card systems do not allow voters to be notified of "undervotes"
or "overvotes."46 Both undervotes and overvotes result in a ballot not
being counted.47
39. Fischer, supra note 27, at 3; Fischer, supra note 24, at 3.
40. This includes the "Pollstar" system, a variant on the Votomatic that was until
recently used in some California counties. See Assembly Comm. on Elections,
Reapportionment and Constitutional Amendments Hearing, Voting Systems in
California: In Use at Polling Places for the November 7, 2000 General Election
(2001) (reporting residual vote rates with Pollstar and other voting systems in
California's 2000 presidential election) (on file with author); Kevin Shelley, Cal. Sec'y
of State, Voting Systems: November 5, 2002 General Election, available at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/voting-systems.pdf (describing voting systems used in
November 5, 2002 general election, including Pollstar).
41. Alvarez et al., supra note 21, at 39.
42. Brady et al., supra note 23, at 12.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Roy G. Saltman, Accuracy, Integrity, and Security in Computerized Vote-
Tallying § 3.4(4) (1988) (NBS Special Publication 500-158), available at
http://www.itl.nist.gov/lab/specpubs/500-158.htm.
46. The exception is a system deployed in Cook County, Illinois, which was
utilized with card readers at the precinct, similar to the precinct-count optical-scan
[Vol. 731720
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The other type of punch-card equipment is the Datavote.48 In
contrast to the Votomatic punch card, the Datavote card does not
have chads.49 Instead, the voter receives cards without pre-scored
perforations. In contrast to the Votomatic system, the names of the
candidates or ballot choices appear on the cards themselves.5' The
voter inserts the card in the machine and makes his or her choice by
punching a hole in the ballot, using a special mechanism that functions
like a one-hole punch. 5 The tool is mounted on a slide, so that it can
move up and down and be positioned over the row to be punched. 3
The voter using a Datavote makes a mark directly adjacent to the
candidate name,54 making it easier for voters to "check their work"
than is the case with Votomatic-style systems. Because candidate
names appear next to the punched holes, it is less difficult to
determine whether a hole has been made in the correct place. 55 The
downside of Datavotes is that, because the names of candidates
appear on the ballots, multiple cards are often necessary in a single
election. This can lead to confused voters and inadvertent
undervotes, making the Datavote a less attractive option for
jurisdictions with lengthy ballots. In addition, there is no mechanism
for automatic checking of overvotes or undervotes, as is possible with
the precinct-count optical scan and electronic systems discussed
below.5
6
4. Optical-Scan Ballots
Optical-scan or "Marksense" technology has been used for decades
for standardized tests such as the SAT.5 7 It first became available for
use in voting in the 1980s.58 Optical-scan ballots were used by 27.5%
of United States' voters in 2000, the second most commonly used type
of equipment after punch cards.5 9
Like the punch-card ballot, the optical-scan ballot is a paper-based
technology that relies on computers in the counting process. Voters
system described below. Jackie Calmes, November Butterflies: As the Election Nears,
Counting the Vote Faces New Pitfalls, Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 2004, at Al.
47. This Article refers to "undervotes" and "overvotes" collectively as "non-
votes" or "residual votes."
48. Brady et al.,supra note 23, at 12.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See Fischer, supra note 24, at 4.
54. See Brady et al., supra note 23, at 12.
55. See id. (noting that Votomatic systems "sever the link" between the voter's
mark and the candidate's name).
56. Id.
57. Fischer, supra note 24, at 4.
58. Id.
59. Alvarez et al., supra note 21, at 39.
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make their choices by using a pencil or pen to mark the ballot,
typically by filling in an oval or drawing a straight line to connect two
parts of an arrow.6" The ballots are counted by scanners, which may
be located either at the precinct (in "precinct-count" systems) or at
some central location ("central-count" systems). 61  Voters using
optical-scan ballots may inadvertently undervote or overvote, through
stray marks or the failure to use the proper type of marking device.
The significant dividing line within the category of optical-scan
equipment is between those that allow voters to check for errors at
the precinct and those that do not.6 With precinct-count systems, the
ballots may be scanned by a machine before being placed in a ballot
box, and the scanner may be programmed to notify the voter if he or
she has overvoted or undervoted.63  Such error notification, or
"second chance" voting as it is sometimes called,64 may prevent voters
from inadvertently marking more choices than allowed.
With central-count systems, the ballots are placed in a ballot box
and sent to a central location for scanning. Central-count systems
allow mistaken overvotes to occur, and cannot be programmed to
notify the voter if he or she has undervoted. 65 Second-chance voting is
therefore impossible with a central-count system. 66
5. Direct Record Electronic Machines
Electronic systems are the newest type of voting system, first
introduced in the 1970s.67 Some type of Direct Record Electronic (or
"DRE") machine was used by 10.7% of American voters in 2000.68
Although sometimes referred to as "e-voting," these machines are not
hooked up to the internet.69 DREs are instead stand-alone machines
that record votes in their internal memories. 7 The risks inherent in
DRE voting must therefore be distinguished from those arising from
internet voting.71
60. Id.
61. Caltech/MIT, supra note 30, at 19.
62. See, e.g., J. Kenneth Blackwell, Changing the Election Landscape in the State
of Ohio 26-27 (2003).
63. Brady et al., supra note 23, at 13.
64. See Kimball, supra note 22, at 2.
65. In addition, some counties that count optical-scan ballots at the precinct do
not activate the error correction feature. Id. at 8 n.4. For simplicity, these will be
treated as central-count optical-scan counties in this Article.
66. See id.
67. Fischer, supra note 24, at 4.
68. Nat'l Comm'n on Fed. Election Reform, supra note 21, at 51.
69. Fischer, supra note 24, at 4-5 (distinguishing DRE technology from internet
voting).
70. Id. at 5.
71. Roy G. Saltman, Auditability of Non-Ballot, Poll-Site Voting Systems 3 (2003)
("The risks of Internet voting should not be used to taint the use of DREs by
combining the latter with the former as 'electronic voting' and by giving the
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There are two basic types of DRE systems. The first generation of
DRE systems, some of which are still in use, are known as "full-face"
systems because they present the entire ballot to the voter at once.72
These machines, some of which were modeled on lever machines,
typically use push buttons.73 As of 2000, approximately two-thirds of
the DRE counties used machines of the "full face" variety.74 The
more recent models of DRE equipment, which I shall here refer to as
"second generation," include ATM-style touchscreens-so labeled
because the voter touches the screen to cast his or her vote.75 In other
second-generation models, the voter turns a wheel in order to cast his
or her vote.76
Instead of receiving a paper ballot, voters using these DRE
machines typically receive a plastic card-sometimes known as a
"smart card"-alt the polling place.77 The voter inserts the smart card,
which looks like a thick credit card, into the voting terminal, causing
the ballot to be displayed and activated. 7 The voter then makes his or
her choices manually, either by touching a screen, using a dial, or
pressing buttons, depending on the type of DRE machine being
used. 79 With second-generation systems, the voter is typically shown a
verification screen at the end of the voting process, which may be
checked to confirm that the choices made are correct. At the
conclusion of the voting process, the voter touches the screen or
depresses a button to cast the vote.8 °
As with lever machines, it is not generally possible to overvote with
DRE voting machines, either first- or second-generation. With
second-generation DREs, the names of the candidates or ballot
choices appear on the screen and, at the end of the voting session, the
voter may check the choices made to confirm that they are correct.8'
impression that the unique difficulties of Internet voting apply also to DREs."),
available at http://vote.nist.gov/pospapers/Saltman-
AuditabilityofDREs(Revised)2003.pdf. For a discussion of the prospects for internet
voting, see R. Michael Alvarez & Thad E. Hall, Point, Click & Vote: The Future of
Internet Voting (2004); Bryan Mercurio, Democracy in Decline: Can Internet Voting
Save the Electoral Process, 22 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info L. 409 (2004).
72. Kimball, supra note 22, at 8.
73. Id.
74. Caltech/MIT, supra note 30, at 19-20.
75. Brady et al., supra note 23, at 13.
76. An example is the "eSlate" DRE manufactured by Hart InterCivic, in which
the voter uses a wheel rather than a touchscreen to make his or her choices. See Kevin
Shelley, Cal. Sec'y of State, eSlate-DRE Voting System, available at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/voting-systems/eslate.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
77. See Rick DelVecchio, Alameda County Vote Going High Tech, S.F. Chron.,
Oct. 14, 2002, at A22; Tadayoshi Kohno et al., Analysis of an Electronic Voting
System, Feb. 27, 2004, at 7, at http://avirubin.com/vote.pdf.
78. Kohno et al., supra note 77, at 7.
79. Fischer, supra note 24, at 4.
80. Brady et al., supra note 23, at 13.
81. Id. at 13-14.
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Second-generation DREs do not generate a paper record of the ballot
at the time of voting.82 Instead, they save the votes in electronic form,
typically in multiple places within the unit.83
Some of the second-generation DRE systems now available feature
components that make it possible for voters with disabilities to vote
independently.' These include an audio component for people with
visual impairments or illiterate voters, and "sip and puff" devices for
voters with manual dexterity limitations. 5 The more flexible interface
of second-generation DRE screens also allows multiple languages to
be displayed, thereby facilitating independent voting by non-English
speaking voters.86
B. Tracing the Chase: 2000-2004
The 2000 election laid bare the problems with the equipment
currently used to cast votes. Yet despite an initial outpouring of
interest on the part of citizens and public officials throughout the
United States, and numerous studies documenting the serious
problems with some of the equipment used, reform has not proceeded
as expeditiously as many anticipated. Litigation and legislation have
resulted in some significant changes, including the replacement of
Votomatic-style punch-card equipment in several states.87 Yet the
introduction of paperless electronic voting has generated escalating
controversy, leading some advocates to label it a threat to
democracy.88 The consequence is that many jurisdictions, including
those in some swing states, decided to stand pat with their existing
voting equipment in 2004.89
1. Florida 2000
The logical starting point for discussion of the changes in voting
technology over the past four years is Florida's 2000 election. The
story of this election is familiar9" and need only be briefly summarized
82. Fischer, supra note 24, at 4.
83. Id.
84. Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348-49
(M.D. Fla. 2003).
85. Id.; see also Hart InterCivic, eSlate Electronic Voting System, at
http://www.hartintercivic.com/solutions/eslate.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2005)
(describing accessibility features of eSlate DRE).
86. Caltech/MIT, supra note 30, at 25.
87. See infra notes 129-54 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Verifiedvoting.org, at http://www.verifiedvoting.org (last visited Jan.
30, 2005) (advocacy site calling attention to the hazards of paperless electronic voting
technology).
89. In Ohio, approximately 72% of voters used punch cards in 2004. Rowland,
supra note 3.
90. For an account of the recount battle that followed the 2000 presidential
election, see generally Jeffrey Toobin, Too Close to Call (2001). For a description of
the litigation surrounding the 2000 presidential election, see generally Abner S.
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here. With the outcome of the presidential election hanging on the
Florida recount, and George W. Bush leading narrowly after the
machine count, then-Vice President Al Gore sought manual recounts
of ballots in four counties. 1  The Florida Secretary of State set a
deadline of November 14 for the completion of manual recounts, later
moved back to November 26 by an order of the Florida Supreme
Court. 2 The United States Supreme Court vacated that order in Bush
v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,93 and the Florida Elections
Canvassing Commission certified the election on November 26, with
Bush prevailing by a narrow margin. Gore responded by filing a
contest action pursuant to Florida law.9 4 A state circuit court denied
Gore relief, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed in part, ordering
a manual recount in all counties that had not yet conducted one.95
That led to the opinion in Bush v. Gore, in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held the manual recount procedure ordered by the Florida
Supreme Court unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.96
What is significant about the opinion, for purposes of understanding
the subsequent changes in voting technology, is its recognition that the
election exposed a serious but previously overlooked problem in need
of attention. As the Court explained:
The closeness of this election, and the multitude of legal
challenges which have followed in its wake, have brought into sharp
focus a common, if heretofore unnoticed, phenomenon. Nationwide
statistics reveal that an estimated 2% of ballots cast do not register a
vote for President for whatever reason, including deliberately
choosing no candidate at all or some voter error, such as voting for
two candidates or insufficiently marking a ballot .... This case has
shown that punch card balloting machines can produce an
unfortunate number of ballots which are not punched in a clean,
complete way by the voter. After the current counting, it is likely
legislative bodies nationwide will examine ways to improve the
mechanisms and machinery for voting.97
The Supreme Court did not expressly rule on whether the use of
inaccurate voting equipment, in some but not all counties within a
state, violated equal protection. Nor could the Court have ruled on
this issue because this argument was not made by either side. Instead,
Greene, Understanding the 2000 Election: A Guide to the Legal Battles that Decided
the Presidency (2001).
91. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 73-74 (2000).
92. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101 (2000). The constitutional norm upon which
Bush v. Gore purported to rely is discussed at greater length infra Part II.A.4.
93. 531 U.S. at 70.
94. Id. at 101.
95. Id. at 101-03.
96. Id. at 110.
97. Id. at 103-04.
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the Court anticipated that legislative bodies would examine the
problem in the months to come.98
2. Post-2000 Studies of Voting Technology
Although previously understood by only a small cadre of experts,
problems with punch-card voting machines were in fact nothing new.
As early as 1988, Roy Saltman of the National Bureau of Standards
described at considerable length the accuracy and integrity problems
with punch-card voting systems.99 In that report, Saltman found that
the inaccuracies resulting from the continuing use of Votomatic-style
punch-card machines threatened voter confidence, and recommended
that the use of this equipment be ended.00
The reports that followed the 2000 presidential election provided
substantial empirical support for Saltman's findings. 1' If better
technology had been used in Florida during the 2000 election, it is
quite possible that the result would have been different. As Judge
Richard Posner has observed: "[I]f the question is what percentage of
the people who voted in the Florida election thought they were voting
for Gore, the probable answer is more than 50 percent."'0 2
Shortly after the 2000 election, the United States Commission on
Civil Rights undertook a thorough analysis of voting irregularities
(combined overvotes and undervotes) in Florida. 3 As part of their
final report, the commission released an empirical study by Allan J.
98. Id. at 104.
99. Saltman, supra note 45, § 3.4.
100. Id. § 6.9.2. For an even earlier study of punch-card voting equipment, see
Herb Asher et al., The Effect of Voting Systems on Voter Participation, Address at
the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin (Apr. 28-May 1, 1982) (on file with author). Professor Asher and his
colleagues found that in top-of-the-ticket races, "the punch-card system depresses the
number of valid votes cast," although the system actually did better in some down-
ballot races. Id. at 11. They also found some evidence that "the errors made in punch-
card voting do not occur uniformly among all population segments, but instead impact
most heavily on voters in lower socioeconomic strata." Id. at 12.
101. See, e.g., Brady et al., supra note 23, at 29 (finding a significantly higher
residual vote rate for punch cards than other types of equipment in 2000 presidential
election); Caltech/MIT, supra note 30, at 21 (finding a higher residual vote rate for
punch cards than other types of voting equipment in presidential elections from 1980-
2000); Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, the
Constitution, and the Courts 67-82 (2001) (analyzing Florida 2000 overvotes and
undervotes with different types of technology).
102. Richard A. Posner, The 2000 Presidential Election: A Statistical and Legal
Analysis, 12 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 20 (2004). Posner stops short of saying that Gore
would have won if better technology had been used, speculating that the parties might
have devoted more resources to Democratic-leaning counties if those counties had
been using better equipment. Id. at 21.
103. U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Voting Irregularities During the 2000 Election
(2001).
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Lichtman of American University. 1°4 Professor Lichtman concluded
that approximately 2.9% of all ballots cast in Florida (approximately
180,000 of six million) did not contain a valid vote for President. The
substantial majority of these were overvotes. Lichtman found that
blacks were "far more likely than non-blacks to have their ballots
rejected."'0 5 The racial gap was especially severe in counties using
punch cards, and was reduced (but not eliminated) in counties with
optical-scan equipment that allows for errors to be corrected at the
precinct level." 6
Media organizations likewise probed the incidence of uncounted
votes in Florida's election, examining ballots for which no presidential
vote had been registered. In November 18, 2001, the New York
Times, Washington Post, and Sun-Sentinel all released the results of
their inquiry into the Florida election. 7 Looking at precinct-level
data, these studies found that race, education, and income were all
positively correlated with rejected ballots.0 8
The Florida election sparked national studies, examining the
performance of different types of voting machines throughout the
country. Former presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter chaired a
bipartisan commission, established to look into the functioning of the
nation's election systems.'019 The commission agreed that the
performance of voting equipment throughout the country was one
area where there was cause for concern." 0 As for electronic voting,
the commission noted that early DRE systems had high rates of voter
errors, which were "significantly reduced by more modern hardware
and more sophisticated software designs that improve the user
interface.""' The Carter-Ford Commission did not, however, suggest
the conversion to any single system. Instead, it urged setting
104. Allan J. Lichtman, Report on the Racial Impact of the Rejection of Ballots Cast
in the 2000 Presidential Election in the State of Florida, in U.S. Comm'n on Civil
Rights, supra note 103, at app.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Id. at 17.
107. See Ford Fessenden, Ballots Cast by Blacks and Older Voters Were Tossed in
Far Greater Numbers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 2001, at A17; Dan Keating & John Mintz,
Florida Black Ballots Affected Most in 2000; Uncounted Votes Common, Survey Finds,
Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 2001, at A3; Sally Kestin et al., The Disenfranchised: Poor,
Uneducated Rejected Most in 2000 Election, Sun-Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov.
18, 2001, at IF.
108. See Kestin et al., supra note 107; Keating & Mintz, supra, note 107; Fessenden,
supra note 107.
109. See Nat'l Comm'n on Fed. Election Reform, supra note 21.
110. Id. at 55 (listing counties whose performance was deemed "worrying" or
"unacceptable").
111. Id. at 52.
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benchmarks for reliable performance, and allowing state and local
election officials to determine how best to meet those benchmarks." 2
The first nationwide examination of the racial impact of voting
technology was conducted by the minority staff of the U.S. House
Committee on Government Reform."3  It examined forty
congressional districts in twenty states, half of which had high poverty
rates and large minority populations and half of which had low
poverty and small minority populations."4 The report found that
voters in the low-income, high-minority districts were more likely not
to have their votes counted, and that better technology significantly
reduced the gap.'15 In particular, it found that some low-income, high-
minority districts achieved low rates of uncounted votes, using either
electronic or precinct-count optical-scan technology.' 6
A handful of legal academics also turned their attention on the
"nuts and bolts" of elections,"7 including the machinery used to cast
and count votes. 18 The most thorough consideration of the voting
technology divide in the wake of the 2000 election appears in an
article by Paul Schwartz, principally focused on the voting technology
used in Florida's 2000 election."9 Professor Schwartz described the
empirical research showing that election equipment providing
"feedback" to the voters resulted in fewer residual votes than central-
count punch card and optical-scan systems that lack such feedback.
21
He found that precinct-count optical scans and lever machines, both
of which provide some feedback to the voter, did best.' 2' Professor
Schwartz concluded that the use of inferior technology "exacerbates
the underlying racial disparity, and closing the voting-technology
divide would reduce it-but would not eliminate it.' ' 22  He
recommended adoption of equipment that provides feedback to
voters.
112. As a rule of thumb, the Carter-Ford Commission report recommended that
the benchmark for residual vote rates in the next election cycle be set for no higher
than 2%. Id. at 53.
113. Minority Staff, U.S. House of Representatives, Income and Racial Disparities
in the Undercount in the 2000 Presidential Election (2001) [hereinafter House
Minority Report].
114. Id. at i.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 7.
117. See Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in
Elections, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 377, 378 (2001) (pointing out that Bush v. Gore's
majority opinion "eviscerated the distinction between nuts-and-bolts questions and
big picture questions," for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment analysis).
118. Mulroy, supra note 4, at 357-58.
119. Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 625
(2002).
120. Id. at 633.
121. Id. at 636.
122. Id. at 643.
123. Id. at 696.
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3. Voting Equipment in the Courts
Relying on evidence of voting equipment problems, especially with
punch cards, voting rights advocates in several states filed lawsuits
seeking to require the replacement of antiquated systems. 124 While
the specifics of these lawsuits varied, they all relied on Bush v. Gore,1
2 5
arguing that the use of different types of voting equipment with
different levels of accuracy within a state violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 26 In addition, the post-2000 lawsuits alleged that the
use of unreliable voting equipment resulted in racial disparities,
violating section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
127
As the dust from the 2000 election controversy began to settle, the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund, and other advocacy groups, brought suit on
behalf of Florida voters to end punch-card voting in that state. 28 The
ACLU subsequently brought lawsuits in Georgia, Illinois, California,
and Ohio on similar grounds. 12 9 In each of these lawsuits, plaintiffs
argued that the continuing use of punch-card voting equipment denied
their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights
Act.13 In both the California and Illinois cases, federal district court
judges denied state defendants' motions for dismissal at the pleading
stage.'
In addition to the cases seeking elimination of punch-card voting
equipment, one case has sought postponement of an election based on
disparities arising from its use. In Southwest Voter Registration
Education Project v. Shelley, voting rights groups brought suit, seeking
to postpone the October 2003 California recall until punch cards could
124. Second Amended Complaint, Stewart v. Blackwell (N.D. Ohio 2003) (No.
5:02-CV-2028); Complaint, Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106, (C.D. Cal.
2001) (No. 01-CV-3470); Complaint, Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D.
Ill. 2002) (No. 01-C-208); Complaint, NAACP v. Harris (S.D. Fl. 2001) (No. 01-CIV-
120-GOLD); Complaint, Andrews v. Cox (Ga. Sup. Ct. Fulton County 2001) (No 01-
CV-0318).
125. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
126. Second Amended Complaint at 21-25, Stewart; Common Cause, 213 F. Supp.
2d at 1108-10; McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 897-99; Complaint at 31, Harris;
Complaint at 6, Andrews.
127. Second Amended Complaint at 26-27, Stewart; Common Cause, 213 F. Supp.
2d at 1110; McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 896-97; Complaint at 31, Harris; Complaint
at 8, Andrews.
128. See, e.g., Complaint, Harris. This case also sought to stop other practices
alleged to deny the voting rights of African-Americans and other voters. Id. at 2
(summarizing barriers to voting challenged).
129. See Second Amended Complaint at 30, Stewart (identifying ACLU attorneys
as counsel for plaintiffs in Ohio litigation); Mulroy, supra note 4, at 358-61 (describing
progress of litigation in California, Illinois, and Georgia); Tokaji, First Amendment
Equal Protection, supra note 11, at 2510 & n. 499.
130. See supra notes 126-27.
131. See Common Cause, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1110; McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at
881. These opinions are discussed infra Parts II.A, IV.A.
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be replaced.132 After the district court declined to issue a preliminary
injunction postponing the recall,'33 a three-judge panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and enjoined the
recall from proceeding on the scheduled date.' That opinion,
however, was vacated one week later by the en banc court. 135 The en
banc court did not rule squarely on whether the state's deployment of
voting equipment with substantially different levels of accuracy
violates equal protection. 3 6  It instead rested on the deferential
standard applicable to preliminary injunctions and the harm to the
State of California that would result from postponing an election that
had already begun. 137 In effect, the court punted, leaving for another
day the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause and Voting
Rights Act in cases where inaccurate voting equipment is employed.
4. State Legislative Responses
As lawsuits seeking to end the use of punch cards were proceeding,
legislative bodies in a handful of states began to examine whether
their voting systems might be improved. Florida was one of the first
to act. In 2001, Governor Jeb Bush signed into law the Florida
Election Reform Act of 2001, which banned the use of punch-card
ballots and required the purchase of either optical-scan or electronic
voting technology by 2002.138 Individual counties in Florida were left
to decide which type of equipment to purchase.139 Florida's law
provided $24 million for new voting equipment, with additional
132. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir.
2003) [hereinafter SVREP IV].
133. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1131,
1133 (C.D. Cal. 2003) [hereinafter SVREP I].
134. SVREP II, 344 F.3d 913,913 (9th Cir. 2003).
135. SVREP IV, 344 F.3d at 920.
136. The Ninth Circuit's cursory discussion of the equal protection issue states
"[t]hat a panel of this court unanimously concluded the claim had merit provides
evidence that the argument is one over which reasonable jurists may differ." Id. at
918. The Ninth Circuit proceeded to find that the district court had not abused its
discretion in finding that plaintiffs had not shown a "clear probability of success" at
the time of their preliminary injunction motion. Id. As one commentator has put it,
the court "neither accepted nor rebutted the equal protection claim." Ninth Circuit
Affirms, supra note 5, at 2028.
137. See SVREP IV, 344 F.3d at 919-20. The court noted that hundreds of
thousands of absentee votes had already been cast for the October 2003 recall
election. Id. at 919.
138. Fla. Stat. chs. 101.5604, 101.56042 (2002).
139. See Schwartz, supra note 119, at 694. Florida made this decision despite the
recommendation of a state task force recommending that it move to uniform
technology statewide. See generally The Governor's Select Task Force on Election
Procedures, Standards and Technology, Revitalizing Democracy in Florida (2001) (on
file with author).
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amounts for poll worker training, voter education, and creation of a
voter registration database.14
Georgia and Maryland also enacted election reform legislation in
2001.141 Unlike Florida, both of these states made the decision to
move to uniform voting technology. Until 2000, Georgia had used a
variety of different voting equipment, including punch cards, optical
scans, lever machines, and paper ballots, which resulted in widely
divergent undervote and overvote rates across the state.142 Its 2001
legislation required uniformity in technology,14 3 and the state
implemented DRE technology statewide for the 2002 elections.
144
Maryland's legislation also required uniformity in voting
technology.1 45  And like Georgia, Maryland converted to DRE
equipment. 146
In March 2002, California voters narrowly approved Proposition 41,
the Voting Modernization Bond Act of 2002.147 The law made
available $200 million to allow counties to purchase updated voting
equipment. 148  The law did not mandate uniformity of voting
equipment statewide, nor did it require the replacement of punch
cards or any other particular type of voting equipment. Anticipating
the "paper trail" controversy that would later erupt over electronic
voting, Proposition 41 provided that any voting system that did not
require voters to mark their ballots must produce "a paper version or
representation of the voted ballot or of all the ballots cast .... ",149 The
law did not require that this paper record be printed out at the time of
voting. Rather, it allowed the paper printout to be generated either
140. Florida Election Reform Act of 2001, 2001 Fla. Law ch. 2001-40 § 76
(indicating the amount on a per-precinct basis); see also Brad Hahn, Goodbye Chad:
Bush Signs Bill, Punch Cards Knocked Out, Sun Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), May
10, 2001, at Al (noting that election reform bill included $24 million to help sixty-
seven Florida counties buy new voting equipment).
141. S.B. 213, Gen Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2001); H.B. 1457, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2001).
142. Cathy Cox, Ga. Sec'y of State, Analysis of Undervote Performance of
Georgia's Uniform Electronic Voting System (2003), available at
http://www.sos.state.ga.us/pressrel/undervoteanalysis.htm.
143. Ga. Code. Ann. § 21-2-300 (2002).
144. Cox, supra note 142.
145. Md. Code Ann., Elec. § 101 (2004).
146. Md. State Bd. of Elections, Voting System Procurement: State Board of
Elections Selects Voting System Vendor (2001) (announcing Maryland's selection of
Global/Diebold as vendor for new DRE voting system), at
http://www.elections.state.md.us/citizens/voting-systems/voting-system-selection.htm
1.
147. See Cal. Elec. Code § 19230-19245 (West 2002); see also Julie Tamaki et al.,
Election 2002: New Challenge to Legislative Term Limits Vowed; Propositions:
Teachers Union Suffers Upset on Sales Tax Measure Despite Extensive Advertising
Against It, L.A. Times, Mar. 7, 2002, pt. 2, at 7 (reporting that Proposition 41 received
51.5% of the vote).
148. Cal. Elec. Code § 19234(a).
149. Id. § 19234(e).
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"at the time the voter votes his or her ballot or at the time the polls
are closed."' 150 Thus, the California law required that any electronic
equipment purchased with state funds print out a paper record,
though not necessarily a contemporaneous paper record, of the
electronically voted ballot.
5. The Help America Vote Act ("HAVA")
Although Congress began considering legislation to overhaul the
nation's election system in early 2001,51 HAVA was not actually
signed into law until October 29, 2002.12 Enactment of what would
ultimately become HAVA was slowed by partisan disagreements over
several facets of the bill. 53 Among them was whether to set minimum
standards for voting equipment that all jurisdictions must meet, with
Democrats pressing for mandates and Republicans arguing against
them. 154
The legislation eventually enacted sets modest mandates for voting
systems, while attempting to give the states incentives to upgrade to
better technology. 55 HAVA does not require the replacement of
punch cards, or any other specific type of voting equipment. To the
contrary, it includes a provision specifically stating that it shall not be
interpreted to prohibit jurisdictions from using the same kind of
voting equipment that they had in November 2000.156 Instead, HAVA
provides funds for the replacement of punch-card and lever systems,
while imposing some general requirements that all voting systems
must meet.
Title I of HAVA authorizes $650 million in payments to the states,
half of which is for the replacement of punch-card ballots and lever
voting machines. 57 States that choose to receive payments under Title
I are obligated to replace their punch-card and lever voting equipment
by November 2004, although this deadline may be extended for good
150. Id.
151. John Cochran, Voting Systems Challenged, 59 Cong. Q. Wkly. 865 (2001).
152. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15523).
153. David Nather, Election Overhal May Have to Wait in Line Behind Other
'Crisis' Issues, 60 Cong. Q. Wkly. 2034 (2002) (reporting that Democrats sought
measures to promote access for voters of color and of low income, while Republicans
were less interested in promoting access than strengthening protections against
fraud).
154. See David Mark, With Next Election Only a Year Away, Proponents of Ballot
Overhaul Focus Their Hopes on 2004, Cong. Q. Wkly., Oct. 27, 2001, at 2532.
155. See Karen Foerstel, Deal Reached in House on Ballot Overhaul, 59 Cong. Q.
Wkly. 2670 (2001).
156. 42 U.S.C.S. § 15481(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2004).
157. Id. § 15304(a); Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote
Act, 3 Election L.J. 424, 428 (2004).
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cause until 2006.158 As of January 2004, a total of twenty-four states
had sought such a waiver."'
Title III prescribes standards that all voting equipment must meet.
It states that, by January 1, 2006, voting systems must allow voters to
verify their choices and provide them the opportunity to correct their
choices, before votes are cast.16 ' There is also a provision requiring
that voting systems notify voters of overvotes. 161 While this provision
would appear to ban many current systems, HAVA takes away with
one hand what it seems to give with the other. The Act provides that
jurisdictions using paper-based systems (such as punch cards) may
meet the "notice" requirement through a voter education program
that gives instructions on how to correct mistakes and informs voters
of the effect of overvoting. 62 Thus, HAVA does not actually require
that voting systems provide actual notice and the opportunity to
correct mistakes.
HAVA does require that all voting systems have an "audit
capacity," and that they produce a "permanent paper record" that can
be used for manual audits-though not the contemporaneous paper
record that some advocates now demand. 63 People with disabilities
must also be accommodated, through voting machines that "provide[]
the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy
and independence) as for other voters."' "6 Jurisdictions can meet this
requirement by providing at least one DRE unit or other accessible
voting machine in each polling place.165 Voting systems must also
allow alternative language access, for people whose primary language
is not English.1 66
HAVA entrusts significant responsibilities in the area of voting
technology to the EAC, a four-member body created by the Act, and
to related boards created by the Act. 167  Among the EAC's
responsibilities are administering the "requirements payments" to the
states, provided for under Title II of the Act. 168 A total of $3 billion in
requirements payments are authorized for distribution to states under
Title II for the fiscal years 2003 through 2005.169 These monies are to
be used for meeting HAVA's requirements, which include not only
voting equipment but also the creation of a statewide voter
158. Shambon, supra note 157, at 428.
159. Electionline.org, Election Reform 2004: What's Changed, What Hasn't, and
Why 24 (2004), at http://www.electionline.org.
160. 42 U.S.C.S. § 15481(a)(1)(A).
161. Id. § 15481(a)(1)(A)(iii).
162. Id. § 15481(a)(1)(B)(i).
163. Id. § 15481(a)(2)(A)-(B).
164. Id. § 15481(a)(3)(A).
165. Id. § 15481(a)(3)(B).
166. Id. § 15481(a)(4).
167. Id. § 15341.
168. Id. § 15402.
169. Id. § 15407(a).
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registration database, implementation of provisional voting, and
effectuation of HAVA's mandate that certain first-time voters
provide identification at the polling place.17°
In sum, HAVA provides substantial funding to upgrade voting
technology and make other improvements in voting systems. But it
provides only limited guidance on what type of voting equipment
should be implemented, with few binding mandates. Many of the
details are left to the states and counties. States that receive Title I
funds for the buyout of punch cards and lever machines must get rid
of this equipment, but the law does not require the implementation of
electronic voting or any other particular type of equipment-except to
say that, by 2006, at least one DRE machine or other accessible unit
be made available at each polling place. 171
6. Controversy over Electronic Voting
Congress was aware of the security issues surrounding electronic
voting at the time it enacted HAVA, as evinced by its inclusion of a
requirement that there be a paper audit trail'7 2 and by its provision for
further study of security problems. 173 Since 2002, the security of DRE
voting equipment has come under intense scrutiny, generating a
heated public debate that has spilled from computer scientists'
websites1 74 onto the editorial pages of major newspapers. 75 The
debate has focused on touchscreens and other second-generation
electronic voting equipment.
While some raised concerns about DRE security before HAVA's
passage, 76 the controversy over paperless electronic voting reached a
170. Id. § 15407. These HAVA requirements can be found at id. §§ 15482-83.
Although my focus here is on HAVA's provisions relating to voting technology, a
forthcoming article deals with the equal protection implications of HAVA's
provisions regarding registration, provisional voting, and the ID requirement. Daniel
P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement, and the
Help America Vote Act, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming Aug. 2005).
171. 42 U.S.C.S. § 15481(a)(3).
172. Id. § 15481(a)(2).
173. See id. § 15381(a)(2).
174. See, e.g., Formal Verification Group, at http://verify.stanford.edu (last visited
Jan. 28, 2005) (website of Stanford Voter Verification Group led by Professor David
L. Dill).
175. The Century Found. & Electionline.org, Primary Education: Election Reform
and the 2004 Presidential Race 13 (2004) (describing intensification of dispute over
whether to require voter verified paper audit trail), available at
http://www.electionline.org/site/docs/pdf/Primary%20Education.PDF; see also, e.g.,
Editorial, A Paper Trail for Voters, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 2003, at A28 (supporting
legislation to require contemporaneous paper record); Editorial, Pointless Paper
Chase, Phil. Inquirer, Feb. 8, 2004, at D6 (opposing proposal to require
contemporaneous paper record).
176. For example, the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project's report noted it is
"extremely important" that election officials be able to conduct a reliable audit, and
that first-generation DREs offer "no auditability." But the VTP report also noted
[Vol. 731734
THE PAPERLESS CHASE
fevered pitch in 2003. Professor David Dill of Stanford University's
computer science department led the charge, arguing that paperless
DRE voting machines are error prone and vulnerable to fraud. 177 As
summed up by Professor Dill: "[E]lection technology has not
advanced to the point where it can provide us with electronic systems
that are reliable enough to trust with our democracy. In other words,
we just aren't there yet.' '1 78
These concerns assumed new prominence with a 2003 study
analyzing the source code used on Diebold's DRE system.'79 Diebold
was the vendor awarded contracts to install DRE technology
statewide in both Georgia and Maryland. 180 Four computer scientists,
including Professor Avi Rubin of Johns Hopkins University,
conducted an analysis of the source code used in that system. 8 This
report (the "Hopkins Report") concluded that the source code had
security flaws that could allow election workers, voters, software
developers, or hackers to tamper with elections.
82
The Hopkins Report fueled calls for state and federal legislation to
require a "voter verified paper audit trail" ("VVPAT"). 8 3 To comply
with such a requirement, electronic voting machines would have to be
equipped with attached printers capable of generating a paper record
of the electronic ballot at the time of voting."8 As noted above,
HAVA requires that, by 2006, all voting equipment produce a
"permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity.' '185 It does
not, however, require that this paper record be produced at the time
of voting. The concern expressed by some DRE skeptics is that,
without a contemporaneous record that the voter can see, malicious
codes in the DREs software could result in the voter's intended choice
that second-generation DREs produce an "internal paper tape.., and an electronic
recording of every voting session," that should allow election officials to reconstruct
the voting process and conduct a meaningful audit. Caltech/MIT, supra note 30, at 24.
177. See Verifiedvoting.org, supra note 88.
178. David L. Dill, Peace Action N.M., Will Your Vote Count in the Next
Election?, at http://www.peace-actionnm.org/alerts/vote.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2005).
179. See Fischer, supra note 27, at 8-9.
180. Press Release, Cathy Cox, Ga. Sec'y of State, Secretary Cox Announces
Selection of Diebold Election Systems to Provide New Statewide Electronic Voting
System (May 3, 2002), available at http://www.sos.state.ga.us/pressrel/050302.htm; Md.
State Bd. Of Elections, Voting System Procurement: State Board of Elections Selects
Voting System Vendor (2001), at
http://www.elections.state.md.us/citizens/voting-systems/voting-system-selection.htm
1.
181. Kohno et al., supra note 77, at 4; see also Testimony, Dr. Aviel D. Rubin, U.S.
Election Assistance Comm'n (May 5, 2004), available at http://avirubin.com/eac.pdf.
182. The findings and conclusions of the Hopkins Report are analyzed in greater
detail infra Part III.
183. The Century Found. & Electionline.org, supra note 175, at 13.
184. Shelley, supra note 17, at 39.
185. 42 U.S.C.S. § 15481(a)(2)(B)(i) (LexisNexis 2004).
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appearing on the screen, while a different selection is recorded in the
machine's memory. 18 6 A contemporaneously generated paper record
would, it is argued, eliminate this possibility. If there is a discrepancy
between the paper record and the intended choices, then the voter
could either revise her choices or call the discrepancy to the attention
of the poll worker. If a candidate or voter suspected foul play, then a
recount of the paper records could be conducted. At least in theory,
then, the contemporaneous paper record would provide a secure and
auditable record of voters' intended choices.187
Citing the possibility of fraud and error with paperless electronic
machines, a growing group of advocates, technologists, and editorial
pages have argued that the contemporaneous paper record is needed
to promote public confidence in electronic voting.18 8 Supporters argue
that this device is essential for use in the event of a recount.18 9 Others
have gone further, calling for a complete ban on electronic voting. 9°
Although there has been no documented instance of any fraud or
attempted fraud with these machines,19 these concerns have cast a
cloud over efforts to move to paperless DRE systems. In California,
they prompted the Secretary of State to convene a task force which
considered the security vulnerabilities of electronic voting, 92 and
ultimately led to conditional decertification of the DRE machines
used in that state.
193
On the other hand, many election officials and some civil rights
advocates have opposed a contemporaneous paper record
requirement, arguing that it is unnecessary, burdensome, and likely to
discourage adoption of accessible voting technology.1 94  The four
principal co-sponsors of HAVA have publicly opposed imposition of
a contemporaneous paper record requirement.1 95 At least seven
states, however, have plans to implement the contemporaneous paper
186. Fischer, supra note 27, at 15.
187. See id. at 28-29.
188. See Verifiedvoting.org, supra note 88.
189. See id. (arguing that electronic voting systems are insecure and advocating
adoption of voter-verified audit trail).
190. Ian Hoffman, Lawmakers Press Against Touchscreens, Oakland Trib., Mar. 12,
2004, at News 2 (describing efforts of California senators to stop the use of electronic
voting machines).
191. Shelley, supra note 17, at 18 ("[T]he Task Force agrees that there is no proven
instance of such an attempt at fraud that has happened in the number of years that
DRE voting equipment has been in use.").
192. See generally id.
193. See Kevin Shelley, Cal. Sec'y of State, Decertification and Withdrawal of
Approval for Certain DRE Voting Systems and Conditional Approval of the Use of
Certain DRE Voting Systems 3 (2004), available at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/ksdre-papers/decertl.pdf.
194. See Pointless Paper Chase, supra note 175.
195. See Letter from Representative Robert W. Ney, Representative Steny Hoyer,
Senator Mitch McConnell, and Senator Christopher J. Dodd, to Colleagues (Mar. 3,
2004), available at http://www.house.gov/cha/dearcolleaguemarch3-04.htm.
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record,'96 with three of those states (Ohio, California, and Alaska)
enacting laws requiring a "voter-verified paper audit trail" by 2006.197
In addition, lawsuits have been filed in four states, none of them to
this point successful, challenging the use of paperless DRE
technology.1 98
7. Voting Technology in 2004
Although substantial changes in the equipment used for voting have
occurred in the past four years, three-quarters of voters nationwide
used the same equipment in 2004 that they did in 2000.1'9 Appendix A
summarizes each state's HAVA plan in the area of voting equipment,
showing the significant changes that either are planned or have taken
place. The percentage of registered voters in jurisdictions using each
type of technology in 2004 (with 2000 figures given for comparison)
was as follows:
2000 2004
Votomatic Punch card 28.6% 12.0%
196. See Steven Levy, Ballot Boxes Go High Tech, Newsweek, Mar. 29, 2004, at 60
(stating that California and six other states have moved to require contemporaneous
paper records); Neil Modie, State Adopts Voting-Device Safeguards: Electronic
Machines Must Leave Paper Trail by Election of 2006, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July
8, 2004, at B1 (reporting Washington Secretary of State's decision to require
contemporaneous paper record by 2006); News Release, Dean Heller, Nev. Sec'y of
State, Secretary of State Heller Announces Direct Recording Electronic Voting
Machine Choice (Dec. 10, 2003) (announcing Nevada's decision to purchase DRE
machines with voter-verifiable paper printout for 2004 elections), available at
http://sos.state.nv.us/press/121003.htm; Kevin Shelley, Cal. Sec'y of State, Regarding
the Deployment of DRE Voting Systems in California 4 (2003) (mandating
implementation of contemporaneous paper record by July 1, 2006), available at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/ks-dre-papers/ks-ts-response-policy-paper.pdf.
197. H.B. 459, 23d Leg. (Ala. 2004); S.B. 1438, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2004);
H.B. 262, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2004). In addition to these states,
Brazil has also enacted legislation (Law 10.408) to require a voter-verified paper-
audit record. See Pedro A.D. Rezende, Electronic Voting Systems: Is Brazil Ahead of
Its Time?, in 7 Cryptobytes 1 (Fall 2004), available at
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/cryptobytes/CryptoBytesFa112004.pdf.
Approximately 3% of Brazilian voters used machines with an attached printer in the
country's 2002 elections. Id. at 3; see also Leslie M. Mira, For Brazil Voters, Machines
Rule, Wired News, Jan. 24, 2004, at
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,61654,00.html?tw=newsletter-topstories_
html.
198. Wexler v. LePore, 385 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2004); March v. Diebold (Cal. filed
July 11, 2004) (this case is summarized at
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/article.php?list=type&type=15); Schade v. Md. State
Bd. of Elections, No. C-04-97297, slip op. (Md. Sept. 1, 2004); Gusciora v.
McGreevey, No. MER-L-2691-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 26, 2004), available
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/docs/NJopinion.pdf.
199. Jim Drinkard, Remember Chads? They've Hung Around, USA Today, July
13, 2004, at 1A.
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Datavote Punch card 2.7 1.1
Optical scan 30.8 35.7
Lever 17.4 13.8
Electronic 12.2 29.6
Paper 1.5 0.6
Mixed 6.7 7.2200
The number of registered voters living in jurisdictions that used
Votomatic punch cards declined from over 44 million in 2000 to less
than 19 million in 2004.201 The opposite trend occurred with electronic
voting, with the number of registered voters in counties using this type
of system going from just under 19 million to over 46 million between
2000 and 2004-although fewer voters used electronic voting than
optical-scan equipment in 2004.202 Despite these changes, voters in
several states (including Ohio, Missouri, Illinois and Utah) continued
to use punch cards in 2004.203 HAVA has thus produced significant
changes, but has not yet affected a complete overhaul of voting
equipment in all of the states.
There are at least two reasons for the less-than-complete
transformation of voting technology between 2000 and 2004. The first
is the delay in making federal funds available to states and counties
for the replacement of existing equipment. 2°  This was partly the
result of President George W. Bush's failure to appoint the four EAC
commissioners on the timetable contemplated by HAVA. Although
HAVA set a deadline of February 26, 2003, the nominations were not
formally made until October 3, 2003 and the commissioners were not
confirmed until October 28, 2003.205 In addition, Congress
appropriated only $833 million of the $1.4 billion in HAVA in Title II
money that Congress authorized for fiscal year 2003.206 This shortfall
was made up for with a larger fiscal year 2004 appropriation, but the
delay in receiving these funds caused states-many of which were
200. Election Data Servs., Voting Equipment Report, Year: 2000 (on file with
author); Election Data Servs., supra note 3, at 1-2. "Mixed" refers to voters living in
counties that use more than one type of voting equipment for in-precinct voting.
201. Election Data Servs., supra note 200; Election Data Servs., supra note 3, at 1-
2.
202. Election Data Servs., supra note 200; Election Data Servs., supra note 3.
203. Electionline.org, supra note 159, at 35, 39, 43, 46.
204. See Shambon, supra note 157, at 437-38; Thomas Hargrove, Quarter of Voters
Will Use Unreliable Machines, Scripps Howard News Service, June 21, 2004, available
at http://www.knoxstudio.com/shns/story.cfm?pk=MISCOUNT-06-21-04&cat=PP.
205. Electionline.org, supra note 159, at 20-21.
206. Shambon, supra note 157, at 437.
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already facing revenue shortages-to be cautious in moving
forward.207
The second reason for the delay in replacing existing voting
equipment has been the controversy over electronic voting.2 8 The
questions surrounding DRE security largely arose after the
completion of the major commission studies. The lack of certainty as
to its resolution, and in particular the "paper trail" controversy, has
caused hesitation among election officials considering whether to
purchase new equipment.2 9
In Ohio, for example, approximately 74% of voters lived in counties
using punch cards in 2000.210 This system resulted in substantially
more uncounted votes than other voting equipment, particularly in
African-American precincts. 211 Plans to rid the state of punch cards in
time for the 2004 election were abandoned, however, as the result of a
report finding numerous security concerns with electronic voting.2 2
The legislature's subsequent decision to require a VVPAT further
delayed the replacement of punch cards in Ohio, with most counties
deciding to stand pat with punch cards in 2004 rather than convert to
electronic voting. 213 Only four of the thirty-one counties eligible to
make the shift by 2004 elected to do so. 214 Subsequently, three of
those four counties were forced to keep using punch cards when the
Ohio Secretary of State decided not to allow the use of the Diebold's
DRE machine, due to security concerns.215 As a result, about 72% of
voters used punch-card ballots in 2004, almost all of them Votomatic
punch cards, and the number of uncounted votes was comparable to
that in 2000.216
207. Electionline.org, supra note 159, at 22; see also Shambon, supra note 157, at
438.
208. Shambon, supra note 157, at 438.
209. See id. at 439.
210. Rowland, supra note 3.
211. Id.; see also Dennis J. Willard & Doug Oplinger, Ballots Go Uncounted in
Summit: 15 Precincts Skip 10% or More in 2000, Akron Beacon-Journal, Oct. 31,
2004, at Al.
212. Electionline.org, supra note 159, at 15-16.
213. Punch-Card Ballots Live, So Poke Hard, Dayton Daily News, June 14, 2004, at
A8; Katharine Q. Seelye, Demand Grows To Require Paper Trails for Electronic
Votes, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2004, § 1, at 20.
214. Jim Provance, 4 Counties Adopt Electronic Voting, Toledo Blade, June 8, 2004,
available at
http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/artikkel?SearchID=73174176265246&Avis
=TO&Dato=20040608&Kategori=NEWS24&Lopenr=406080355&Ref=AR.
215. John McCarthy, Electronic Voting on Hold, Cincinnati Post, July 17, 2004,
available at http://www.cincypost.com/2004/07/17/voting07-17-2004.html.
216. Thomas Hargrove, 2004 Vote Smoother, Still Some Problems, Scripps Howard
News Service, Dec. 22, 2004, available at
http://www.shns.com/shns/g-index2.cfm?action=detail&pk=MISCOUNT-FINAL-12-
22-04 (reporting 96,580 uncounted votes in Ohio's 2004 presidential election
compared to 93,991 in 2000); Darrell Rowland, Fewer Ohio Votes Uncounted This
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So how did electronic voting fare in comparison to other
technologies in the 2004 election? Although DRE skeptics mounted
an intensive and organized effort to monitor problems with electronic
voting equipment, the process of analyzing the performance of
different voting technologies in that election is only beginning as this
Article goes to press. As in previous elections, there have been many
allegations of fraud and some problems, but no documented instances
of foul play arising from the use of electronic voting.217 A few days
after the election, the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project issued
a report debunking the claim, widely circulated through internet
blogs, that electronic voting had been used to "steal the 2004 election
for President Bush., 218
Nevertheless, electronic voting skeptics have called attention to a
handful of problems that occurred in the 2004 election. Most
noteworthy among these are incidents in two states. In Carteret
County, North Carolina, the electronic voting machine used failed to
record more than 4500 votes, apparently because its memory was
full.219 And in Franklin County, Ohio, one precinct reported almost
4000 excess votes for President Bush in a precinct with less than 800
voters.220 Although election officials promptly corrected and detected
this error, these incidents have intensified the considerable pre-
existing anxiety regarding the implementation of electronic voting.
On the other hand, there is evidence that jurisdictions that switched
from paper-based systems to electronic voting have reduced their
number of uncounted votes. In Florida, for example, the state's
replacement of punch-card and central-count optical-scan ballots with
electronic and precinct-count optical scans is reported to have
considerably reduced the number of uncounted votes.221 And in
Georgia, the replacement of the state's hodgepodge of voting
equipment with a uniform touchscreen voting system has had an even
more dramatic impact, with the statewide rate of uncounted votes
declining from 3.5% to .39%.222 Some of the biggest improvements in
the 2004 election were in heavily African-American precincts that had
Time, Columbus Dispatch, Nov. 4, 2004, at 134 (reporting approximately 93,000
residual votes in 2004, compared to 95,500 in 2000).
217. John Schwartz, Mostly Good Reviews for Electronic Voting, N.Y. Times, Nov.
12, 2004, at A20.
218. Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting Machines and the
Underestimate of the Bush Vote (2004), available at
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/ReportsNotingMachines3.pdf.
219. Schwartz, supra note 217.
220. Id.
221. Andres Viglucci, Touch Screens Reduced Spoiled Ballots, Miami Herald, Nov.
22, 2004, at 1A.
222. Doug Gross, Georgia Election Data Shows Black Precincts Saw Biggest Voting
Improvements, Ledger-Enquirer (Columbus, Ga.), Dec. 2, 2004, at http://www.ledger-
enquirer.com/mld/ledgerenquirer/news/local/lO321965.htm.
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formerly used punch cards.223  Despite these improvements, the
debate over electronic voting shows little sign of abating.
1I. TECHNOLOGY AND EQUALITY
Having described the current state of play, I now turn to the core
democratic values that should guide the assessment of voting
technology. My starting point is to define four equality norms
embodied in the Constitution and federal voting rights laws. Viewing
the voting technology debate in light of these equality norms reveals
serious deficiencies in existing paper-based equipment, including not
only the infamous punch card, but also central-count optical-scan
ballots. As explained below, the present generation of electronic
voting equipment performs much better. In particular, DREs can
reduce uncounted votes and virtually eliminate the "racial gap" that
tends to exist with other types of equipment. They also have the
potential to expand access for people with disabilities and for voters
with limited English proficiency.
A. Four Equality Norms
Embodied in federal voting rights laws are four equality norms
germane to the assessment of available voting technologies. First,
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, jurisdictions may not
employ election practices that result in vote denial on account of
race.224 Second, under both the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 ("ADA") and HAVA, election officials must provide equal
access to people with disabilities.225 Third, the Voting Rights Act and
HAVA protect language minorities by requiring that voting materials
be provided in languages other than English where there are
significant numbers of non-English proficient citizens residing in a
state or political subdivision.226 Fourth, the Equal Protection Clause
stands for the principle that equal weight be given to each vote and
equal dignity accorded to each voter.227 While the precise scope of
this principle remains a matter of considerable controversy, at the
very least it forbids certain election practices that systematically
disfavor voters residing in particular geographical areas within a
state.228
223. Id.; see also Charles Stewart III, The Reliability of Electronic Voting
Machines in Georgia, (2004) (VTP Working Paper), available at
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/georgiastewart.pdf.
224. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2003).
225. See Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (M.D.
Fla. 2003).
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (2000).
227. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2001).
228. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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Before describing these four norms, some clarifications and
qualifications are in order. First, I take these norms to be ones that
are generally shared by those with radically different conceptions of
democracy-and of the role that courts should play in overseeing the
administration of elections. But I defer until Part IV the question of
whether courts or other institutional actors are best suited to promote
these norms. Also, I do not mean to suggest that this is an exclusive
list of equality norms or to engage in a searching inquiry into the
theoretical basis for them. Undoubtedly, those with different
conceptions of democratic politics will have varied ideas as to the
precise scope of these norms, and the relative weight that each should
be given. Finally, in setting forth these equality norms, I do not mean
to imply that other values, such as security and transparency, must
unyieldingly bend to them. My goal here is simply to describe four
equality norms embedded in federal law that should, at the very least,
inform the comparison of available voting technologies.229
1. Racial Equality
The first legal norm germane to the debate over voting technology
is racial equality. This norm is embodied in the Voting Rights Act of
1965 ("VRA"), which prohibits state and local governments from
engaging in voting practices that result in the denial or dilution of
minority votes. Specifically, section 2 of the VRA provides that no
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any state or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race
or color.23 °
The Act specifically provides that all actions "necessary to make a
vote effective," including "casting a ballot and having such ballot
counted properly," are covered.231 Courts are to examine the "totality
229. Professor Hasen describes three core equality principles that should guide
judicial intervention on constitutional grounds. Hasen, supra note 5, at 381-92.
Equality claims that fall outside of the core, he argues, should come from legislative
bodies rather than the judiciary. Id. The approach taken in this Article differs from
that of Professor Hasen, in that my focus is on statutory norms, as well as
constitutional equality norms. The equality norms upon which I focus here
nevertheless could be categorized as falling within the "essential political rights
principle" that he defines as encompassing the right not to be denied the right to vote
on the basis of characteristics such as race, gender, literacy, and national origin. Id. at
382-86. This is not to deny the other two equality principles that Professor Hasen
discusses (anti-plutocracy and collective action). These principles, however, do not
appear to be particularly germane to the debate over voting technology. In addition,
the focus of this Article is not simply on judicial enforcement of these equality norms,
but also on what legislative bodies, administrative agencies, and election officials
should do to promote democratic equality and other values.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
231. Id. § 1973(l)(c)(1).
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of circumstances" in determining whether there has been a violation
of section 2.232
Section 2 has been interpreted to prohibit not only practices that
are intended to discriminate against minority voters, but also those
that have the result of denying or diluting minority voters' power. 33
There must be a causal connection between the challenged election
practice and the racially discriminatory result.234 Thus, to the extent
that election practices disproportionately deny the votes of racial
minorities, they may violate section 2.
Three federal district courts have held that a section 2 violation may
be shown where the use of certain voting equipment results in the
disproportionate denial of minority votes. Two of them are post-Bush
v. Gore challenges to punch cards. In Black v. McGuffage, the Court
denied a motion to dismiss a section 2 claim by Illinois voters,
challenging the use of punch-card voting systems.235 And in Common
Cause v. Jones, the court refused to dismiss a similar challenge,
alleging that voters of color were disproportionately denied their
voting rights due to the use of punch cards. 236  The other case is
Roberts v. Wamser,237 a 1987 challenge to the implementation of
punch-card voting equipment in St. Louis. Although later reversed by
the Eighth Circuit for lack of standing,238 the district court in Roberts
held that the failure to manually review punch-card ballots had a
disproportionate impact on African-American voters.239
In each of these cases, the parties have disputed how section 2's
"totality of the circumstances" test should apply in the context of
voting equipment challenges. No appellate court has yet ruled on the
merits of a section 2 case arising from the use of voting equipment
that has a disparate impact on voters of color. 24° There is, accordingly,
some uncertainty as to the precise legal standard that ought to apply
in this context. Nevertheless, there can be little question that voting
systems that "result[] in"'241 the disproportionate denial of minority
votes can violate section 2, at least in some circumstances. Whatever
the precise standard governing section 2 claims in this area, the goal of
avoiding the disproportionate denial of minority votes should be
232. Id. § 1973(b).
233. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986); Farrakhan v. Washington, 338
F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
234. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d. at 1016-20.
235. Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 896-97 (N.D. I11. 2002).
236. Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
237. Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
238. Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617, 617 (8th Cir. 1989).
239. Roberts, 679 F. Supp. at 1532.
240. See SVREP IV, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003). Without expressly ruling on
the section 2 claim, the en banc Ninth Circuit in SVREP IV indicated its view that
plaintiffs had made a stronger showing on this claim than on their equal protection
claim against punch-card voting machines. Id. at 918-19.
241. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
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taken into consideration in assessing different types of voting
technology.
2. Disability Access
The second equality norm that should be considered in assessing
voting technologies is accessibility to citizens with disabilities.
Technology is of course only one of the things that may promote
equal access to the democratic process for people with disabilities. In
fact, technology has not been the principal focus of efforts to improve
voting access, at least until recently. Most of the attention has instead
been directed at physical barriers to access to the polling place for
people with mobility impairments, most notably in a survey of polling
places conducted by the General Accounting Office in the 2000
election.242 None of the polling places examined in that survey offered
voting equipment adapted to voters with visual impairments. 243 But
for visually impaired voters, as well as for voters who have manual
dexterity or cognitive impairments, technology may be vital in
ensuring that they are able to vote secretly and independently.
There are several statutes that incorporate the norm of equal access
for people with disabilities. For purposes of voting technology, the
most important of these statutes are the ADA and HAVA.2" The
ADA prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in
numerous aspects of public life, including the voting process. Title II
of the ADA forbids the exclusion of people with disabilities from
services, programs, or activities of public entities. 245 At the time it
enacted the ADA, Congress specifically found that voting was one of
the areas in which discrimination against people with disabilities
persisted.246
242. U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Voters with Disabilities-Access to Polling Places and
Alternative Voting Methods (2001).
243. Id. at 32.
244. Three other statutes also address disability access in the context of voting, but
provide more limited protection. The VRA requires that voters requiring assistance
due to a disability be given that assistance by persons of their choice. 42 U.S.C. §
1973aa-6 (2000). The Voting Accessibility for Elderly and Handicapped Act requires
that polling places be accessible, but does not specifically address the technology used
for voting. Id. § 1973ee. Finally, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits the
exclusion of people with disabilities from activities receiving federal funding. 29
U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
246. Id. § 12101(a)(3); see also Staff of Senate Subcomm. on Handicapped of the
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources & Staff of House Subcomm. on Select Educ.
Of Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 101st Cong. 941 (Comm. Print) (statement of Rep.
Tony Coelho) ("As the Council found, unfair discrimination is the daily experience of
many of the 43 million Americans with disabilities. Every sphere of life is affected:
housing, employment, recreation, transportation; even the ability to operate
independently in the commercial sphere, or to vote, or to raise children." (emphasis
added)).
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As Professor Michael Waterstone has suggested, the ADA can be
interpreted as requiring "secret and independent" voting for people
with disabilities. 47  Among the voters who may benefit from
accessible voting technology are: (1) visually impaired voters who are
unable to read printed ballots, (2) voters with manual dexterity
impairments who cannot punch holes in or mark paper ballots, and (3)
voters with cognitive impairments that prevent them from reading
paper ballots.248  Unfortunately, there is relatively little published
research on how well existing technologies serve the needs of voters
with these types of disabilities-or on how these technologies might
be adapted or improved to better meet their needs.
Much of the available information regarding the accessibility of
voting equipment comes from judicial opinions. In two states,
disabled citizens have brought suit under the ADA, challenging the
failure to provide accessible voting technology. In American
Association of People with Disabilities v. Hood, individuals with
disabilities brought a class action against Duval County, Florida
officials, asserting that the failure to provide DRE voting systems
violated plaintiffs' rights under the ADA.249 Plaintiffs argued that the
paper-based systems used by the county did not allow people with
visual and dexterity limitations to vote independently.2 0 They cited
regulations promulgated under the ADA that specifically protect the
right to communication and auxiliary aids. 1
Relying on Title II and the regulations promulgated under that
statute, the district court ruled: "[W]hile the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act do not necessarily create a comprehensive federal
right to vote without assistance, the application of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act in a particular case may have the effect of
requiring equipment that allows voters to vote without assistance.,
25 2
In so holding, the district court expressly rejected suggestions that
language in the VRA or HAVA could be interpreted to absolve
public entities of their responsibilities under the ADA.
In a subsequent opinion, the American Association of People with
Disabilities court granted declaratory judgment against counties
247. Michael Waterstone, Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights for People
with Disabilities, 14 Stan. L & Pol'y Rev. 353, 360 (2003).
248. See American Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1226,
1235-36 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (discussing electronic voting equipment capable of
accommodating voters with manual and visual impairments); Hollister Bundy,
Election Reform, Polling Place Accessibility, and the Voting Rights of the Disabled, 2
Election L.J. 217, 218 (2003) (describing accessible electronic voting technology
available for voters who are unable to read or use their hands and arms).
249. Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (M.D.
Fla. 2003).
250. Id. at 1350-51.
251. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (1991).
252. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 1356.
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failing to provide accessible voting equipment.253 The court found that
it was technologically feasible to provide accessible equipment-and
specifically that touchscreen DRE systems had the capacity to allow
visually and manually impaired citizens to vote without assistance.254
Under this decision, counties may be subjected to liability under the
ADA, if they fail to provide equipment that allows people with
disabilities to vote independently.
On the other hand, a California federal court recently denied a
temporary restraining order application sought by people with
disabilities under the ADA. 5 While agreeing that Title II of the
ADA covers the vote, the court disagreed with plaintiffs' contention
that it protected the right to vote "independently and secretly." '256 The
court provides little in the way of explanation-perhaps because of
the early stage in proceedings-to support its conclusion that the right
to cast a secret and independent ballot falls outside the scope of the
ADA.
Whatever the ADA's scope when it comes to voting, accessible
technology will have to be provided by 2006. HAVA requires that
voting systems "be accessible for individuals with disabilities,
including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in
a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and
participation (including privacy and independence) as for other
voters., 25 7 This provision may be met by having at least one DRE or
other voting system equipped for persons with disabilities at each
polling place.2" This requirement becomes effective January 1,
2006.259 Furthermore, any equipment purchased with funds made
available under Title II of HAVA after January 1, 2007 must be
accessible to people with disabilities.26 °
It is abundantly clear that there is a pressing need for further
research into the ability of technology to facilitate independent voting
by people with certain types of disabilities. In fact, one of the areas in
which HAVA calls for periodic studies is accessible voting for people
with disabilities, including those who are blind or visually impaired.26'
HAVA specifically directs the EAC and the National Institute on
Standards and Technology ("NIST") to conduct "human factor
research," on the usability of different types of voting equipment,
253. Hood, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
254. Id. at 1235.
255. Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Shelley, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D.
Cal. 2004).
256. Id. at 1126.
257. 42 U.S.C.S. § 15481(a)(3)(A) (LexisNexis 2004).
258. Id. § 15481(a)(3)(B).
259. Id. § 15481(a)(3)(C).
260. Id.
261. Id. § 15381(a)(1).
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including how accessibility for individuals with disabilities might be
improved.262
Technology is certainly not the answer to every access problem. It
does not, for example, obviate the need to address issues of polling
place access for people with mobility impairments. But for individuals
with other kinds of impairments, technology can be essential to
independent voting. Whether or not the failure to provide accessible
technology to people with visual, manual, or cognitive disabilities
would give rise to liability under the ADA, it is clear that it is an
important goal. Moreover, under HAVA, all jurisdictions are
required to provide technology that allows private and independent
voting for people with disabilities by 2006. Accordingly, disability
access is among the equality norms that must be taken into
consideration in evaluating different voting technologies.
3. Multi-Language Access
The third equality norm is accessibility of voting technology to
individuals who are not proficient in English. This norm is embodied
in both the VRA and HAVA. The VRA provides: "No voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote because he is a member of a language minority
group.263
The first provisions protecting language minorities were adopted in
1975. They were extended for ten years in 1982 and for another
fifteen years in 1 99 2 .26 In enacting these provisions, Congress found
that language minorities had been "effectively excluded from
participation in the electoral process" as the result of various
practices.265 Congress also noted the high illiteracy and low voting
participation rates among language minorities.266
Under section 203 of the VRA, bilingual voting materials must be
provided in any jurisdiction where more than 5% of the voting age
population or more than 10,000 citizens of voting age are not English
proficient.267 Although the requirements of section 203 have been in
262. Id. § 15383.
263. Id. § 1973b(f)(2).
264. Id. § 1973aa-la(b)(1) (noting the August 6, 2007 expiration date of current
provisions); Glenn D. Magpantay, Asian American Access to the Vote: The Language
Assistance Provisions (Section 203) of the Voting Rights Act and Beyond, 11 Asian L.J.
31, 34 (2004) (stating that the language assistance provisions were adopted in 1975
and reauthorized in 1982 and 1992).
265. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973aa-la(a).
266. Id.
267. Id. § 1973aa-la(b)(2)(A)(i). For implementing regulations describing in
greater detail the criteria for coverage, see 28 C.F.R. § 55.6 (2005). For a list of
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place for many years, ballots are not always readily accessible to
people whose first language is not English. As one commentator
explains, "translations on ballots are often faulty, too small to read,
contain misleading layouts, and incorrectly transliterate candidates'
names." 268  In addition, the inadequate number of interpreters
available to serve at polling places remains an issue.269
As in the area of disability access, there is relatively little available
research on how technology might improve access for non-English
speaking individuals. HAVA contemplates that technology may play
some role in improving language accessibility, requiring that by 2006,
voting systems "provide alternative language accessibility. ' 270 While
HAVA's formal requirements for language access do not extend
beyond those set forth in the VRA, the new law clarifies Congress's
intent that these requirements apply to voting technology. In
addition, HAVA requires the EAC to study means of improving
access for voters with limited English proficiency. 271 As with the
federal disability access requirements, the VRA and HAVA's
provisions regarding access for non-English proficient voters should
be viewed as a floor and not a ceiling. They prescribe the minimum
for what states and counties must do to protect the voting rights of
non-English speaking voters, but not the maximum for what they can
do.
4. Inter-Jurisdictional Equality
The fourth voting right is the most difficult to define, and might be
thought of as the wild card in the deck of equality norms. The
Supreme Court has long held that the right to vote is a "fundamental
political right" because it is preservative of all other rights.2 72 For this
reason, the Court has closely scrutinized certain election practices
which deny or dilute the right to vote, especially when they
disadvantage an identifiable group of voters based upon wealth or
place of residence.273
As Professor Richard H. Pildes recently observed, the last
generation has witnessed "the constitutionalization of democratic
politics," as issues regarding the processes of democracy have
increasingly become the subject of constitutional litigation.274 Voting
jurisdictions covered under this provision, see Committee for Purchase from People
Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled, 67 Fed. Reg. 48871-77 (July 26, 2002).
268. Magpantay, supra note 264, at 38.
269. Id. at 43.
270. 42 U.S.C.S. § 15481(a)(4).
271. Id. § 15381(a)(1).
272. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
273. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
274. Pildes, supra note 13, at 31 (internal quotations omitted).
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technology and other facets of election administration have not, of
course, been immune from this phenomenon.275 Yet defining the
constitutional norms that should guide assessment of voting
technology remains a difficult enterprise, particularly given the
Court's failure to speak with clarity on the subject.
The logical starting point is Bush v. Gore,76 which was decided
against the backdrop of a dispute over which punch-card ballots
should be counted. A great deal has been written about the Court's
opinion in Bush v. Gore, much of it highly critical. 77 It is not the
purpose of this Article to join the heated debate over whether the
Court decided the case properly or should have decided it in the first
place. Instead, the purpose here is to assess the applicability of the
equality principle articulated in Bush to the debate over voting
technology. 278 As it turns out, the cases that preceded Bush v. Gore
are more enlightening than is Bush itself.
The Court in Bush rested on the equality principle articulated in the
"one person, one vote" line of cases.279 As I have elsewhere noted,
Bush goes beyond these precedents, insofar as it finds a violation in
the absence of any evidence that a definable class of voters had been
treated unfairly.28 0 There was no showing, for example, that voters
residing in urban jurisdictions had been treated less favorably than
voters in rural jurisdictions; 28 1 or that poor voters had been treated
less favorably than well-off ones.282 The basic principle on which Bush
rests-namely, "equal weight" to each vote and "equal dignity" '283 to
each voter-is hardly novel. But it is also not particularly helpful in
defining what sorts of inequalities are constitutionally intolerable." 4
275. See id. at 32 ("[Ilssues of voting technology and vote-counting procedures
might now be matters of constitutional law.").
276. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
277. For examples of criticism of Bush v. Gore, see Alan M. Dershowitz, Supreme
Injustice: How the High Court Hijacked Election 2000 (2001); Jack M. Balkin, Bush
v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 Yale L.J. 1407, 1408 (2001);
and Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its
Hall of Mirrors, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 170, 179 (2001).
278. For an analysis of this question, see generally Mulroy, supra note 4.
279. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 ("When the state legislature vests the right to vote for
President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is
fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight
accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.").
280. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 11, at 2489.
281. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
282. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
283. Bush, 531 U.S. at 529.
284. In fact, it is not at all clear that a concern with individual equality rights are
really what was motivating the Court. See Pildes, supra note 13, at 49 (noting that,
although Bush speaks in the language of individual rights, its "central elements... are
more consistent with [a] structural concern for partisan capture of election processes
than with any individual right to an equally weighted vote").
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What is novel about Bush is not its statement of this equality
principle, but rather its application of the principle. The Court
concluded that Florida's manual recount, conducted without clear
standards dictating which votes should count, violated equal
protection. 85 According to the Court, the problem was the absence of
"specific standards to ensure its equal application." '286
The Court was careful to limit the scope of its holding, emphasizing
that the "problem of equal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities." 287 In particular, the Court noted that
the issue before it was not whether "local entities, in the exercise of
their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing
elections." '288 It would be a mistake, however, to take from Bush v.
Gore the lesson that substantial differences in the accuracy of
different voting equipment are immune from equal protection
scrutiny. 89 The Court did not, after all, say that such differences raise
no constitutional problem. Instead, the Court quite properly noted
that the constitutionality of such differences was not the issue before
it. 9° It articulated a broad principle-equal treatment in the voting
process-leaving it to future courts to determine the applicability of
this principle to such issues as discrepancies in voting technology.
This leaves open the question of what exactly the Equal Protection
Clause demands when it comes to discrepancies in voting technology.
It is surely speculative at best to assess how the Supreme Court would
address this question, or whether it will do so anytime soon.
Nevertheless, some guidance may be drawn from the four opinions
upon which Bush relies. One of those cases is Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections, in which the Supreme Court struck down a state's
poll tax on the ground that it contravened the right to political
equality: "Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's
ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process." '291 In the
three other cases, the Court struck down apportionment schemes that
accorded different weight to voters in different jurisdictions. For
285. A careful reading of the Court's opinion reveals five specific problems: (1)
from one county to another, different standards for determining which votes should
count were being applied; (2) even within certain counties (the opinion specifically
mentions Miami-Dade and Palm Beach), inconsistent standards were being applied;
(3) in some but not all counties, the recounts included undervotes but not overvotes;
(4) there was no assurance that the recounts included in the final tally would be
complete; and (5) the Florida Supreme Court's manual recount order did not specify
who would recount the ballots. Bush, 531 U.S. at 105-08; see also Hasen, supra note 5,
at 5 (identifying the different flaws that the Court found to exist with Florida's
recount process).
286. Bush, 531 U.S. at 106.
287. Id. at 109.
288. Id.
289. See Amar, supra note 5.
290. See Hasen, supra note 5.
291. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
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example, in Gray v. Sanders, the Court invalidated a system of vote-
counting that gave rural county votes greater weight than urban
county votes.292 This line of cases established the rule that citizens'
votes should not be given significantly less weight due to the
happenstance of where they reside. As the Court put it in Reynolds,
"[d]iluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs
basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 93
In all of these cases, the Court focused on the disparate treatment
accorded to identifiable groups of voters. In Harper, that group was
defined by poverty (those too poor to afford the poll tax).294 In the
"one person, one vote" line of cases, the affected group was defined
by geography (those who resided in larger districts). 95 In both sets of
cases, "an identifiable class of voters" was accorded less favorable
treatment.2 96  Moreover, each of these cases occurred against a
backdrop of racial inequality.297
The Bush v. Gore equal protection holding goes beyond this
precedent in two significant respects. First, the Court holds there to
be an equal protection violation without evidence that an identifiable
group of voters had been accorded less favorable treatment than
another.298 In contrast to Harper, there was no evidence that people
of lesser means had been denied the right to vote; and in contrast to
Reynolds and Gray, there was no evidence that the votes of those in
larger urban counties had been diluted.299 What the Bush Court
instead found problematic was the broad discretion afforded to public
officials to determine whose vote would count. As I have previously
argued, this aspect of the Court's reasoning borrows from First
Amendment jurisprudence, which looks with disfavor upon licensing
schemes that afford public officials broad discretion to regulate
292. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
293. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,566 (1964).
294. Harper, 383 U.S. at 266-67.
295. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
[I]f a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the State
should be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of votes of
citizens in another part of the State, it could hardly be contended that the
right to vote of those residing in the disfavored areas had not been
effectively diluted.
Id.
296. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 11, at 2489; see also
Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679, 684 (2001);
Tribe, supra note 277, at 225.
297. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 11, at 2483-84.
298. Id. at 2489.
299. See id. (contrasting Bush v. Gore with cases involving differential treatment of
a discernible class of voters). Nor was there any suggestion that the recount was
denying a particular racial group equal treatment. See id. If anything, the decision to
stop the manual recounts may have resulted in the disproportionate failure to count
the votes of African-Americans, who tend to cast invalid votes at higher rates than
whites. See Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 15, at 47.
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speech.3°0 But one need not rely on the First Amendment aspect of
Bush to conclude that the use of voting machines disfavoring
identifiable groups of voters, defined by place of residence, is
constitutionally problematic. Thus, to the extent that there is direct
evidence showing that a particular group of voters-for example,
those residing in urban areas-is disfavored by the use of a particular
voting technology, the "one person, one vote" cases actually provide a
closer analogue than does Bush.
The second respect in which Bush v. Gore expands upon precedent
is in applying the "one person, one vote" rule to the "nuts-and-bolts"
of elections.30 1 While prior cases had focused on such big picture
issues as how districts were drawn, Bush identifies the procedures and
mechanisms used to conduct elections-and more specifically the
vote-counting process-as the proper subject of an equal protection
challenge.3 2  The opinion in Bush reserves the issue whether
discrepancies in voting equipment violate equal protection. But as
some commentators have observed, its equal protection logic leads to
that conclusion.303 For if discrepancies in the manual recount process
may violate equal protection, it is difficult to see why other
discrepancies in the administration of elections may not.
Disparities in voting equipment raise a serious equal protection
problem, at least to the extent that they bear more heavily upon
voters in certain geographic areas. As noted above, voters and civil
rights advocates in at least five states have brought lawsuits
challenging discrepancies in the voting equipment used within those
states.304 All these cases have alleged that voters in counties relying
on unreliable voting equipment, such as the punch card, are denied
equal protection. In the California and Illinois litigation, the courts
found these allegations sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.3 5 In
the Ohio litigation, however, a district court judge rejected challenges
300. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 11, at 2488; see also
Greene, supra note 11 (manuscript at 43-55) (explaining Bush v. Gore as an extension
of First Amendment cases striking down administrative decisions affecting rights of
political expression under discretionary standards).
301. Hasen, supra note 117, at 378.
302. Id.
303. See id.; see also Balkin, supra note 277 at 1428 (asserting that "technological
differences among counties" are "probably the greatest source of unequal treatment,
particularly between more affluent counties and less affluent ones").
304. Second Amended Complaint, Stewart v. Blackwell (N.D. Ohio 2003) (No.
5:02-CV-2028); Complaint, Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, (N.D. I1. 2002)
(No. 01-C-208); Complaint, Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (No. 01-3470); Complaint, NAACP v. Harris (S.D. Fla. 2001) (No. 01-CIV-120-
GOLD); Complaint, Andrews v. Cox (Ga. Super. Ct. Fulton County 2001) (No 01-
CV-0318).
305. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 889; Common Cause, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
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to punch-card and central-count, optical-scan voting equipment after a
bench trial.""
Whether or not one agrees that the use of punch cards violates
equal protection, the cases preceding Bush established a principle
forbidding election practices that disfavor certain geographically
defined groups within a state-at least where there is statistical
evidence of less favored treatment.3"7 It would surely contravene
equal protection, for example, were a state to employ a counting
mechanism that randomly rejected half the votes in one county, while
counting all of those in a neighboring county. The only real question
is the degree of inequality that is constitutionally tolerable. The equal
protection argument made in the ACLU's voting machine cases is, in
this sense, less novel than those at issue in Bush v. Gore. In contrast
to Bush, the ACLU cases do not demand that courts deem discretion
over elections to be constitutionally problematic in itself. Rather, as
in cases challenging malapportioned districts, the plaintiffs rely upon
evidence of unequal treatment affecting a geographically defined class
of voters within the state.30 8
The equal protection argument against unreliable voting equipment
is thus more similar to "one person, one vote" cases than is Bush
itself. Accordingly, I define the fourth equality norm that should
guide our consideration of voting equipment as inter-jurisdictional
equality. My point is not that other inequalities-such as racial
disparities or the denial of access to people with disabilities-fall
306. Stewart v. Blackwell, No. 5:02 CV 2028, mem. op. at 30-33 (N.D. Oh. Dec. 14,
2004).
307. See, e.g., Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969) (striking down Illinois law
providing that voters in "counties which contain 93.4% of the registered voters may
not form a new political party and place its candidates on the ballot" while allowing
"25,000 of the remaining 6.6% of registered voters properly distributed among the 53
remaining counties [to] form a new party to elect candidates to office"); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 550 (1964) (describing Alabama legislature's apportionment plan,
under which each representative in eight rural counties would represent less than
20,000 people, while each representative in two larger counties would each represent
approximately 52,000). Relying on Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966), one might also argue that inequalities bearing more heavily on the poor
should also be among the list of equality norms protected by the Equal Protection
Clause. Thus, to the extent that certain voting technologies have a disparate impact
on people of lesser wealth or income, they might trigger some form of heightened
judicial review. Such review might further be justified on the ground that those of
lesser means are more likely to find their interests neglected by policymakers. While
I do not mean to dismiss the possibility that such inequalities might contravene some
constitutional norm, I have omitted it from my list of four equality norms described in
this part because, aside from such direct impediments to the franchise as the poll tax, I
suspect that there is substantial disagreement over whether election practices that
disproportionately affect poor people violate equal protection.
308. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 893 (describing variations in uncounted vote
rates among Illinois jurisdictions); Common Cause, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1107
(describing plaintiffs' allegations that "individuals living in counties where the punch-
card system is used are substantially less likely to have their votes counted").
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outside the scope of the Equal Protection Clause. Nor is it to deny
that Bush should be interpreted to reach other areas, in which
excessive discretion over the administration of elections is vested in
state and local officials.3 9 Finally, I do not mean to suggest a "zero
tolerance" policy that would prohibit even the most trivial inter-
jurisdictional inequalities within the state.310 Whatever else the equal
protection line of cases leading up to Bush may stand for,311 they
clearly stand for the idea that there are limits upon the state's ability
to accord differential treatment to its voters based on the jurisdiction
where they reside. That is particularly true where there is also reason
to believe that a particular subgroup, such as racial minorities, bears a
disproportionate burden from the challenged practice.
B. Empirical Research on Electronic Voting
In the ongoing debate over electronic voting, surprisingly little
attention has been given to the important work that social scientists
have conducted in the area of voting technology since 2000.312
Although this literature has barely penetrated the legal and public
policy discourse, it provides considerable guidance in assessing the
degree to which different types of voting technology serve the equality
norms set forth above. On the whole, the social science research on
voting technology shows that implementation of present-generation
electronic voting equipment tends to considerably reduce the number
of uncounted votes. In addition, there is increasing evidence that
electronic voting can reduce the "racial gap" in uncounted votes,
thereby avoiding the disproportionate loss of votes among people of
309. See Greene, supra note 11; Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra
note 11.
310. On a related point, the above analysis does not speak to the level of scrutiny
that should govern the assessment of inter-jurisdictional inequalities arising from
different voting technologies. Some cases in the "one person, one vote" line suggest
that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562
(1964) ("[Any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized."). On the other hand, other cases suggest a balancing
test under which the rigorousness of judicial scrutiny depends on the magnitude of the
restriction upon the right to vote. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)
("[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends
upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens... Fourteenth Amendment
rights."). My point here is simply that, whether heightened scrutiny or some lesser
standard of review applies, there is a constitutional norm against inter-jurisdictional
inequalities.
311. See Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 11, at 2483-90
(describing "one person, one vote" cases and Bush v. Gore's extension of their
rationale).
312. The major exception is Professor Schwartz's article. Schwartz, supra note 119.
There has, however, been substantial empirical research conducted since then, as
described below, which sheds significant light on the performance of electronic voting
technology in particular.
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color that tends to result from at least some types of paper-based
equipment.313
1. Technology and Residual Votes
The measure that empirical researchers generally use to assess
voting equipment performance is "residual votes.""' This term refers
to the sum of undervotes and overvotes. This metric clearly has its
limitations. For one thing, it cannot measure ballots (paper-based or
electronic) that are never captured in the first place-for example,
voted ballots that are not deposited in the correct ballot box or
electronic ballots that are not recorded by the machine.315 In addition,
this measure does not indicate how many voters mistakenly select the
wrong candidate, something that is very difficult to measure without
compromising voter anonymity. Finally, some voters in every
election, of course, intentionally choose not to vote.
Despite its limitations, the percentage of residual votes provides
some useful information, particularly in "top-of-the-ticket" races.316
In presidential races, the number of intentional non-votes tends to be
very small. Stephen Knack and Martha Kropf have estimated that a
very small percentage of voters-between 0.23% and 0.75%-
intentionally undervoted in presidential races between 1980 and
2000.317 If that is true, then the vast majority of residual votes in
313. Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 15, at 47.
314. Brady et al., supra note 23, at 8 (internal quotations omitted).
315. One example of the latter is the over 4000 electronic ballots voted in a North
Carolina county in the 2004 general election, which were not recorded because the
memory on the electronic voting machine was full. MoreThan 4,500 North Carolina
Votes Lost Because of Mistake in Voting Machine Capacity, USA Today, Nov. 4, 2004,
at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/vote2004/2004-11-04-votes-
lost x.htm.
316. By "top-of-the ticket" races, I mean ones-such as presidential and
gubernatorial races-that appear at the start of the ballot, as opposed to those further
down the ballot. See Brady et al., supra note 23, at 8 (noting that voters are more
likely to abstain on races "farther down the ballot" than for those at the "top of the
ballot").
317. Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf, Roll-Off at the Top of the Ballot: Intentional
Undervoting in American Presidential Elections, Pol. & Pol'y, Dec. 2003, at 587.
Knack and Kropf found little variation in intentional undervoting in the presidential
race based on race, ethnicity, and party affiliation. Id. at 580. They did find that older
and poorer voters are somewhat more likely to skip the presidential contest, but even
for these voters the intentional undervoting rate was 1.54% or less. Id. While
intentional undervotes for president are uncommon, it is more difficult to estimate
how many voters intentionally skip down-ballot races. Brady et al., supra note 23, at 9.
Even for senatorial and gubernatorial races (in which voters are choosing among the
same candidates statewide), it is difficult to say with confidence how many voters are
intentionally undervoting, since there has been to date no systematic study of these
races similar to that which Knack and Kropf conducted for the presidential contest.
For races further "down-ballot"-such as U.S. House of Representatives, state
legislative, and local races-the reliability of residual votes is much more problematic,
both because of intentional undervoting and because different voters are voting for
different candidates in different parts of each state. See id. at 8-9, 48 (noting problems
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presidential races are not intentional, but instead arise from the
failure (either on the part of the voter or the equipment used) to
accurately record the voter's intended choice.
Dr. Henry Brady and his colleagues at the U.C. Berkeley Survey
Research Center examined the residual vote rates arising from the use
of different types of voting systems in California and throughout the
country.318 The Brady study analyzed data from 2219 U.S. counties in
the 2000 general election.3 19 Brady and his colleagues found that
DRE machines, lever machines, optical-scan ballots, and paper ballots
all produce significantly fewer residual votes than punch cards. Punch
cards had a residual vote rate of 2.64%, compared to 1.68% for
DREs, and 1.37% for optical-scan ballots.32°
The intrastate disparities resulting from the inequalities in voting
technology are dramatic. For example, the residual vote rate in Los
Angeles County, one of the most racially and ethnically diverse
counties in the country, was 2.7% in the 2000 presidential election.
3 21
By contrast, neighboring Riverside County-which used second-
generation DREs of the touchscreen variety in the 2000 election-had
a residual vote rate of 0.59%.322
In a further effort to test whether the equipment was really
responsible for the discrepancies in residual votes, Dr. Brady and his
colleagues have also examined what happens when counties move
with relying on residual votes in races other than the Presidential election).
Accordingly, the rate of unintentional undervoting (and therefore the overall residual
vote rate) may vary dramatically for reasons having nothing to do with the equipment
used. It is for this reason that empirical researchers studying the performance of
voting equipment have focused on presidential residual votes and, to a lesser extent,
gubernatorial and senatorial undervotes. For presidential undervotes, the incidence
of intentional undervoting is small and does not vary significantly based on the voter's
race, or party affiliation. Knack & Kropf, supra, at 580. While the precise level of
intentional undervoting has not been studied for gubernatorial and senatorial races,
voters are at least choosing between the same candidates in different parts of the
state-thereby eliminating the possibility that variations in residual vote rates result
from differences in the competitiveness of the race, rather than the voting equipment
used.
318. Brady et al., supra note 23.
319. Id. at 1. This study did not look at previous years' elections because that data
could not be thoroughly audited. Id.
320. Id. at 29. For the five general categories of voting equipment, the average
residual vote rates were as follows:
Punchcards 2.64%
DREs 1.68
Optical Scan 1.37
Lever Machine 1.72
Paper Ballot 1.99
Id. As was the case with the Caltech/MIT study, the dataset used by Brady and his
associates did not allow first- and second-generation DREs results to be
disaggregated.
321. Materials from Assembly Committee on Elections, Reapportionment and
Constitutional Amendments Hearing (Jan. 16, 2001) (on file with author).
322. Id.
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from one type of equipment to another. Focusing on three California
counties that moved from Votomatic-style punch cards to precinct-
count optical-scan equipment between 1996 and 2000, Dr. Brady
found significant reductions in the residual vote rate within each
county.3" 3 He also found that a California county shifting from
central-count optical-scan ballots to touchscreen DRE equipment
reduced its residual vote rate by more than half (from 1.21% to
0.59%).324
The differences in the 2003 California recall election reveal an even
more striking discrepancy between punch cards and other voting
systems. On the first ballot question (whether to recall Governor
Gray Davis), Dr. Brady found that Votomatic-style punch cards had a
residual vote rate of 7.77%, compared to 2.33% for optical scans and
1.34% for electronic voting equipment, in California's twenty largest
counties.325 Of those twenty counties, all five of the remaining punch-
card counties had residual vote rates higher than the counties using
other technology.326 Comparing these residual vote rates to exit
polling data, Dr. Brady estimated that at least 176,000 votes were lost
due to the continued use of punch-card voting machines. 327 Counties
that converted from punch cards to DREs or precinct-count optical
scans saw a dramatic improvement. 328 For example, racially diverse
Alameda County-which, when it used punch-card machines, had one
of the higher residual vote rates in the state3 9-had one of the lowest
residual vote rates (0.74%) when it switched to DREs for the 2003
recall election.33°
323. Henry E. Brady, Initial Declaration of SVREP v. Shelley (Aug. 11, 2003), at
http://ucdata.berkeley.edu/new-web/recall/initaclu.pdf. In Fresno County, for
example, the average residual vote rate declined from 3.35% to 0.70% after moving
from punch cards to precinct-count optical-scan ballots. Brady et al., supra note 23, at
44. Dr. Brady found similar results for two other counties that moved from punch
cards to precinct-count, optical-scan systems (Marin and San Francisco). Id. at 7-8.
324. Brady et al., supra note 23, at 44.
325. Henry E. Brady, Revised Memorandum on Residual Vote Rates 3 (2003),
available at http://ucdata.berkeley.edu/. California does not use lever machines. See
Materials from Assembly Committee on Elections, supra note 321 (describing voting
equipment used in each California county in 2000).
326. Brady, supra note 325, at 2.
327. Id. at 1.
328. Id.
329. Materials from Assembly Committee on Elections, supra note 321.
330. Brady, supra note 325, at 2. Another study of the California recall election
found evidence that many voters had mistakenly cast votes for the wrong candidate in
that election. Thomas Dee found an unusually large number of votes cast for
candidates whose names appeared adjacent to the two major candidates
(Schwarzenegger and Bustamante), among voters using punch cards. He concluded,
based on this evidence, that punch cards increase the rate of voter errors by at least a
third. Thomas S. Dee, Do Punch Cards Promote Voter Errors? Evidence from the
California Recall Election 2 (2004), available at
http://www.swarthmore.edu/socsci/tdeel/Researchlbookends0404.pdf.
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Other empirical analyses confirm that pre-scored punch cards
consistently result in higher residual vote rates than other types of
equipment. The General Accounting Office's ("GAO") 2001 study
yielded results similar to those found by Brady and his colleagues.
The GAO concluded that the "type of voting equipment that counties
used in the 2000 general election.., had an effect on uncounted
presidential votes."33' While paper ballots, lever machines, optical-
scan ballots and DRE machines all had roughly similar levels of
residual voting, higher levels were found in punch-card counties.332
The GAO also found that precinct-count optical-scan equipment with
error correction yielded significantly better results than punch-card
technology.333
In its study of elections between 1980 and 2000, the Caltech/MIT
Voting Technology Project likewise found high residual vote rates
with punch cards, but found that the residual vote rate for DREs was
almost as high.334  The Caltech/MIT report, however, expressly
rejected the conclusion that DRE technology is "inherently flawed
and should not be used." '335 It suggested that the high residual vote
rate with DREs may have resulted from the poor user interface with
some types of DREs, particularly the earlier "push button" model.
36
In fact, the report noted that, even in 2000, two-thirds of DRE
counties were still using first-generation DRE equipment.337
331. Gen. Accounting Office, Elections: Statistical Analysis of Factors That
Affected Uncounted Votes in the 2000 Presidential Election 3 (2001).
332. Id. at 8.
333. Id. at 3. This is consistent with the results from Florida reported in Professor
Schwartz's article. See Schwartz, supra note 119, at 631-40.
334. See Caltech/MIT, supra note 30, at 21, 23. The Caltech/MIT report found the
following residual vote rates in the presidential contests between 1980 and 2000, from
highest to lowest:
Punch Card 2.5%
DRE 2.3
Paper Ballot 1.8
Optical Scan 1.5
Lever Machine 1.5
Id. at 21-22; see also Stephen Ansolabehere, Voting Machines, Race, and Equal
Protection, 1 Election L.J. 61, 63 (2002).
335. Caltech/MIT, supra note 30, at 23.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 19-20. A prior report of the Voting Technology Project supports the
conclusion that the relatively high rate of residual voting with DREs used from 1980
to 2000 are largely due to the first-generation DREs that were predominantly used in
pre-2000 elections. Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Residual Votes
Attributable to Technology 11 (2001), available at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/
-voting/CalTechMITReportVersion2.pdf. According to a March 2001 report, the
residual vote percentages with the four most common systems in 2000 were:
Punch Card
"Votomatic" 3.0%
"Datavote" 1.0
Optically scanned 1.2
Lever Machine 1.7
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Until recently, there was no empirical research disaggregating first-
and second-generation DREs. The Berkeley report, the Caltech/MIT
report, and the GAO report each group DREs together, presumably
because it could not easily be determined from the data whether
jurisdictions were using first- or second-generation equipment. And a
comparison of how different types of DREs fare is still in a relatively
nascent state.
The only available nationwide study to disaggregate different types
of DREs and optical scans is an as yet unpublished analysis by
Professor David Kimball.338  Examining data from the 2002
gubernatorial elections, Professor Kimball found the following
residual vote rates:
Punch Card-Votomatic 3.5%
Punch Card-Datavote 2.8
Paper Ballot 2.3
Lever Machine 2.2
Optical Scan-Central Count 2.0
Optical Scan-Precinct Count 1.3
Older DRE (full-face) 2.2
Newer DRE (touch-screen) 1.2 339
As in other studies, Votomatic-style punch-card voting equipment
performed worst, increasing residual votes by 58% in comparison with
central-count optical-scan ballots.340 The best-performing equipment,
according to Professor Kimball's study, were present-generation
DREs, which reduced residual votes by 41% in comparison to central-
count optical scans.341 By contrast, first-generation DREs performed
Electronic (DRE) 1.6
Paper Ballot 1.7
Id. These results are in line with those found by the Berkeley and GAO studies, and
support the conclusion that the first-generation DREs are largely responsible for the
relatively high level of residual voting with this technology, when elections from 1980
through 2000 are aggregated. Similar results are reported in a more recent study co-
authored by Michael Alvarez, one of the Caltech/MIT VTP's principal co-authors.
Alvarez et al., supra note 21, at 40-41. Examining both national and California data,
Alvarez and his co-authors found that punch cards performed the worst, while
optical-scan and touchscreen equipment had much lower levels of residual votes. Id.
338. See Kimball, supra note 22. Professor Kimball's study examined 1846 counties
out of a total of 2184 that cast votes for governor in 2002. Id. at 11.
339. Id. at 28 tbl. 2. I have omitted the results for "mixed" counties-that is,
counties in which more than one type of equipment is used.
340. Id. at 17-18.
341. Id. at 13-18.
20051 1759
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
worse than other voting equipment -including both central-count
optical scans and lever machines.342
While further research on this question is necessary, Professor
Kimball's analysis highlights the importance of disaggregating
different kinds of equipment within the five general categories
identified above. Conducting further analyses of this nature, in the
2000 election and beyond, is imperative in order to ascertain just how
well each type of equipment performs. But there is at least some
evidence to suggest that present-generation DREs fare considerably
better than earlier models in terms of reducing the number of residual
votes.3
43
2. Race and Voting Technology
Empirical research conducted since the 2000 election has also
examined the racial implications of the use of different voting
technologies.3" There are at least two possible ways in which voting
technology might interact with race.3 4' The first is that voters of
certain racial or ethnic backgrounds may be more likely to reside in
counties using that equipment. Put another way, inferior voting
technology may be disproportionately concentrated in counties with
larger numbers of minorities. The second possibility is that the use of
certain types of voting equipment, such as the punch card, may have a
more severe impact on some voters than others. For example, to the
extent that people with lower educational or income levels have more
difficulty using a certain type of equipment, it may result in a "racial
gap" in uncounted votes. I refer to the first issue as the usage of
voting equipment, and the second as the impact of voting equipment.
Both must be examined, in order to assess whether use of different
voting technologies results in the disproportionate loss of votes among
people of different races or ethnicities.
342. Id. at 18. Professor Kimball also examined changes in residual vote rates
among those counties that changed voting equipment between 2000 and 2002.
Unsurprisingly, he found that counties that abandoned their punch-card equipment
experienced dramatic reductions in their residual vote rates. See id. at 22. Counties
that moved to precinct-count optical-scan or second-generation DRE equipment saw
significant reductions in their residual vote rates. See id. at 21. By contrast, those that
moved from paper ballots, lever machines, or Datavote punch cards to either central-
count optical scans or first-generation DREs actually experienced a slight increase in
residual votes. Id.
343. Id. at 28 tbl. 2.
344. Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 15, at 46-59; see also Justin Buchler et al.,
Punch Card Technology and the Racial Gap in Residual Votes, 2 Persps. On Pol. 517
(2004); Schwartz, supra note 119, at 641; Ford Fessenden, Ballots Cast by Blacks and
Older Voters Were Tossed in Far Greater Numbers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 2001, at A17
(reporting a 10% ballot spoilage rate in predominantly African-American precincts).
345. See Ansolabehere, supra note 334, at 64-67.
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a. The Usage of Voting Technology
On the first question, the available evidence paints a more
complicated picture than has often been supposed. It is not, as some
commentators have asserted,346 unambiguously true that racial
minorities are more likely to use unreliable voting equipment than are
white voters. In his analysis of the 2000 Florida election, Allan
Lichtman found that African-Americans were somewhat more likely
than whites to reside in counties using inferior voting technologies.347
This is not, however, the case within all states.
Nationwide, blacks and whites are almost equally likely to use
punch-card ballots. Relying on 1998 data, Knack and Kropf found
that 31.9% of whites and 31.4% of blacks lived in counties using
punch-card equipment.348 Latinos were more likely to reside in
punch-card counties, with 44.3% doing so in 1998.14' However, they
found that this difference was "entirely attributable" to Los Angeles
County (home to almost one seventh of the nation's Latino voters), 350
which eliminated its punch cards effective March 2004.311 Blacks were
somewhat more likely than whites to use electronic voting equipment,
who were in turn more likely than Latinos to vote electronically.352
Therefore, on a national basis, the racial differences in the usage of
punch-card and electronic voting equipment are fairly small.
3 53
For the purpose of determining whether the usage of different
voting technologies has a racial impact, however, the critical question
is not whether there are nationwide differences in the usage of
different technologies across states. That is because elections, for
346. E.J. Dionne Jr., Back to Florida, Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 2000, at A43; William
Raspberry, Post-Traumatic Suggestions, Wash. Post, Jan. 1, 2001, at A23; Toward
Chad-Free Elections, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 2001, at A20.
347. Lichtman, supra note 104, at 4 (finding that 70% of blacks used punch-card
and central-count optical-scan technologies, as opposed to 64% of non-blacks).
348. Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf, Who Uses Inferior Voting Technology?, 35
PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 541, 544 (2002).
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Jeffrey L. Rabin et al., Glitches Hinder Casting of Votes, L.A. Times, Mar. 3,
2004, at B1 (reporting that Los Angeles County replaced punch cards for March 2004
election).
352. Id.
353. For a similar conclusion, see Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 331, at 12
(finding that "minorities and persons with lower income were not more likely than
others to reside in counties that used punch cards"). Another analysis found some
racial differences in the usage of voting technology. Ansolabehere, supra note 334, at
64-68. Professor Ansolabehere found "no apparent tendency for counties with larger
minority populations to be less likely to use the latest technology [DREs]." Id. at 66
(emphasis added). But he did find that minority voters were more likely to use punch
cards than white voters. Id. at 67. Because counties differ dramatically in population
size, "the likelihood that a county uses a technology may not mirror the likelihood
that a voter uses that technology." Id. at 66. Ansolebehere found that 36% of white
voters used punch cards, while 44% of non-white voters used them. Id. at 67. Overall,
non-white voters were 20% more likely to reside in counties using punch cards. Id.
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President as well as lower offices, are conducted within states rather
than across states. In the presidential race, the Electoral College
system accords a fixed number of votes to each state, which does not
depend on how many valid votes are cast. As Knack and Kropf put it,
"differences in voting technology that are purely cross-state cannot
disadvantage a state's voters relative to other states." '354 What can
disadvantage voters are intrastate differences in the equipment used.
The critical question, then, is whether there are significant racial
differences in the usage of punch cards within particular states, rather
than across the several states.3 5
On this point, the evidence shows that voters of color are more
likely to use inferior voting equipment in some but not all of the
states. Overall, Knack and Kropf found that there were twenty-nine
states in which different types of voting equipment, including punch
cards, were used within the state. In eleven of those states, blacks
were more likely than whites to live in punch-card counties; and in
eight of those states, Latinos were more likely than whites to live in
punch-card counties.356
In some states, the usage of voting equipment shows little variation
across racial and ethnic groups. For example, in Ohio, 74.5% of
whites used punch cards, compared to 73.8% of blacks and 71.2% of
Latinos. s7 But in others, the intrastate racial disparities in equipment
354. See Knack & Kropf, supra note 348, at 545.
355. Professor Ansolabehere suggests that the evidence regarding punch card
usage runs contrary to the equal protection arguments made against this type of
equipment. Ansolabehere, supra note 334, at 65 (stating that lower usage of punch
cards in counties with higher minority populations tends to "run contrary to the
premises" of the California litigation, Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106
(C.D. Cal. 2001), challenging use of punch cards). But the equal protection claim
made in Common Cause and the other ACLU punch-card cases does not depend
upon the existence of racial discrimination. Id. at 1108. Instead, the constitutional
claim rested on the inter-county disparities arising from the use of punch cards in
some counties but not others. Id. at 1107. The other claim made in these cases is that
the use of punch cards, made under section 2 of the VRA, does depend on the racial
disparities arising from the use of punch-card voting equipment. See id. at 1108, 1110.
Section 2 requires a showing that voting practices "result[ ] in" the denial of minority
votes, but not on a showing of intentional discrimination. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973(a)
(LexisNexis 2004). This statutory claim, moreover, relies solely on intra-state
disparities in the usage of punch-card voting equipment. In particular, plaintiffs in
those cases allege that the use of punch cards results in the disproportionate loss of
minority votes. Common Cause, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1108. Thus, the fact that punch
cards are not used with more frequency in predominantly minority counties
nationwide is irrelevant to the race discrimination claims made in those cases. So too,
the existence or nonexistence of intentional discrimination is irrelevant to the section
2 claim.
356. Knack & Kropf, supra note 348, at 545. But see id. (noting also that in eighteen
of twenty-nine states, whites were more likely than blacks to live in punch-card
counties, and that in twenty-one of twenty-nine states whites were more likely to live
in punch-card counties than Latinos).
357. Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf, Who Uses Inferior Voting Technology? 28
tbl. 5 (2001), available at http://unofficial.umkc.edu/kropfm /inferior.pdf.
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usage were pronounced. For example, in California (one of the states
in which race discrimination claims under Section 2 of the VRA were
brought), 80.8% of African-American voters used punch cards,
compared to 58.3% of whites and 66.6% of Latinos.358 In sum, the
evidence shows that there are some intrastate racial disparities in the
usage of voting equipment, though they are far from uniform
nationwide.
b. The Impact of Voting Technology
The second way in which voting technology may result in racial
disparities is if the same equipment results in more lost votes among
some groups than others. On this point, the picture is considerably
clearer. The available evidence shows that certain types of voting
equipment do generate a significant "racial gap," resulting in more
lost votes among non-white voters than among white voters. 359 The
empirical research also shows that some types of voting technology-
including DREs and possibly precinct-count optical scans-can
reduce, if not entirely eliminate, this racial gap.36° In short, when it
comes to racial disparities, the differential usage of voting equipment
is far less important than the differential impact of certain types of
voting equipment on people of different races.
As noted above, Allan Lichtman's study for the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights found an especially strong correlation between race
and residual voting in counties using punch-card and central-count
optical-scan technology.361 Subsequent studies have looked beyond
Florida, examining nationwide data in an attempt to assess the racial
impact of different voting technologies. D.E. "Betsy" Sinclair and R.
Michael Alvarez, for example, examined precinct-level data from Los
Angeles County, and concluded that Latino, African-American, and
Asian-American voters were all more likely to cast residual votes than
white voters.362
Examining data from the 1996 election, Knack and Kropf found
that the level of residual voting tended to rise with the percentage of
358. Id. Although the state-by-state usage of voting equipment is not set forth in
the final version of Knack & Kropf's analysis, they are available in an earlier version.
Id.
359. See infra notes 364-92 and accompanying text.
360. See infra notes 364-92 and accompanying text.
361. Lichtman, supra note 104, at 4; see also Posner, supra note 102, at 20 ("The
choice of some counties of punchcard technology, and of centralized vote counting,
not only hurt Gore but hurt him through disenfranchising a disproportionate
percentage of blacks who were eligible to vote.").
362. D.E. "Betsy" Sinclair & R. Michael Alvarez, Who Overvotes, Who
Undervotes, Using Punchcards? Evidence from Los Angeles County, 57 Pol. Res. 0.
15, 16 (2004); see also John Mintz & Dan Keating, A Racial Gap in Voided Votes,
Wash. Post, Dec. 27, 2000, at Al (reporting that African-American precincts in the
Chicago area, where punch cards are used, had a high rate of residual voting).
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minorities in a county.3 63 However, they also found that "the link
between African American population share and voided ballots
disappears in counties using types of voting technology that can be
programmed to prevent overvoting. '' 3' Knack and Kropf qualified
their analysis, however, to note that because their results were based
only on county-level data, it could not be inferred that minorities were
more likely to have their ballots voided based solely on their results.
3 65
It is possible, at least in theory, that the relatively high rate of residual
voting in counties with large minority populations could be the result
of ballots cast by white voters. Put another way, individual behavior
cannot necessarily be inferred from aggregate results-especially
when those results come from large and heterogeneous populations,
such as those often found at the county level.366
Notwithstanding the limitations of county-level data, other social
scientists have also attempted to use it in order to estimate the degree
to which voting technologies have a differential racial impact.
Professors David Kimball, Chris Owens, and Katherine Keeney
examined unrecorded votes cast in 2895 counties in 2000, and found
results similar to Knack and Kropf's results.3 67 In particular, they
found that DREs, precinct-count, optical-scan, and lever machines
reduced the racial gap as compared to punch cards and central-count
optical scans.316
Two other studies examining county-level data have yielded
somewhat different results. Studies by the GAO and Professor
Ansolabehere both found that counties with higher percentages of
minorities had higher percentages of residual votes.369 The GAO was
careful to qualify its results, by noting that it had examined only
county-level data,370 which as noted above may obscure the racial
impact of voting technology. In addition, both studies attempt to
estimate the racial gap in uncounted votes after controlling for factors
such as education, poverty, and experience voting. But in the real
world, there are differences among racial groups in terms of these
characteristics. Accordingly, controlling for these variables in
363. Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf, Voided Ballots in the 1996 Presidential
Election: A County-Level Analysis, 65 J. Politics 881 (2003).
364. Id. at 882. This is specifically true for DREs and precinct-count optical-scan
equipment. Id. at 892.
365. Id. at 894.
366. Id. Social scientists refer to this problem as the "'ecological fallacy."' Id.
(citation omitted). Nevertheless, although it is theoretically possible that the larger
residual vote rates in high-minority counties are caused by non-minorities, Knack and
Kropf find this explanation "implausible." Id.
367. David C. Kimball et al., Unrecorded Votes and Election Reform, 76 Spectrum
34,34 (2003).
368. Id. at 35.
369. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 331, at 9-11, 12; see also Ansolabehere,
supra note 334, at 64.
370. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 331, at 12.
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conducting a racial analysis may actually obscure the differential
impact of voting equipment given the different characteristics that real
voters actually have.371
In an effort to more carefully study the interaction between race
and voting technology, other studies have undertaken precinct-level
analyses. Rather than simply examining whether there is a correlation
between minority population and residual vote rates across counties,
they have examined the correlation across precincts within counties,
to determine whether residual vote rates tend to increase with the
percentage of minorities. The advantage of this approach is that it
helps deal with the ecological fallacy. In addition, these studies have
presented their results without controlling for education, poverty, or
voter experience. This has the advantage of showing the differential
impact that voting equipment actually has in the real world, given the
varying degrees of white and minority voters' education, poverty, and
voting experience.
In an effort to develop a clearer picture of the relationship between
race and residual voting, Michael Tomz and Robert P. Van
Houweling conducted a precinct-level analysis of voting technology.372
They examined racial disparities arising from the use of different
voting equipment, using precinct-level data from South Carolina and
Louisiana.373 Tomz and Van Houweling found that the incidence of
overvotes with both punch-card and optical-scan equipment increased
with the percentage of African-Americans.374 But when electronic or
lever systems are used, the gap in unintentional nonvoting (in other
words, those residual votes arising from human error rather than the
intent to abstain) disappears almost entirely.375 As Tomz and Van
Houweling explain: "[Tihe black-white gap in voided ballots was
substantially lower with DRE and lever machines than with punch
cards and optical scanners. 376 This may be explained by the error-
correction protection that DREs have to prevent accidental overvotes
and undervotes.377 In South Carolina, one of the states examined in
their studies, the racial gap with punch-card machines was 4.2%, and
with optical scans it was 6.2%.378 With DRE systems, by contrast, the
racial gap dropped to 0.3 %. 31 Overall, "DRE and lever machines cut
[the racial gap in uncounted votes] by a factor of ten."380 Tomz and
371. See Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 15, at 49.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 46.
374. Id. at 47 (citing previous studies finding higher rates of residual voting among
black voters than white voters).
375. Id.
376. Id. at 52.
377. Id. at 48.
378. Id. at 55 tbl. 4.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 58.
2005] 1765
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Van Houweling conclude that the small gap that remains with DRE
and lever machines (which they estimated at 0.3% to 0.7%) may result
from intentional undervoting (choosing not to cast a vote for any
office), which African-Americans tend to do at a slightly higher rate
than whites.38' These findings demonstrate that, when it comes to
eliminating the racial disparity in uncounted votes, DREs do
significantly better than their paper-based counterparts. In fact,
DREs "nearly eliminate the difference between black and white
[vote] invalidation rates. 382
Other studies examining the racial impact of voting technology have
likewise found a significant racial gap arising from the use of some
paper-based voting equipment.383  Research also demonstrates that
the racial gap decreases, in counties that move to electronic voting
technology.38" Less clear is whether the use of precinct-count, optical-
scan equipment can similarly reduce the racial gap in uncounted votes.
Some research tends to show that precinct-count optical scans can
reduce the correlation between race and residual votes.385 But Tomz
and Van Houweling's examination of counties in which precinct-count
optical-scan equipment was used yielded inconsistent results.
386
A variety of explanations have been offered for the racial disparity
in uncounted votes, including socioeconomic status, educational
attainment levels, illiteracy rates, and the quality of poll worker
assistance.387 Some have suggested that African-Americans may be
less likely than whites to obtain assistance, especially in jurisdictions
where there is a history of voter intimidation or harassment.388
Whatever the explanation, there is no question that there is a racial
381. Id.
382. Id. at 59.
383. See, e.g., Buchler et al., supra note 344, at 517 (finding minority voters less
likely than white voters to have their votes recorded correctly with punch cards);
Sinclair & Alvarez, supra note 362, at 24 ("Nonwhites have higher residual vote rates,
especially when they use punchcard voting systems like 'Votomatic."').
384. See Brady et al., supra note 23, at 44 (finding a decrease in residual vote rate in
a county that moved from central-count optical-scan to touchscreen DRE); Kimball
et al., supra note 367, at 35; see also Expert Report of Richard L. Engstrom, Stewart v.
Blackwell, No. 5:02-CV-2028, mem. op. (N.D. Ohio Dec. 14 2003) (on file with
author) (examining four demographically similar Ohio counties and finding that the
one using DREs had significantly fewer uncounted votes than the other three, which
used punch cards).
385. See Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 15, at 49 n.2 (citing studies finding
that "correlation between race and invalidation is substantially weaker where voters
use precinct-counted optical ballots than where they either use punch cards or
centrally counted optical ballots"); see also House Minority Report, supra note 113, at
8 (reporting that the City of Detroit's residual vote rate declined significantly when it
moved from punch cards to central-count optical-scan technology); Brady et al., supra
note 23, at 44 (finding a decrease in the residual vote rate in a county that moved
from punch cards to precinct-count optical scan).
386. Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 15, at 56.
387. Id. at 47.
388. Id.
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gap that results from the use of at least some paper-based voting
technologies.
Technology is not, of course, the only factor that causes higher
residual vote rates among voters of color. Nor can technology
improvements alone be expected to eliminate the racial gap in
uncounted votes.389 The available evidence does, however, indicate
that conversion to electronic voting can considerably reduce the
disparities that arise from the use of some, if not all, paper-based
voting equipment.39
3. Implications of the Empirical Research
The considerable empirical research that has been conducted on
voting technology allows the electronic voting debate to be seen in a
much different light. While the public discourse has largely focused
on the security flaws in electronic voting, this research reveals that
second-generation DREs offer considerable advantages when it
comes to the equality norms defined above.391 Implementation of
DRE voting technology thus advances the norm of inter-jurisdictional
equality that, as noted above, inheres in the Equal Protection
Clause.392
That is not to say that the Fourteenth Amendment commands that
counties move to the best available voting technology, particularly
given the intense disagreement over what the best available
technology is and how it should be measured. As set forth above, the
Equal Protection Clause is most plausibly understood as creating a
norm of inter-jurisdictional equality when it comes to voting
equipment.393 But there is more than one way of achieving this
objective. In fact, the statewide implementation of any type of voting
technology, even the most inaccurate kind, would at least in theory
ensure inter-jurisdictional equality because voters in different counties
would be treated the same. Thus, a state that used punch cards in
some counties but used DREs in other counties could, theoretically,
cure this inter-jurisdictional inequality in one of two ways: (1) all
counties could convert to punch cards, or (2) all counties could
convert to DREs. Few would argue, however, that converting to less
accurate voting equipment is a sensible way of remedying an existing
inter-jurisdictional inequality. Moreover, there can be substantial
inter-county disparities even among counties using the same type of
unreliable equipment, depending upon the demographic
characteristics of those counties. Accordingly, for states using
389. See Lichtman, supra note 104, at 17.
390. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
391. See supra Part II.A.
392. See supra Part II.A.4.
393. See supra Part II.A.4.
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multiple systems, implementation of DRE voting equipment provides
a more plausible means of advancing the norm of inter-jurisdictional
equality than converting to less accurate technology.
Georgia's experience provides a graphic example of how
implementation of DREs can advance this equal protection norm. In
the 2000 election, Georgia employed a hodgepodge of voting
equipment, including punch-card ballots, optical-scan ballots, lever
machines, and hand-counted paper ballots.394 Implementation of
DREs dramatically reduced the number of uncounted votes.395
Statewide, implementation of DRE technology reduced the senatorial
residual vote rate from 4.8% to 0.88%.396 Residual vote rates declined
dramatically in the rural and urban counties that had experienced the
highest rates of over and undervoting in 1998 and 2000."97 The
consequence of Georgia's transition to a uniform DRE system
statewide was therefore to reduce the inter-county disparities in
uncounted votes.
The empirical research also has obvious implications for the norm
of racial equality. The evidence shows that implementation of
electronic voting can considerably reduce the gap in uncounted votes
that paper-based voting equipment tends to produce.39 8 Precinct-level
studies leave little doubt that, from the perspective of racial equality,
DREs are superior to both punch-cards and central-count optical-scan
systems. 99 Accordingly, the norm of racial equality as well as the
norm of inter-jurisdictional equality supports the implementation of
electronic voting or precinct-count optical-scan systems.
C. Technology and Accessibility
In addition to advancing the goals of racial equality and inter-
jurisdictional equality, present-generation DRE technology also offers
significant advantages over paper-based voting equipment from the
perspective of disability and multilingual access. While there has been
relatively little empirical research on the accessibility benefits of
different voting technology,0 ° DREs provide accessibility features
that are not available with other types of equipment.4 1
394. Cox, supra note 142.
395. Id.; see Letter from Representative Robert W. Ney, to Howard Dean,
Governor of Vermont (July 13, 2004), available at
http://www.house.gov/cha/neyrespo.pdf.
396. Cox, supra note 142.
397. Id.
398. See id.
399. See supra notes 375-89 and accompanying text.
400. HAVA calls for the EAC and NIST to conduct such research. 42 U.S.C.S. §§
15381(a)(1), 15383 (LexisNexis 2004).
401. See supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text. Because lever machines are no
longer manufactured and paper ballots are ill-suited to all but the smallest counties, I
focus on the other three types of machines in the discussion that follows.
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From a disability access perspective, contemporary DRE voting
machines offer significant advantages. Most important among these
advantages is that they allow a secret and independent ballot for
people with disabilities.4 2 Until now, people with disabilities have
been forced to rely on friends, relatives, or poll workers to mark their
ballots for them. 43  Voters relate stories of those third parties
questioning their choices and even attempting to persuade them to
change their minds.4 °4 To the extent that casting a secret ballot is
considered an integral component of the right to vote, the failure to
allow secret voting by people with disabilities raises serious equality
concerns.
Disability access to the vote may also affect the results of elections.
A nationwide Harris poll conducted in 2000 revealed that people with
disabilities were 20% less likely to vote than able-bodied
Americans. 40 The same poll also revealed that people with
disabilities favored then-Vice President Gore over then-Governor
Bush by an 18% margin.40 6 If the turnout for people with disabilities
had been equivalent to that of non-disabled voters, then Al Gore
would likely have carried Florida and won the election.4 7
As I have previously stated, electronic voting technology can help
accommodate voters with at least three different types of disabilities:
(1) visual impairments, (2) cognitive impairments, and (3) manual
dexterity limitations.4 8 Several DRE models now on the market have
an audio capacity for those who are blind or have visual
impairments.40  This capacity may also allow independent voting by
those with cognitive impairments that prevent them from reading.
Some DRE systems also have devices such as a "sip and puff tube" or
"jelly switch" that allow people with manual dexterity impairments to
cast votes independently."' They may also be positioned in order to
402. See Michael Waterstone, Civil Rights and the Administration of Elections-
Toward Secret Ballots and Polling Place Access, 8 J. Gender Race & Just. 101, 104
(2004) (arguing that federal voting rights laws should be interpreted to protect the
right of disabled citizens to vote "in the same manner as their fellow citizens").
403. See id. at 107.
404. Id. at 107-08.
405. Wis. Coalition for Advocacy, Disability Considerations in the Help America
Vote Act (2004), available at www.nls.org/conf2004/hava.htm.
406. Id.
407. Id. This assumes that Florida's disabled voters turned out at the same rate as
did disabled voters nationally, and that Florida's disabled voters favored Gore over
Bush by the same margin as disabled voters nationally.
408. Feldman & Hyman, supra note 16, at ii-iv, 28-32, 33-34.
409. See id. at 6-34 (describing features of currently available DRE systems); Gen.
Accounting Office, Voters with Disabilities: Access to Polling Places and Alternative
Voting Methods 30 (2001); Waterstone, supra note 247, at 362.
410. See Paul S. Herrnson et al., Characteristics of Contemporary Voting Machines
(2003), available at
http://www.capc.umd.edu/rpts/md-evote-ContempVotingMach.pdf.
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accommodate people with mobility impairments.41' Finally, they can
be taken outside the polling place for "curbside voting" by those who
cannot enter their local polling place, or even to voters' homes.412
Paper-based voting systems, by contrast, do not have an audio
capacity, thereby preventing people with visual impairments or those
who cannot read from voting independently. Both punch-card and
optical-scan systems require that voters be able to hold an object
(either a stylus or a pencil) to punch or mark the ballot, preventing
people with manual dexterity impairments from voting independently.
And paper-based systems may also be more difficult for those with
mobility impairments, such as people in wheelchairs, since they
require the ability to reach the stylus or pencil and the ballot device413
HAVA recognizes the superiority of DRE systems when it comes
to accommodating people with disabilities. As noted above, the law
requires that each jurisdiction provide one DRE unit "or other voting
system equipped for individuals with disabilities" by January 1,
2006. 4 ' And as of January 1, 2007, any new equipment purchased
with Title II funds must be accessible to people with disabilities.415
Optical-scan systems do not, as a general rule, allow independent
voting by people with disabilities.4 16 Braille ballots are one option, but
their capacity to improve accessibility is limited because it is believed
only about 10% of people who are blind read Braille.417 There is a
system relying on tactile ballots and audiotapes to accommodate
visually impaired voters.418 While this system, at least in theory,
411. Feldman & Hyman, supra note 16, at 6.
412. Hollister Bundy, Election Reform, Polling Place Accessibility, and the Voting
Rights of the Disabled, 2 Election L.J. 217, 218 (2003); see also Feldman & Hyman,
supra note 16, at 27 (describing accessibility features of different DRE models,
including whether they allow curbside voting).
413. See Disability Rights Educ. and Def. Fund, Guide to Voting Equipment
Usability for People with Disabilities, at
http://www.dredf.org/voting/voting-guide.html (2003).
414. 42 U.S.C.S § 15481(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2004). Jurisdictions could comply with
HAVA's mandate by moving to a dual system in which one type of equipment is
provided for people with disabilities and another is provided to able-bodied voters.
As a policy matter, it is dubious whether jurisdictions should implement dual voting
systems designating one machine for disabled people and another for all others. It is
likely to arouse resentment on the part of non-disabled voters, and will also prevent
multiple disabled voters from voting at the same polling place at the same time.
415. 42 U.S.C.S. § 15481(a)(3)(C).
416. Herrnson et al., supra note 410, at 4-10 (listing features of optical-scan and
DRE voting equipment, including accessibility features); see also Am. Ass'n of People
with Disabilities v. Hood, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (describing
non-accessible, optical-scan equipment purchased by Duval County, Florida).
417. Feldman & Hyman, supra note 16, at v; see also Gen. Accounting Office,
supra note 409, at 36.
418. See Waterstone, supra note 247, at 363. The equipment relies on raised dots
that voters feel in order to make their choices. See Global Initiative to Enfranchise
People with Disabilities, Best Practices, Ballot Templates, at
http://www.electionaccess.org/Bp/Ballot-Templates.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2005)
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allows people with visual disabilities to vote independently, it is time
consuming and does not allow them to verify that they have marked
their ballots correctly.4 19 One voting equipment vendor, however, is
now marketing a machine that it advertises as allowing people with
visual and manual impairments to mark ballots independently.4 20 This
system is best thought of as a hybrid between a DRE and optical scan.
Disabled voters would make their choices through a DRE-like device;
the machine would then print a paper ballot, to be read by an optical
scanner.4 21 Although a promising technology, this equipment has yet
to be implemented in any actual election.
From the standpoint of language access, DREs may also provide
significant advantages over their paper-based rivals, although there is
a pressing need for further research on this subject. DREs can
accommodate multiple languages with relative ease.422 As with an
ATM, the voter may simply select the language in which he or she
wishes to vote at the start of the voting process. The advantage of
DREs, in comparison with other systems, is that they allow the non-
English proficient voter to cast his or her vote secretly and
independently, without relying on assistance from a poll worker or
other third party.4 23 With precinct-count, optical-scan equipment, by
contrast, the voter may need assistance from a poll worker in
determining how to place the ballot through the counter and in
determining what should be done, in the event that the counter
indicates that there has been an overvote or undervote.424
The opportunity to vote independently can be especially valuable in
jurisdictions where immigrant voters may be subject to harassment,
intimidation, or simply less-than-hospitable treatment from those
working the polls. It may also be useful in those jurisdictions in which
there are an inadequate number of poll workers who speak the native
language of non-English proficient voters.
(describing how to use tactile ballots); Election News, Voting Gets Easier for Blind
Electors, at http://www.lgcnet.com/pages/products/elections/mar12.htm (Mar. 22,
2001).
419. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 409, at 35-36; see also Disability Rights
Educ. and Def. Fund, supra note 413 ("Voters who are blind or have vision
limitations that interfere with their ability to read cannot use this voting method
[optical scan] either independently or privately.").
420. The machine, the "Automark," is being marketed by ES&S. See ES&S
Automark, Products and Services, at
http://www.essvote.com/HTML/products/automark.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
421. Id.
422. League of Women Voters, Questions and Answers on Direct Record
Electronic (DRE) Voting Systems and the Proposal to Require a Voter-Verified
Paper Trail (VVPT) (June 2004), available at
http://www.lwv.org/joinelections/HAVA-QAonDRE.pdf.
423. See id.
424. See also Disability Rights Educ. and Def. Fund, supra note 413 (describing
precinct- and central-count optical-scan voting, and noting that optical-scan voting
does not allow secret and independent voting for people with disabilities).
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In addition, DRE systems would make it more economical for
counties to provide multilingual access in situations where they would
not be required to do so because DRE systems avoid the costs
associated with printing ballots in multiple languages. If, for example,
a voting jurisdiction is just below the 5% or 10,000 voter threshold
under the VRA, concerned citizens may still ask that the county
exceed its minimum obligations under the VRA. This is particularly
appropriate in a case where a language minority group, such as Thai
speakers, is geographically concentrated within a part of the county.
Under these circumstances, it would be much easier for counties using
DRE systems to exceed their VRA obligations by providing language
accessibility, than it would be for counties using paper-based systems
to do the same. DREs avoid the higher printing costs that would be
required to provide dual or multi-language ballots with paper-based
systems.
That is not to say that jurisdictions that choose to use paper-based
voting equipment would be in violation of section 203. It is certainly
possible to comply with the mandates of the VRA and HAVA with
the implementation of optical-scan ballots. But in terms of promoting
the goal of providing equal access to disabled and non-English
proficient voters, then, DREs may offer significant advantages.
D. Tallying the Results
The evidence identified above allows for a qualitative comparison
of different voting technologies to be made in terms of each of the
four equality norms identified above.4 25 The chart below assesses the
performance of punch cards, central-count optical scans, precinct-
count optical scans, first-generation DREs, and second-generation
DREs, according to each of these norms.4 26 A "+" is used to indicate
that the technology performs well in this area, and a "-" to indicate
relatively poor performance.4 7
425. See supra Part II.A.
426. Hand-counted paper ballots, lever machines, and Datavotes are omitted due
to the limitations of these technologies, which makes jurisdictions unlikely to move to
them.
427. "Accuracy" is used as shorthand for the goal of avoiding unintentional
residual votes. As noted above, this is different from the goal of inter-jurisdictional
equality, which can at least theoretically be achieved through the implementation of
any type of voting technology, including ones that are inaccurate. But to the extent
that there are differences in accuracy among different types of equipment used within
a state, conversion to the more accurate form of equipment provides the more
plausible means of remedying this inequality.
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Race Disability Language Accuracy
Punch Card .CC-OS .... ____
PC-OS + + -
Old DRE + - - -
New DRE + + +
This chart is necessarily rough, particularly given the need for
further research on the accessibility features of different voting
equipment. It nevertheless captures the fact that, as set forth in the
preceding discussion, present-generation DREs offer significant
benefits from an equality perspective, in comparison to their paper-
based rivals.4 28 Newer DREs and precinct-count optical-scan systems
both appear to perform well, in terms of reducing undervotes and
overvotes.429 Both these systems may also reduce the racial gap in
uncounted votes, although the evidence on precinct-count optical
scans is somewhat ambiguous.43° When it comes to promoting
disability access, DREs appear to fare better than any paper-based
technology. They also have the potential to improve language access.
There is unquestionably a pressing need for further research on
how different voting technologies perform with respect to each of
these norms, particularly disability access and multi-language access.431
This must include an assessment of how people interact with the
technology in real world election environments. Nevertheless, the
information presently available indicates that, from the perspective of
promoting equality, electronic voting enjoys considerable advantages
over existing paper-based technology.
III. SECURITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND ELECTRONIC VOTING
Equality is a central consideration in assessing different voting
technology. But it is not the only consideration. This part considers
two other democratic values that should also be taken into account in
considering voting technologies: security and transparency. It
summarizes the concerns of those who have been most critical of
428. See supra Parts II.B-II.C.
429. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
430. See Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 15, at 49 n.2, 52 (finding the black-
white gap to be substantially higher with electronic and lever machines than with
punch card and optical-scan system, but noting other studies finding that precinct-
count optical-scan reduces gap).
431. Paul Herrnson and his colleagues with the Center for American Politics and
Citizenship are currently undertaking a project, funded by the National Science
Foundation, to test the usability of DRE and optical-scan voting equipment, including
their accessibility features. See Ctr. for Am. Politics and Citizenship, Univ. of Md.,
Research on Voting Technology and Ballot Design, at
http://www.capc.umd.edu/rpts/VotingTech-par.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
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existing DRE technology, as well as the analyses that have been
conducted of security vulnerabilities. I then consider the
vulnerabilities of paper-based voting, in an effort to provide a
comparative perspective on the relative risks associated with different
technologies. I conclude that, while there are legitimate reasons to be
concerned about the implementation of DRE voting, paper should
not be considered the gold standard. In particular, it is questionable
whether adding printers to DRE machines is either a workable or
effective solution to the vulnerabilities that exist.
A. The Risks of Electronic Voting
1. Two More Democratic Values
In addition to equality, two other democratic values also warrant
attention in comparing different types of voting technology. The first
is security, which I use here to mean the resistance of votes and vote
totals to fraud and other forms of manipulation. This value
encompasses a set of related concerns that have been raised about
present-generation DRE technology. These include the possibility
that malicious code could be inserted into the software to alter the
results of an election, that DRE units could be subjected to attacks on
the day of the election, and that the vote tallies could be manipulated
at the central counting location.432 Recent allegations that votes were
mysteriously added to George W. Bush's 2004 vote totals in Florida
counties using electronic voting have given further fuel to these
concerns.43 3 Although these allegations were debunked almost as
quickly as they emerged,434 serious concerns regarding the security of
electronic voting remain.
The second value is transparency, by which I mean the technology's
capacity to produce auditable results, in which both candidates and
voters can justifiably have confidence.435 This value is related to
432. Michael Ian Shamos, Paper v. Electronic Voting Records-An Assessment §
1.2, at http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/people/faculty/mshamos/paper.htm (April 2004).
433. Michael Hout et al., Working Paper: The Effect of Electronic Voting
Machines on Change in Support for Bush in the 2004 Florida Elections, at
http://ucdata.berkeley.edu/new-web[VOTE2004/election04 -WP.pdf (last visited Jan.
17, 2005) (asserting that between 130,000 and 260,000 votes were added to Bush's
total in Florida counties using electronic voting machines in 2004).
434. B.D. McCullough & Florenz Plassmann, Nat'l Res. Comm'n on Elections and
Voting, A Partial Critique of Hout, Mangels, Carlson and Best's "The Effect of
Electronic Voting Machines on Change in Support for Bush in the 2004 Florida
Elections," at http://election04.ssrc.org/research/critique-of-hmcb.pdf. (Dec. 2, 2004).
435. A national survey of public attitudes found mixed views when it comes to the
integrity of electronic voting. Thad E. Hall & R. Michael Alvarez, Center for Pub.
Pol'y & Admin. Univ. of Utah, American Attitudes About Electronic Voting:
Results of a National Survey (Sept. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/fall04survey.pdf. Of those surveyed, 38.3% said
they were most comfortable with electronic voting, while 29.5% report that they are
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security, insofar as a system that allows for effective auditing will be
less vulnerable to tampering. I categorize it as a distinct democratic
value to emphasize its importance not only for a voting system to be
resistant to manipulation, but also for the polity to have assurance
that elections are conducted on the square. It is at least theoretically
possible to have a system that is in fact resistant to fraud and error,
but which nevertheless fails to provide assurances to citizens that their
votes were accurately counted, resulting in a loss of public confidence.
2. Identifying Vulnerabilities
Much has been said about the security of electronic voting
technology over the past two years. The concerns arise from the fact
that, with contemporary DRE machines, the voter does not see an
actual paper ballot but instead an electronic representation of that
ballot.436 The ballot itself is stored in redundant internal locations
within the DRE.437 In this respect, DREs are similar to lever
machines, in which voting requires moving "counters" that are not
visible to the voter.438 The difference is that DREs are much more
complicated, relying on complex software that only sophisticated
technical analysts are capable of understanding. Some have argued
that this would make it easier to insert malicious software, such as a
so-called Trojan Horse, that could alter election results while escaping
detection.439
When addressing the security of DRE voting technology, it is
important at the outset to identify and differentiate the specific risks
that exist." The Hopkins Report 4" and subsequent studies have
identified three general areas in which present-generation DREs may
be vulnerable to fraud or other forms of manipulation."2
a. Insertion of Malicious Code
The first area of vulnerability, which has received the most intensive
scrutiny from the technical community, is the code upon which DREs
rely. The Hopkins Report itself was based solely upon source code
most comfortable with paper-based optical-scan voting. Id. at 8. Only 18.4% said they
were most comfortable with punch cards. Id. Another survey found that three-
quarters of voters have "confidence" or "significant confidence" in the security and
reliability of electronic voting, while one-quarter have "little" or "no confidence."
Dr. Larry Ponemon, E-Voting Trust Survey: Political Party Affiliation Differences 3
(Aug. 8, 2004) (unpublished survey; Ponemon Institute) (on file with author).
436. Fischer, supra note 27, at 5.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 5-6, 13.
440. Shamos, supra note 432, § 1.2 ("It is pointless to discuss the security of a
computer system in the absence of a well-articulated list of threats.").
441. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
442. See The Century Found. & Electionline.org, supra note 175, at 13.
2005] 1775
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
for Diebold's TS voting machine, which was left on an open website.4"
The study's analysis concluded that the code had serious flaws that
could permit tampering by software developers and others. 4 The
study made certain assumptions (some of which turned out to be
incorrect) about how the system would be operated in actual
elections." 5  It nevertheless generated considerable concern that a
machine manufacturer or software developer could deliver software
to the jurisdiction that is programmed to switch votes to a favored
candidate.446
In theory, the software could be programmed to correctly display to
voters their choices, but record their choices differently. For a voter
intending to vote for Bush, for example, the screen that appears at the
end of the voting process would display the voter's intended choice,
but could be programmed to switch every fifth Bush vote to a Kerry
vote in the redundant internal memory. Due to the length of the
source code, some technologists argue, such malicious code might not
be detected before an election." 7 Some have warned that malicious
source code might be hidden to avoid detection even after an
election. 448  Through this means, some computer scientists
hypothesize, an election could be "stolen" without anyone knowing
it.449
b. Attacks on Individual Machines at the Polling Place
The second category of vulnerability is that individual DRE units
could be subjected to an attack, before or during an election. 5 ° This
was one of the principal vulnerabilities upon which the Hopkins
Report focused. Such an attack could be as crude as taking a
sledgehammer to the voting machine or, somewhat more plausibly,
attempting to open the machine by force.45'
An attack on individual machines might also be accomplished
through more subtle means. As noted above, present-generation
DREs are typically activated by inserting a credit card-sized
"smartcard" into the voting unit, which in turn causes an image of the
ballot to be displayed upon the screen.452 The Hopkins Report raised
the possibility that voters could "homebrew" smartcards and use them
443. Kohno et al., supra note 77, at 4.
444. Id. at 21.
445. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., Risk Assessment Report: Diebold AccuVote-TS
Voting System and Processes III (Sept. 2, 2003) [hereinafter SAIC Report].
446. Shamos, supra note 432, § 1.2(4).
447. See Fischer, supra note 27, at 13.
448. See Shamos, supra note 432, § 1.2(4).
449. Id.
450. Id. § 1.2(2).
451. Id. § 1.2(1).
452. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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in the voting terminal . 3 This would, in theory, allow the attacker to
cast multiple votes without detection.454
The report also raised the possibility that an attacker could
homebrew "administrator" cards, which would give access to the
unit's controls.455 This would allow the attacker to incapacitate the
machine and, again theoretically, shut down polling places. While
access to administrative controls requires a personal identification
number ("PIN"), the Hopkins Report asserted that this number could
easily be ascertained by anyone who knew the system's protocol.456
c. Tampering with Election Results
The third area of vulnerability is on the back-end of elections, after
the votes have been cast but before they are tallied. The Hopkins
Report suggested that votes stored on individual DRE units would be
transmitted from the polling place to a central location over a network
connection or through the internet.457 The report identified the
possibility that an attacker might "inject fake votes to a back-end
tabulating authority by impersonating a legitimate voting terminal.
4 58
By so doing, the attacker could either alter existing votes or create
new ones.459 Thus, even though the vote was correctly recorded by the
machine, erroneous votes might be transmitted to the jurisdiction's
central counting location, thereby resulting in alteration of the
election results.460
3. Analyzing Vulnerabilities
The source code used by DREs is, of course, only one component
of the machine. Moreover, the machine itself is just one component
of the larger election system within which it operates. An analysis of
the security risks with DREs (or, for that matter, any other voting
technology) therefore cannot be understood in isolation from this
system, of which the hardware and software is only a part.461
In July 2003, the California Secretary of State released a task force
report, which found that "in theory, there is a possibility of a security
threat with DRE voting equipment. 462  While the task force was
unanimous in finding that there was "no proven instance of such an
attempt at fraud" in the years that DRE equipment had been in use,
453. Kohno et al., supra note 77, at 9-10.
454. Id. at 10.
455. Id. at 10-11.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 12.
458. Id. at 15.
459. Id.
460. See Shamos, supra note 432, § 1.2(3).
461. See Saltman, supra note 71, at 3.
462. Shelley, supra note 17, at 18.
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some members of the task force believed that there was a high risk of
attack.46 3  The task force report included a number of
recommendations on how DRE security should be improved.4" It
recommended that some sort of voter-verified audit trail should be
required for machines purchased as of 2007. However, the task force
majority did not recommend that a voter-verifiable paper audit trail
be required, recognizing instead that there might be other means by
which to audit election results, and thereby ensure transparency.465
Prompted by the Hopkins Report, Maryland commissioned Science
Applications International Corporation ("SAIC") to conduct a risk
assessment report of Maryland's Diebold AccuVote TS system (the
"SAIC Report"). 466 SAIC found that many of the statements made in
the Hopkins Report were technically correct, but that its authors
lacked a thorough understanding of the environment in which the
equipment was to be implemented.467 In particular, the Hopkins
Report did not take into account the procedural controls followed in
running a real-life election.4 68 The Hopkins Report also raised the
possibility that "voting terminals could potentially communicate over
insecure phone lines, '469 when in fact the DRE units in Maryland are
not attached to the network.470 Notwithstanding the counterfactual
assumptions of the Hopkins Report's analysis, the SAIC report found
several flaws in the Diebold system. 471 It also recommended a number
of measures to reduce the security risks associated with the Diebold
system.
472
463. Id.
464. Among the California task force's recommendations were: (1) improvement
of federal testing standards and procedures, (2) enhancement of the state certification
process, (3) random audits of machines to check the software code, (4) parallel testing
of machines, (5) improved logic and accuracy testing, (6) tightly controlling system
software, (7) requiring background checks of vendors, and (8) providing a "review
screen" on all DREs for voters to check their votes. Id. at 30-36.
465. Id. at 36-46.
466. SAIC Report, supra note 445.
467. Id. at 9; see also RABA Innovative Solution Cell, Trusted Agent Report:
Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System 7-9 (Jan. 20, 2004) [hereinafter RABA Report].
468. For example, the Hopkins Report expressed concern about the possibility that
smartcards used to operate DRE machines would be sent through the mail, which
they are not. SAIC Report, supra note 445, at B-6; see also id. at III ("The State of
Maryland procedural controls and general voting environment reduce or eliminate
many of the vulnerabilities identified in the Rubin report."). After working as a poll
worker in a Maryland county, one of the Hopkins Report's principal co-authors has
since acknowledged that using homebrewed smartcards to cast multiple votes is
unlikely to occur without being detected, given the procedures followed there. See
Avi Rubin, My Experience As an Election Judge in Baltimore County, at
http://avirubin.com/judgel.html (Mar. 2, 2004).
469. Kohno et al., supra note 77, at 4.
470. SAIC Report, supra note 445, at 9.
471. Id. at III.
472. Id. at IV-V. The recommendations included: (1) bringing the system into
compliance with existing state security standards, (2) applying cryptographic
protocols to protect vote tally transmissions, (3) establishing a formal process for the
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Maryland subsequently commissioned a second report, authored by
RABA technologies ("RABA Report"). 473 For the RABA Report, a
"red team" of computer experts were given access to DRE voting
units and allowed to experiment with a variety of attack scenarios.474
This report thus focuses on the second type of security vulnerabilities
identified above.475 Like the SAIC Report, the RABA Report found
that Diebold's DRE system was subject to several vulnerabilities,
including: (1) duplication of smartcards and supervisor cards, (2)
opening up the machines to access the hardware and software
components used to register votes, (3) removal of the memory card
used to record voters' cast ballots, and (4) using a disabled access card
to "crash" a DRE terminal.4 76 The RABA Report also identified
vulnerabilities in the software used to collect and tally precinct
results.477
The likelihood of such an attack in an actual election nevertheless
remains the subject of intense disagreement. This is partly because
the RABA Report, while avoiding the mistaken assumptions set forth
in the earlier Hopkins Report, had an open access to DRE machines
that is unlikely-if not impossible-in a real election if proper
procedures are followed.478
In a paper assessing the relative risks of paper and electronic voting
records, Professor Michael Shamos of Carnegie Mellon University's
computer science department examines each of the three categories
479
of security vulnerabilities identified above.480 He concludes that while
the hypothesized threats are not beyond the realm of possibilities,
precautions can be taken-and at least in some cases are already
being taken-that considerably lessen the likelihood of their
occurrence.4" Thorough testing of both hardware and software can
decrease the likelihood of malicious sources being used to alter
votes. 482 Professor Shamos also notes that contemporary DREs store
ballot images both within the machine and on redundant memories, in
individual modules that can be transported.483 For this reason, an
attack on the transmission of data from precincts to a central-count
review of audit trails, (4) conducting security awareness training and education for
election officials, (5) changing default passwords, (6) verifying that the certified
version of the software is loaded before implementation, and (7) developing an
integrated set of policies for all jurisdictions. Id.
473. RABA Report, supra note 467.
474. Id. at 16.
475. Id.
476. Id. at 16-20.
477. Id. at 20-22.
478. See Rubin, supra note 468.
479. See supra Part III.A.2. (identifying the three categories).
480. Shamos, supra note 432, § 1.2.
481. Id. §§ 3.1-3.6.
482. Id. §§ 1.4, 3.5.
483. Id. § 1.2(3).
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location is unlikely to be successful, given that the electronic ballots
are already sorted in redundant locations.484 While no one suggests
the use of DREs is free from risk, procedural safeguards can reduce
the possibility of attacks occurring in real world elections.
At the same time, the lack of auditing transparency creates a
legitimate concern.485 Even if the machines are resistant to fraud and
other forms of manipulation, it is important that voters be provided
with reasonable assurance that their votes will be counted accurately.
This does not mean that they must understand the inner workings of
the machine. If that were the standard, then no system ever
developed would be satisfactory because voters may well be
unfamiliar with precisely how voting systems operate. For example,
prior to the 2000 election, it is doubtful that many citizens had much
understanding of the process by which votes are counted. What it
does mean is that the voting system should be reasonably open to
public scrutiny, so that the process through which votes are cast and
counted remains accountable to the citizenry.
B. Is Paper the Answer?
The flurry of attention to DRE security has caused many advocates
to call for a "voter-verified paper audit trail," prompting bills to
mandate this device in both the House and the Senate.486 HAVA
already requires that voting machines produce a permanent paper
record that can be used in the case of manual audits. 487 The new
legislation, however, would go further, requiring attached printers that
would generate a paper replica of the electronic ballot at the time of
voting-the contemporaneous paper record-which the voter could
review before casting his or her vote.
While the goals of security and transparency are vital, it is
questionable whether the contemporaneous paper record is a
workable or effective solution to the legitimate concerns that exist
regarding present-generation DRE technology. As set forth below,
there are three problems with the argument to require a
contemporaneous paper record. First, it relies on the false assumption
that paper-based systems are inherently more accurate and reliable
than paperless ones. Second, it disregards both long and recent
experience demonstrating the vulnerability of paper-based systems to
fraud and error. Third, it fails to comprehend the practical problems
in actually implementing a system that is capable of printing out a
484. Id.
485. Caltech/MIT, supra note 30, at 45-47.
486. Restore Elector Confidence in Our Representative Democracy Act of 2004, S.
2313, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004); Voter Confidence and Increased Availability Act of
2003, H.R. 2239, 108th Cong. § 4 (2004).
487. 42 U.S.C.S. § 15481(a)(2)(B) (LexisNexis 2004).
1780 [Vol. 73
THE PAPERLESS CHASE
contemporaneous paper record, yet preserves voter privacy and
election security.
1. A Comparative Perspective
What has largely been missing from the voting technology debate is
a comparative assessment of the relative risks and benefits of different
voting technologies. Just as the public discourse has largely
overlooked the comparative benefits of DREs, in terms of advancing
voting equality, it has also failed to examine the comparative risks of
DREs compared with paper-based systems.
A published opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit properly recognizes the importance of a comparative analysis
when considering the risks of voting technology. In Weber v. Shelley,
the court rejected a constitutional challenge to the use of DRE
equipment that did not generate a contemporaneous paper record.488
In support of the argument that paperless DREs denied her voting
rights, the plaintiff submitted declarations from leading supporters of
the contemporaneous paper record requirement.489 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff had raised "at most a hypothetical concern
about the ability to audit and verify election results.""49 Completely
absent from the plaintiff's evidentiary case, including her expert
declarations, was any indication that the paperless DRE was
"inherently less accurate, or produces a vote count that is inherently
less verifiable, than other systems." '491 What was missing, in other
words, is any evidence showing that DREs are comparatively less
accurate or reliable than other systems. The opinion proceeded to
note that no voting system is perfect, and that the "unfortunate reality
is that the possibility of electoral fraud can never be completely
eliminated, no matter what type of ballot is used." '492
That is not, of course, to say that paperless electronic systems are
without risks. In arguing that DRE voting technology should be
required to generate a contemporaneous paper record, DRE skeptics
have pointed to a number of problems that have emerged in the
implementation of electronic voting. These include: (1) voters being
given incorrectly coded smartcards, causing the wrong ballot to be
brought up on the screen, (2) the machine used to encode smartcards
not functioning properly and thereby causing delays in polls opening,
and (3) discrepancies between the number of voters signing in at the
polling place and the number of ballots recorded.493
488. Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003).
489. Id. at 1105.
490. Id. at 1103.
491. Id. at 1105.
492. Id. at 1106.
493. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. at 3-8,
Stewart v. Blackwell, No. 5:02CV-2028 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2004) (itemizing alleged
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The significance of the problems that have occurred in the
implementation of DRE systems should not be minimized. At the
same time, such difficulties in the implementation of voting
technology must be distinguished from the concerns of attacks upon
the machines (for example, through the insertion of malicious source
code). Requiring a contemporaneous paper record would do nothing
to address the implementation difficulties that have marred the
introduction of electronic voting in some jurisdictions. Moreover, as
explained below, it is far from clear that adding paper to the voting
process would effectively address the security vulnerabilities of DRE
voting technology.
2. Historical Problems with Paper
Even the most vigorous critics of DRE technology acknowledge
that paper ballots are susceptible to manipulation.494 As Professor
Shamos notes, "[e]very form of paper ballot that has ever been
devised can and has been manipulated, in general with considerable
ease." 495 Fraudulent manipulation of paper ballots stretches back to
the use of hand-counted paper ballots.496
Among the most famous voting incidents of the last century was
Lyndon B. Johnson's 1948 election to the U.S. Senate. Several days
after the election, in what was still a neck-and-neck race, 203
additional votes (202 of them cast for Johnson) were found, giving the
election to Johnson by a margin of eighty-seven votes statewide.497
The court reports, history books, and newspapers are filled with
similar accounts of paper ballots being manipulated. While the
following list is not intended to be comprehensive, it illustrates the
types of problems that have occurred with paper ballots:
In Ex parte Siebold, an 1879 Supreme Court decision, the Court
let stand fraud convictions for placing extra ballots in a ballot box
during the 1878 Maryland congressional election.4 98
incidents with electronic voting), available at http://www.eff.org/Activism!E-voting/;
Election 2004 E-Voting Incidents from the Election Incident Reporting System,
available at http://verifiedvoting.org/article.php?id=5331 (last visited Jan. 18, 2005)
(summarizing reported problems with electronic voting in 2004 election).
494. See Schade v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, No. C-04-97297, mem. op. at 3 (Md.
Sept. 1, 2004) (describing agreement of experts from both sides in a DRE challenge
that "the use of paper ballots is the least accurate of all systems and lends itself to the
most chicanery"). For a compilation of anecdotal evidence of election fraud with
both electronic and paper-based voting systems, see John Fund, Stealing Elections:
How Voter Fraud Threatens Our Democracy (2004).
495. Shamos, supra note 432, § 2.3.
496. In New York City's 1844 election, for example, some 55,000 people cast
ballots, despite the fact that its entire voting pool consisted of 41,000 people. Larry J.
Sabato & Glenn R. Simpson, Dirty Little Secrets: The Persistence of Corruption in
American Politics 276 (1996).
497. Id. at 278.
498. Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
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In a 1937 decision by a federal district court in Missouri,
testimony revealed that clerks and judges had altered more than one
hundred ballots in a Kansas City precinct. 99
The U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Saylor upheld
convictions arising from the 1942 Kentucky senatorial election for
tearing unvoted ballots from the official ballot book and stub book,
and inserting the false votes into the ballot box.5 °
Court decisions during the 1970s report ballot recount ballot-box
stuffing in various states, including West Virginia, New Hampshire,
and Illinois.
50 1
Chicago's 1982 mayoral race, during which there were over one
hundred incidents of voting irregularities, including ballot spoilage,
pre-marked ballots, disparities in the number of votes cast, double
voting, and election judges punching straight party tickets before
voting.
2
In Philadelphia's 1993 election for a state senatorial seat,
fraudulent absentee ballots were cast by one side's campaign,
including 600 absentee ballots cast after the deadline by people who
were not registered. °3
During a 1994 election for Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court, ballot boxes were missing, seals on vote containers had been
broken, and ballot boxes were left open in unwatched public
rooms.
504
Nor can security breaches with paper-based voting be dismissed as a
thing of the past. Even aside from Florida's experience in the 2000
election, numerous incidents of fraud or error with paper ballots have
been reported in the past four years:
In New Mexico's 2000 presidential vote, some 252 early-voting
ballots were reported missing and another 1300 to 1600 "'damaged
votes"' were rejected because of stray marks or other problems.
499. United States v. Clark, 19 F. Supp. 972, 973 (W.D. Mo. 1937).
500. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
501. United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 1077, 1079 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 689 (4th Cir. 1973); New Hampshire v. Perry, 309 A.2d 908,
908 (N.H. 1973); In re W. Bernard Smith, 206 S.E.2d 920, 922 (W. Va. 1974).
502. The Need for Further Federal Action in the Area of Criminal Vote Fraud:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 75-79 (1983); see also United States v. Olinger, 759 F.2d 1293
(7th Cir. 1985) (upholding convictions for election fraud in the 1982 Chicago
election).
503. Sabato & Simpson, supra note 496, at 278-83; see also Marks v. Stinson, No.
93-6157, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5273 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1994).
504. Sabato & Simpson, supra note 496, at 283-88.
505. Leslie Hoffman, Gore's Lead Plummets in New Mexico, Albuquerque Trib.,
Nov. 10, 2000, at Al.
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During a 2000 election in Benton County, Arkansas, a ballot box
was "misplaced," only to reappear after some twelve hours with its
label peeled off and the box wet from sitting out in the overnight
rain.
The City of San Francisco has had a sordid history of election
problems, which includes eight ballot-box lids found floating in the
San Francisco Bay and 240 uncounted ballots found stuck in
machines in the 2001 election.0 7
In a 2002 Illinois assembly election, ballots cast in one of the
precincts could not be located at all, causing the trial judge to order
a new election.5"8
In Broward County, Florida, a box containing 268 unopened
ballots was found in a file cabinet approximately four months after
the September 2002 election.50 9
Early in 2004, in Hamilton County, Tennessee, a box of 189
ballots went uncounted and another 2591 ballots were not included
in the final election tally.510
The point of this list is not to demonstrate that paper-based voting
equipment is inherently insecure. Instead, the purpose of providing
this non-exhaustive list of examples is to demonstrate that no form of
technology-either paper-based or electronic-is immune from fraud
and error. At the very least, the examples should caution against
assuming that a paper replica of the electronic ballot will ensure
security and transparency.
3. Problems with the Contemporaneous Paper Record
Largely overlooked in the debate over whether to require that
DREs print out a contemporaneous paper record are the practical
difficulties in making such a system work. The limited experience that
exists with the contemporaneous paper record thus far reveals serious
questions about (1) whether it is a practicable solution, and (2)
whether it is an effective means of preventing fraud, and thereby
promoting the values of security and transparency.
506. Laura Kellams & Kirstan Conley, Little Flock's Vote Box Misplaced for 12
Hours, Wet Label Peeled Off Container, Delayed Count, Ark. Democrat-Gazette,
Nov. 9,2000, at Al.
507. San Francisco Finds Ballots in Machines, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 2001, at A18.
508. Graham v. Reid, 779 N.E.2d 391 (2002). Although there was no dispute as to
the missing ballots, the appellate court reversed the order for a new election. Id.
509. Scott Wyman, Oliphant Fires Another Staffer; Elections Chief Hires
Accounting Firm, Sun-Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 9, 2003, at 1B.
510. Andy M. Drury, Election Records Unsealed; TBI Probe Continues,
Chattanooga Times Free Press, Apr. 8, 2003, at B1.
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a. Practicability
The anonymity required in the process of voting makes the
implementation of a paper ballot printout more complicated than an
ATM transaction, to which it has often been compared. The purpose
of an ATM receipt is to provide the voter with a record of the
transaction that he or she may take away. By contrast, the purpose of
the "voter-verified paper audit trail" (as the name suggests) is to
provide an audit trail for election officials that can be used to
reconstruct voters' intended choices and to compare them to the
electronic record. In order to preserve the integrity of that audit trail,
the printed paper record must be generated in such a way that the
voter can see it but not touch it.
This is also necessary, in order to prevent voters from walking off
with the paper copies of the electronic ballot-which could then be
used in vote buying schemes, compromising the integrity of
elections.51' It is therefore incorrect to refer to the paper record
generated by DREs as a "receipt," since the voter does not actually
receive a copy of the paper record. Instead, in the most commonly
discussed model, he or she would view it behind glass or a screen-
which allows the paper record to be seen but not touched.512
The experience of jurisdictions that have attempted to implement
DREs capable of generating a contemporaneous paper record
illustrates the practical difficulties inherent in making such a system
work in a real world election. Introducing an additional piece of
equipment can complicate the voting process, resulting in confusion
on the part of both voters and poll workers. The contemporaneous
paper record has proven to be no exception. And as described below,
the device has proved problematic at best in jurisdictions that have
attempted to use a contemporaneous paper record system on a limited
basis.
Sacramento County, California used DREs with attached printers
for early voting in its 2002 election. While voters in Sacramento
reacted favorably to touchscreen voting, as have voters in other
jurisdictions, "[a]dding a printer and paper to the voting process was a
challenge." '513 As the Sacramento registrar explained:
It was new for the voter and some did not even want to see the
printed record. Some voters liked the option of reviewing the
printed record, some did not care and some did not want to take the
511. See Ted Selker & Jon Goler, Security Vulnerabilities and Problems with
VVPT 2 (Apr. 2004), at http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/vtp wpl3.pdf (Apr.
2004) (VTP Working Paper).
512. See id.
513. Memorandum from Ernest Hawkins, Registrar of Voters Sacramento County,
to Bob Jennings, Chairman, Voting Systems and Procedure Panel, Early Voting
Using the Avante System (Nov. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
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extra seconds to see it. It was confusing for some because they
thought they could take it with them....
If the printed record jams, the machine is out of service until
someone can take care of the problem .... A few times when the
printed record stuck they had to be extracted with many creative
tools that were on hand at the early voting site such as a windshield
wiper or back scratcher....
The voter viewed the printed record through a plastic shield on the
front of the machine. Voters complained that it was difficult to read
because of the length of the ballot, size and darkness of the print and
the location of [the] shield. Most voters wanted to remove the paper
copy and check it out before it went back into the machine....
There was concern that the machines would have problems storing
the voter's printed receipts. It was decided to empty the tray every
ten voters. This procedure was stopped. The machines must not be
opened during the day to empty the tray.5 14
Sacramento's experience highlights the practical difficulties in
implementing a DRE system capable of generating the voter-
verifiable paper trail. Even when used in early voting-which
includes a much smaller number of voters than in a regular election
and can be conducted in a more controlled location-practical
impediments to effective implementation emerged, including: (1)
voters trying to take the paper records with them; (2) printed ballot
replicas being removed from the tray where they are held; (3) voter
privacy being compromised when the tray is opened during the voting
day; (4) voters declining to review the paper records before casting
their votes; (5) printers jamming; (6) scarce polling place resources
being consumed by fixing printer jams; (7) difficulty reading paper
ballot records; and (8) voter confusion.5"
A contemporaneous paper record system was also tested on a
limited basis in Wilton, Connecticut's November 2003 election. After
that election, the deputy registrar commented that the "ease of use
and human factors... are appalling." 516 The voting system created
"numerous problems for the voters and placed great stress on the poll
workers." 517
While some of these difficulties may ultimately be resolved through
refinement of the machines and voter experience, there can be little
doubt that adding a printer would place an additional strain on poll
worker resources, and thus strain this component of our election
systems even further. Reports published in the wake of the 2000
514. Id.
515. Id. at 2-3.
516. Report of Marilyn Hutfilz, Deputy Registrar of Voters, Wilton, Ct. (Nov. 6,
2003) (on file with author).
517. Id.
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election document that poll worker resources in many communities,
especially urban ones, are already stretched thin. 18  Adding on
another piece of equipment that poll workers (many of them elderly)
will have to deal with can be expected to complicate the election
process.
A recent paper by Ted Selker and Jon Goler of MIT assesses the
practical problems with the contemporaneous paper record. 19 They
find that:
[The contemporaneous paper record] complicates two of the top
three problems that have compromised more than one percent of
American votes in 2000: equipment problems and polling place
operations. It complicates the setup, teardown, and operation of the
ballot place. It complicates polling place procedures during the
vote. It gives extra and difficult tasks for a person to do and
increases the problems with the user experience and the user
interface. It also increases the length of time of voting, which makes
it, with more steps, easier to make mistakes. 520
Implementation of the contemporaneous paper record is thus
considerably more difficult than some advocates' public statements
might suggest. The difficulties relate not only to costs, for which no
reliable estimates are available, but also to the practical imperatives of
election administration. While touchscreens are sometimes compared
to ATM machines, ATMs need not be transported to and from
hundreds of precincts each election day. Voting machines must be
transportable. When they break, longer lines at polling stations will
result. As numerous reports since the 2000 election have
documented, the nation's polling places are dramatically understaffed,
often by elderly poll workers. 521 Requiring the transportation and
implementation of an add-on device would considerably complicate
an already complicated process, and further deplete already scarce
poll worker resources. Worse still, because of the practical difficulties
and uncertain costs of implementing touchscreens with a
contemporaneous paper record that is accessible to people with
disabilities and language minorities, the likely result of imposing such
a requirement is to force counties to stick with inferior paper-based
systems such as the discredited "hanging chad" punch card.
This does not mean that the contemporaneous paper record is
unworthy of further experimentation. Nevada, for example,
experimented with a contemporaneous paper record system in the
2004 election.522 While some early reports on the use of this
518. See House Minority Report, supra note 113.
519. See Selker & Goler, supra note 511.
520. Id. at 8.
521. Caltech/MIT, supra note 30, at 33.
522. Erica Werner, Nevadans Get Look at New Voting Machines, Reno Gazette-
Journal, Jul. 17, 2004, available at
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equipment have been favorable, election officials continue to express
serious doubts about whether the contemporaneous paper record will
function effectively-particularly in urban areas where there are
insufficient poll worker resources. 23 It thus remains uncertain at best
whether the contemporaneous paper record is a workable solution to
the vulnerabilities that have been identified with DRE technology.
b. Efficacy
The argument that the contemporaneous paper record would serve
as an effective means of policing fraud and error depends upon the
electronic vote tallies being checked against the paper copies of
ballots in a recount. Two states that have enacted VVPAT legislation
(California and Ohio) have proposed standards providing that, in the
event of a discrepancy between the paper and electronic record, the
paper record will govern.' The idea behind this requirement,
presumably, is to provide assurance against tampering with the
electronic record. Yet the belief that the contemporaneous paper
record is to provide an effective check against possible foul play
necessarily rests on three assumptions: (1) some form of recount will
actually be conducted, (2) voters will actually check and thereby
"verify" the accuracy of the paper records, and (3) the integrity of the
paper record will be preserved from the time it is generated until the
time it is counted, to ensure that it does indeed provide a reliable
record of voters' intended choices-or at least more reliable evidence
than the electronic record. All of these assumptions are open to
question.
It is not clear, as an initial matter, that recounts will serve as an
effective check on DRE security-and therefore that they will do
much to improve transparency-in real world elections. For the
contemporaneous paper record to serve as an effective check on DRE
security, a recount must actually be conducted. In fact, very few states
have laws requiring even limited manual recounts, unless the election
is very close or a candidate or voter requests it (often at their own
expense). As the chart displayed in Appendix B shows, only four
states' laws require automatic recounts.52 For example, in Maine, a
http://www.rgj.com/news/stories/html/2004/07/17/75826.php?spl=rgj&sp2=News&sp3
=Local+News&sp5=RGJ.com&sp6=news&sp7=local news.
523. Rachel Konrad, Nevada's E-Vote Free of Serious Problems, MSNBC.com,
Sept. 13, 2004, at http://www.msnbc.msn.comid/59888361.
524. State of Cal., Draft Standards for Use of Accessible Voter Verified Paper
Audit Trail Systems in Direct Record Electronic (DRE) Voting Machines 2 (Mar. 18,
2004), available at
http://ss.ca.gov/elections/ks-dre-papers/avvpat-draft standards- 3 18 04.pdf; Ohio
Sec'y of State, Standards for Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail 3, available at
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/VVPAT.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
525. Those states are California, Kentucky, New York, and West Virginia. See infra
app. B. Whether New York should be included in this list is debatable, since the
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recount is triggered where the margin of victory is less than 1%.526 If
the hypothetical hacker were clever enough to insert malicious code
into DREs, it is logical to assume that she would also be clever
enough to ensure that the number of votes altered is large enough to
avoid triggering an automatic recount-or even suspicion of
wrongdoing that would lead to a candidate-initiated recount.
Even in those states where an automatic recount is required,
regardless of whether the election is close, that recount is unlikely to
serve as an effective check on manipulation of the type that has been
hypothesized, given that even those states that require a recount only
require a partial recount of voted ballots, which is unlikely to detect
manipulation of the results. California, for example, has a law
requiring a manual recount of 1% of voted precincts.527 Such a limited
manual recount will provide little assurance that the election was
conducted fairly. In a congressional race, a full recount of at least 250
precincts would be required to verify accuracy at a 90% confidence
level (and even then, it would only do so with a 1.2% error margin).528
Thus, unless jurisdictions are prepared to conduct a manual recount of
some significant portion of the paper records on a routine basis,
something that no one seriously advocates, the contemporaneous
paper record will not provide an effective check on electronic voting
results in close elections. It is also open to question whether
electronic records will be more accurate than the electronically voted
ballots, given the likely prospect that printers will sometimes fail and
the vulnerability of paper ballots to fraud and error. 529
The SAIC Report addresses the contention that a voter-verifiable
audit trail would solve the DRE security problem. 30 The Hopkins
Report asserted that "the best solution[]" to the asserted flaws in
DRE systems is the introduction of "a 'voter-verifiable audit trail.' 53'
But as the SAIC Report correctly notes, "a printed paper ballot would
still be subject to fraud. '53 2 Assuming the machines were rigged, a
voter-verifiable paper trail would do little to solve the problem:
A compromised machine could be programmed to record votes
incorrectly, but provide a correct paper ballot to the voter. Only in
the event of a total recount would this be discovered. Additionally,
pertinent statute does not actually require a recount but a "recanvass[ing]" of the
vote. N.Y. Elec. Law § 9-208 (McKinney 2005). This is presumably because New
York has until now relied upon lever voting machines which do not produce a paper
record. See New York State Help America Vote Act, State Implementation Plan, 69
Fed. Reg. 14,798, 14,814 (Mar. 24,2004).
526. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 737-A (West 2003).
527. Cal. Elec. Code § 15360 (West 2005).
528. C. Andrew Neff, Election Confidence: A Comparison of Methodologies and
Their Relative Effectiveness at Achieving It 7 (2003) (on file with author).
529. See Shamos, supra note 432, §2.4; supra notes 502-15 and accompanying text.
530. SAIC Report, supra note 445, at III-V.
531. Kohno et al., supra note 77, at 1.
532. SAIC Report, supra note 445, at app. B-2.
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the process of hand counting the millions of votes is time consuming
and is prone to error.533
Roy Saltman likewise concludes that it would be an error to assume
that a paper trail is an effective solution for the problems that may
occur with DRE voting technology:
If the intention of a printout from a DRE machine is to give the
voter a sense of confidence that his or her vote was properly cast
and properly processed, that confidence would be false. Due to the
fact that the printout is created by the computer and is not a
document-ballot, such a printout is a sop to the layperson ignorant
of the inner workings of the computers.
Nor is there any reason to believe that voters would actually check
to determine whether the paper record accurately records their
intentions. This would be extremely difficult with the
contemporaneous paper record technology now being made available
because it could generate printouts as long as fifty-seven inches in
jurisdictions with a large number of items on the ballot. Saltman
notes that, while a working DRE that incorporates a
contemporaneous paper trail might be developed, such a solution
would necessitate attaching a printer to each terminal and would
"negat[e] the value of a DRE because it uses paper ballots. ' 535
Electronic voting critics have pointed to problems that have
occurred in the implementation of electronic voting in some
jurisdictions. But the contemporaneous paper record would do little
to remedy most of the problems that have actually occurred. For
example, in the March 2004 election, three California counties
(Alameda, Orange, and San Diego) experienced problems in the
implementation of new electronic systems.53 6 The contemporaneous
paper record would not have done anything to prevent the sort of
533. Id. at B-2.
534. Saltman, supra note 71.
535. Id. at 4-5. He proceeds to suggest other, more viable alternatives to a
contemporaneous paper trail, including recording of the votes on a removable
diskette for use in the event of recounts, reconciliation of votes and overvotes,
providing an opportunity for the voter to review his or her choices, more thorough
testing of hardware and software, and an audit trail for software handling as possible
solutions. Id. at 5-7.
536. Ian Hoffman, Electronic Voting Devices Lack Federal OK and Disrupt Vote
for Thousands, Alameda Times-Star, Mar. 4, 2004, Local and Regional News
(reporting that failure of precinct control module supplied by Diebold led to
disruption of polling places in Alameda County); Sharon McNary, California Primary
Aftermath; Slow Start Cited in Vote Count Delay, Press-Enterprise (Riverside, Cal.),
Mar. 4, 2004, at Al (reporting "bumpy maiden voyages" with electronic voting in
these counties); Stuart Pfeifer, O.C. Snafus Are Blamed on Workers, L.A. Times, Mar.
4, 2004, at B1 (reporting problems in Orange County); Press Release, County of San
Diego, Report Regarding Touchscreen Voting System, (Mar. 10, 2004) (describing
reasons for the problems in San Diego County), available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/politics/county/20040310-1315-report.html.
[Vol. 731790
THE PAPERLESS CHASE
problems that occurred in these three counties. In Orange County,
some voters were given the wrong smartcard, causing the wrong
electronic ballot to be displayed.537 A paper copy would not have
solved this problem, but would only have replicated it. So too, the
difficulties encountered in Alameda and San Diego counties with
Diebold's system could have been avoided through better
procedures-in both counties, the precinct-control modules ("PCMs")
used to encode smartcards reportedly failed to boot properly.538 Had
poll workers been trained on the relatively simple "four-click" process
for bringing up the correct screen,539 the problem encountered could
quickly have been corrected in a matter of minutes. A
contemporaneous paper record requirement, on the other hand,
would not solve these problems.
C. Alternatives to Paper
The present answer to the question of whether paper is the solution
must therefore be "no"-or at least not clearly "yes." That is not,
however, to deny that it is vital to address the vulnerabilities of
election systems relying on DRE technology. While a thorough
exploration of the alternative means to improve DRE security and
transparency is beyond the scope of this Article, some of the most
promising proposals are summarized below, listed roughly in order of
ease of implementation. Those that could be implemented now with
relatively little disruption of existing election systems are listed first,
with changes that would require more substantial modifications to
existing election ecologies listed later.
1. Tighter Procedures
Among the changes most likely to enhance security and
transparency are improvements to election procedures. In fact,
changes to administrative procedures are at the top of the list of
reforms recommended by the reports commissioned by the states of
Maryland and California.5 40 Foremost among these is a "chain of
custody" for both software and the machines.5 41 Another suggestion is
"parallel testing" of machines on election day to make sure that they
are properly recording votes as intended. 42 Such testing was actually
conducted in counties using DREs in California's March 2004
537. Pfeifer, supra note 536 (reporting that "many [voters] were given ballots with
candidates from the wrong political parties or wrong districts").
538. Hoffman, supra note 536; Press Release, supra note 536.
539. See Press Release, supra note 536.
540. See RABA Report, supra note 467; SAIC Report, supra note 445; Shelley,
supra note 193, at 9-10.
541. Shamos, supra note 432, § 3.3(1).
542. Id. § 3.5.
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election.543 It revealed that the DRE machines tested recorded votes
with 100% accuracy. 5" Another key procedural recommendation is
that DRE terminals not be connected to a network and certainly not
connected to the internet.5 45 Even with a contemporaneous paper
record, testing, training, and adherence to procedures are essential if
the system is to function properly. 46
2. Improved Standards and Testing
One of the recommendations for improving the security of
electronic voting is to reform the standards and certification
process.5 47  Before enactment of HAVA, the Federal Election
Commission ("FEC") was responsible for promulgating standards for
hardware, software, and other aspects of voting systems.548
Compliance with the FEC standards is voluntary, but they are
followed by thirty-six states.5 49  The testing itself is performed by
independent testing agencies ("ITAs"), private companies that
contract with election authorities at the state and local level.5 Critics
have argued that both testing standards and the closed-door process
by which testing is conducted leaves much to be desired.55' HAVA
requires changes in the process for developing standards through the
EAC and related entities. Due to the delays in establishing the
EAC, and Congress's failure to appropriate the full amount
authorized for its budget, it is unclear whether new standards and
guidelines will be in place by January 2006, the effective date of
HAVA's voting system standards. 3
3. Cryptography
An alternative to the contemporaneous paper record that might
better achieve the goals of accessibility and transparency is to create
an independent audit channel for electronically cast votes. Supporters
of this method argue that it provides for greater transparency and
543. Kevin Shelley, Cal. Sec'y of State, Report on Parallel Monitoring Program
(Nov. 30, 2004).
544. Id. at 4.
545. See SAIC Report, supra note 445, at 9.
546. See Ted Selker, Processes Can Improve Electronic Voting: A Case Study On
an Election (Oct. 2004) (VTP Working Paper) (describing author's observation of
Nevada county's implementation of electronic voting with voter-verifiable paper trail
printers in September 2004 election), available at
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/vtp-wpl7.pdf.
547. Fischer, supra note 27, at 23-26.
548. Shamos, supra note 432, § 1.3.
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Fischer, supra note 27, at 25.
552. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 15371 (LexisNexis 2004).
553. Fischer, supra note 27, at 24.
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better auditability than the contemporaneous paper record.554 Under
one model, the voter would receive a piece of paper at the time of
voting. 5 Instead of displaying the names of the candidates chosen,
the receipt would contain encrypted information and, while in the
voting booth, the voter would see the choices to which the encrypted
information corresponds. 56 Afterwards, each voter could determine if
his or her vote was counted as intended by comparing the receipt to
information publicly posted on the internet or elsewhere.5 7 In theory,
this would provide a form of "voter verifiability," without the
difficulties inherent in printing paper ballots. 8 In contrast to the
contemporaneous paper record, which can only confirm that the vote
was correctly captured by the DRE,559 this type of encrypted
technology would (at least in theory) allow voters to determine
whether their votes were correctly counted.
4. Paperless Audit Trails
While the contemporaneous paper record is one means of achieving
a "voter-verifiable" audit trail, it may not be the only one. Put another
way, voter verifiability is not synonymous with paper ballot replicas.
Indeed, the California touchscreen task force recommended that a
voter-verifiable audit trail be required for all DREs purchased after
2007, even though a majority wisely declined to recommend
imposition of a requirement that this audit trail be paper-based.560
One proposal is for an audio audit trail.56' Under this proposal, a
voter would actually listen to his or her choices during the voting
process, as a tape recording is made.562 Such voter-verified audio
transcripts would have the added advantage of allowing visually
impaired and illiterate voters to verify their choices. Another
proposal is the "votemeter," a separate electronic device attached to
the DRE that would record and display voters' choices. The
votemeter records could be tallied separately to avoid any possible
collusion.563
554. Id. at 30-31.
555. Id. at 30. The technology described is the VHTi, marketed by VoteHere.
Information regarding this technology is available at www.votehere.net. For a
description of a similar system, see David Chaum, Secret Ballot Receipts and
Transparent Integrity, at http://notebook.geekdom.net/pages/87.html (May 8, 2003).
556. Fischer, supra note 27, at 30.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 31.
559. See Shamos, supra note 432, § 2.4.
560. Shelley, supra note 17, at 43-44.
561. Ted Selker, The Voter Verifiable Audio Transcript Trail (Sept. 2004) (VTP
Working Paper), available at http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/vtp-wpl8.pdf.
562. Id. at 1.
563. Id.; see also Fischer, supra note 27, at 29.
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5. Open Source
Another promising proposal for promoting both security and
transparency in the long term is the development of voting technology
that uses open source software."6 The software used would be open
to public scrutiny which, in theory, would allow interested members of
the public to inspect it for flaws. Until now, voting equipment
vendors have claimed that their software is a trade secret and they
have guarded against any attempts to make their source code publicly
available. 65 Thus, the code is now disclosed only to ITAs and other
selected parties under nondisclosure agreements. 66 Vendors have
also argued that keeping source code secret provides security
advantages, by limiting the number of people who can exploit any
potential vulnerabilities. Others have criticized the "security through
obscurity" approach, arguing that such stringent limitations on access
to source code severely diminish the opportunity to expose
vulnerabilities or malfeasance. 67 While none of the major vendors are
currently marketing open source products, a group called the "Open
Voting Consortium" is developing an open source voting system. 68
All of these proposed reforms have the potential to address the
vulnerabilities of DRE technology. My point in describing them,
however, is not to suggest that any of them are a magic bullet. At this
point, it cannot be said with confidence that any of them will be
sufficient to fix the vulnerabilities that have been identified. Some of
the measures described above may prove superior to the
contemporaneous paper record; others may turn out to present similar
or even greater difficulties. It is even possible that the questions
regarding the workability and efficacy of the contemporaneous paper
record may ultimately be resolved. It is too soon to say whether any
of the above options, either alone or in combination, will prove
workable or effective.
Considerable uncertainty thus remains on how best to promote the
democratic values of equality, security, and transparency, when it
comes to the implementation of electronic voting technology. The
question to which I now turn is how the various public institutions
with responsibility for safeguarding these values should proceed in
light of this uncertainty.
564. Clive Thompson, A Really Open Election, N.Y. Times, May 30, 2004, § 6
(Magazine), at 14.
565. Shamos, supra note 432, § 3.2.
566. Fischer, supra note 27, at 26.
567. Id.
568. Information regarding the Open Voting Consortium may be found at
http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
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IV. BUILDING BETTER VOTING SYSTEMS
The competing democratic values identified in Parts II and III
create a conundrum. On the one hand, there is considerable evidence
that implementation of electronic voting technology can promote the
core equality values of racial equality, disability access, multi-language
access, and inter-jurisdictional equality. On the other hand, there are
legitimate concerns about the election systems relying on present-
generation DRE technology when it comes to both security and
transparency. And there are serious reasons to doubt that a
contemporaneous paper record provides either a workable or an
effective solution to these problems. It is, moreover, quite unlikely
that the perfect voting technology-one that ensures equality while
providing airtight security and transparency -will come along any
time soon.
While all of this may seem like an insoluble mess, it may also be
viewed as an opportunity. Existing paper-based voting technology is
not perfect. Neither are existing DREs, despite the significant
advantages that they offer in terms of racial equality, disability
accommodation, and multilingual access. The challenge is to find a
way to encourage innovation, while at the same time safeguarding the
basic equality rights protected by law. It is not only, and in fact not
primarily, the courts that face this challenge. It is also a challenge that
Congress, state legislative bodies, and administrative agencies
(foremost among them the EAC) must meet in the coming months
and years. Most important of all, it is a challenge that faces election
officials in each of the fifty states, and the thousands of local entities
with responsibility over our election systems.
Some have decried the "fragmented" character of our election
systems under which authority is dispersed to thousands of local and
state entities.569 Yet the decentralized character of our election
systems provides an opportunity to innovate, while limiting the costs
of that innovation. To be sure, experimentation in the context of
election administration must be undertaken with the utmost care,
given the fundamental character of the right to vote. At the same
time, the unanswered questions that remain about the voting
technologies now being used-and ones that will come into use in the
coming months and years-make it inevitable that some further
experimentation will take place. The State of California, for example,
became the first to employ parallel testing on a statewide basis in the
569. Pastor, supra note 19, at 585.
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March 2004 election.570  And Nevada experimented with the
contemporaneous paper record in its 2004 elections.57'
Such experiments ought to be encouraged. The challenge facing the
various government institutions with responsibility over election
administration is to encourage innovation while at the same time
safeguarding the basic equality rights protected by the Constitution
and other voting rights laws. What follows are recommendations on
how the courts, legislative and administrative bodies, and election
officials can best further the democratic values implicated by the
introduction of electronic voting, given the uncertain and rapidly
changing technological landscape.
A. The Judiciary
The first question is what role the judiciary should play in
promoting or slowing down the ongoing transformation of voting
technology. I have already mentioned three types of legal challenges
to existing voting equipment. The first type is exemplified by the
ACLU lawsuits challenging the use of punch-card and other paper-
based voting equipment under the Equal Protection Clause and the
VRA.572 The second are lawsuits challenging the use of DRE
equipment on the ground that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment
or state law by failing to provide a paper record that can be used in
the event of manual audits.573 The third type consists of lawsuits
brought under the ADA and other civil rights laws challenging the
failure to provide voting technology (specifically DREs) allowing
people with disabilities to cast secret and independent ballots.574
Lawsuits of each type are pending in state and federal courts around
the country.
All of these cases implicate the basic democratic values that I
identified in Parts II and III. The ACLU and disability rights cases
both implicate the core political value of political equality-and more
specifically, the norms of racial equality, disability access, and inter-
jurisdictional equality. The challenge to DRE voting technology
implicates the values identified in Part III, with plaintiffs in those
cases arguing that the use of equipment lacking a "paper trail"
compromises security and integrity.
There is considerable disagreement among commentators on the
role that courts should play in exercising judicial review over the
570. See Kevin Shelley, Cal. Sec'y of State, Report on the March 2, 2004 Statewide
Primary Election (Apr. 20, 2004).
571. Kim Zetter, E-Vote Printers High-Stakes Test, Wired News, May 27, 2004, at
http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,63618,00.html?tw=wn-tophead_.
572. See supra Part I.B.3 (describing the ACLU's punch-card litigation).
573. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting legal challenges to paperless
electronic voting).
574. See supra Part II.A.2.
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democratic processes. Professor Richard L. Hasen has persuasively
argued that courts have an important role to play in safeguarding
"core ... equality principles. 5 75 Outside of those core areas, he urges
courts to tread carefully, and avoid constitutionalizing contested
political rights. On the other hand, Professor Pildes suggests that
courts should take into account "structural flaws in democracy" as
well as equality rights in determining whether judicial review is
appropriate.57 6
At least for purposes of assessing voting technology, it is not
necessary to take sides in the rights-versus-structure controversy.
Whatever one's theory as to the role of the courts when it comes to
the processes of democracy, there are some norms that are vital for
courts to protect. These include both individual rights of access for
people with disabilities and non-English speakers, as well as the
broader interest in avoiding practices that disfavor certain groups-a
distinction that I have elsewhere referred to under the rubric
"atomistic" and "systemic" equality.577 The equality norms that I
defined in Part II are designed to prevent the government from tilting
the political playing field to the disadvantage of certain groups.
Because they bear upon the right of citizens to participate as equals in
the conversations of democracy, these norms have a foundation in the
First Amendment as well as the Fourteenth. They are an integral part
of what I have labeled "First Amendment Equal Protection," an area
in which courts have traditionally-and for good reason-been
especially jealous in guarding against threatened inequalities.5 78
For this reason, there is a strong case for intervention in cases
where the use of certain voting equipment is shown to undermine a
core equality norm. The use of punch-card voting equipment, which
has a clear impact on voters who use it-and an especially negative
impact on racial minorities-is one example. 79 Another example is
the state's failure to make accessible technology available to voters
with disabilities. On the other hand, courts should exercise restraint
in determining the appropriate remedy for the voting rights violation
at issue. For example, in a case challenging the continued use of
punch-card voting machines within a state, it would be appropriate for
a court to enjoin the use of this technology given its well-established
575. Hasen, supra note 14, at 74.
576. Pildes, supra note 13, at 42.
577. For a more thorough discussion of the distinction between atomistic and
systemic equality, see Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 11, at
2428-29, 2502-07. Greg Magarian employs a similar distinction, using the terminology
of "public rights" and "private rights." Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political
Parties Under a "Public Rights" First Amendment, 44 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1939
(2003); see also Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 11, at 2428
n.90.
578. See generally Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection, supra note 11.
579. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
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consequences for racial and inter-jurisdictional equality. 8° Courts
should be reluctant to mandate any particular type of technology,
however, in light of the evidence that both electronic voting machines,
and at least some types of optical-scan technology can redress these
problems and the considerable uncertainty that remains regarding the
best technological means by which to address the values of security
and transparency.58'
Recent litigation within each of the three types noted above
illustrates the proper judicial approach to voting technology.
Common Cause v. Jones582 and Black v. McGuffage5 83 implicated the
core equality norms of racial equality and inter-jurisdictional
equality-more specifically, the idea that voters should not be denied
an equal opportunity to have their votes counted based on their race
or where they live. In both of these cases, the courts acted properly in
affirming these norms and recognizing their applicability to the voting
technology used.5" Yet these decisions both exemplify a
commendable restraint. They do not demand uniformity of
equipment. Instead, they characterize the equal protection
violation as "whether a state may allow the use of different types of
voting equipment with substantially different levels of accuracy." '586
This standard allows states to experiment with different types of
voting equipment, while protecting the core of political equality.
In this respect, the equality standard set forth in Black bears
comparison to the standard that the Supreme Court has set in its "one
person, one vote" cases decided under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This standard requires that electoral districts be of roughly equal size,
while allowing "minor deviations" from precise numerical equality.587
So too, courts in voting technology cases should not require that
voting technology used throughout the state yield precisely the same
results-either across districts or among people of different races-a
standard that would be practically impossible to meet. The better
standard is articulated in Black, which forbids the use of voting
technologies with substantially different levels of accuracy, while
allowing minimal deviations from precise equality.588
580. See supra Part II.B.3.
581. On this point, a comparison might be drawn to the area of judicial
intervention when it comes to campaign finance reform. As Spencer Overton
observes, the empirical uncertainty that exists with respect to the consequences of
particular regulations of campaign finance should make courts cautious about
invalidating those reforms. Spencer Overton, Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial
Review of Campaign Reform, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 663, 718-19 (2004).
582. 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
583. 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. 11. 2002).
584. Black, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 889; Common Cause, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
585. Black, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 889; Common Cause, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
586. Black, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 898 (emphasis added).
587. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835,842-43 (1983).
588. Black, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 898.
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For similar reasons, the Common Cause court showed
commendable restraint when it came to the remedy imposed. The
court did not require that California implement any particular form of
voting technology statewide.58 9 Instead, the court decertified the
equipment that was alleged to contravene equality norms (namely,
Votomatic-style punch cards), while leaving it to the state and
counties to fashion a remedy.5 9° In particular, the court made a
determination as to when the unreliable equipment could feasibly be
replaced, but allowed that equipment to be replaced by any certified
voting technology-either electronic or paper-based.591
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion in the
California recall case, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project
v. Shelley5 92 is a disappointment, even if one agrees with its result. The
en banc court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction
postponing the California recall, pending the replacement of punch
cards.593  This opinion followed a three-judge panel's opinion
concluding that the use of punch cards in some, but not all, California
counties denied equal protection. 94 The three-judge panel had
engaged in a thorough discussion of the equal protection merits. 95 By
contrast, the en banc court issued a brief opinion that avoided the
issue, stating that it was one on which reasonable jurists might
disagree without specifying the standard according to which the claim
should be judged.596 Instead, the en banc opinion relied on the
deferential standard traditionally accorded preliminary injunctions
and the harm to the state that would result from postponing the
recall.5 97
The reluctance to postpone an election that has already begun is
understandable. The en banc court dropped the ball, however, by
failing to provide clear guidance on the important constitutional and
statutory voting rights issues raised. Both these claims implicated core
equality norms. A better approach would have been for the court to
have ruled definitively on the Fourteenth Amendment and VRA
claims, and then to have weighed the severity of any voting rights
violation found against the hardship to the state that would arise from
issuance of the requested relief-as the preliminary injunction
589. Common Cause, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (decertifying punch-card technology
without specifying the type of voting equipment that it should be replaced with).
590. Id.
591. Id. The parties in Common Cause had stipulated that the Votomatic-style
punch cards should be decertified and left it to the court to determine the date by
which it was feasible to replace that equipment. Id.
592. SVREP IV, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
593. Id. at 920.
594. SVREP II, 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.), vacated, 344 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc).
595. SVREP II, 344 F.3d at 894-901.
596. SVREP IV, 344 F.3d at 918.
597. Id. at 919-20.
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standard allows. Even if the result had been the same, addressing the
merits would have provided guidance to future courts on the scope
and applicability of the equality norms in question.
More impressive is the decision in Weber v. Shelley, another Ninth
Circuit case.598 Weber was a type two case, in which the plaintiff
challenged the use of a paperless touchscreen voting system. 99 As the
court properly noted, every voting regulation will have some impact
on the right to vote.6" Only those that impose "severe" restrictions on
the right to vote, as opposed to "reasonable, nondiscriminatory"
restrictions, should be subject to heightened scrutiny.601 In contrast to
such cases as Common Cause' and Black, 3 the plaintiff in Weber
failed to come forward with evidence showing that citizens using the
challenged type of equipment were less likely to have their votes
counted.' There was, for example, no evidence that Riverside
County's electronic voting resulted in their voters being less likely to
have their votes counted, nor was there any evidence that it generated
a racial disparity. To the contrary, the evidence available shows that
the present generation of DREs are more likely to record votes
accurately than other types of equipment and that they can
significantly reduce the racial gap in uncounted votes.60 5 And as
Riverside County concluded at the time it purchased touchscreens,
this technology facilitates voting by disabled and non-English
proficient voters.60 6 In short, the Weber court acted correctly, given
the plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate that the challenged voting
technology violated any core equality norm. 6°7
598. 347 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003).
599. Id. at 1106.
600. Id. (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
601. Id.
602. Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
603. Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
604. Weber, 347 F.3d at 1105 ("[T]here is no indication that the [challenged
electronic voting equipment] is inherently less accurate, or produces a vote count that
is inherently less verifiable, than other systems.").
605. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
606. Weber, 347 F.3d at 1104.
607. A recent state court decision from Maryland likewise illustrates the propriety
or restraint in type two voting technology cases. Although based on state rather than
federal law, Schade v. Maryland State Board of Elections, No. C-04-97297, slip op.
(Md. Sept. 1, 2004), raises issues similar to those implicated by Weber. Plaintiffs
argued that the Diebold DRE system used in Maryland failed to protect the security
of the voting process and failed to count votes accurately. Id. at 1. After reviewing
the expert evidence submitted by both sides, the circuit court declined to grant a
preliminary injunction. Id. at 7. It found that "the use of paper ballots is the least
accurate of all systems and lends itself to the most chicanery," while DREs "if
untampered ... are the most accurate in recording and counting votes." Id. at 3. It
also recognized the accessibility advantages of DREs, pointing out that they allow
blind and visually impaired citizens to vote independently. Id. Most important, the
court properly recognized that no voting technology is perfect and that imposing a
standard of perfection would effectively paralyze government entities attempting to
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Type three cases challenging the failure to implement DRE voting
equipment bring to the fore the equality norm of disability access.
The ability to cast a secret and independent ballot on an equal basis
with other citizens is integral to the right to vote,6"8 and courts should
enforce this equality norm. It is appropriate to require that DREs be
made available to people with disabilities. On the other hand, courts
should exercise caution when it comes to the remedy. The best course
of action is to make at least one DRE unit available for citizens with
disabilities at each polling place (as HAVA requires effective January
1, 2 00 6),609 while leaving it up to counties to determine whether to
institute DRE technology for able-bodied voters. This will protect a
disabled citizen's right to a secret and independent ballot without
unduly intruding into state and county election officials' authority to
safeguard other democratic values in the voting process.
In sum, courts considering legal challenges to voting technology
should focus on whether the challenged system contravenes one of the
core equality norms that I have identified. If it does, then they should
not hesitate to declare that the use of that technology violates
statutory or constitutional voting rights. But in crafting remedies,
courts should exercise restraint in order to ensure that election
officials retain the authority needed to serve the democratic values of
equality, security, and transparency.610
B. Legislative and Administrative Bodies
While courts have an essential role to'play in protecting core
equality norms, the role of the legislative branch is to provide a
structure that will promote the democratic values I have identified. In
exercising this responsibility, it is imperative that legislative bodies,
like the courts, proceed with caution. Given the unanswered
questions that remain about how best to secure voting technology, it is
a serious mistake to insist upon legislation mandating any particular
technological fix, such as the contemporaneous paper record. That
would lock states into a remedy that may not be workable or effective.
implement the best practicable voting equipment. Id. at 3, 5, 6-7. Applying the
preliminary injunction standard, the court found that the "hypothetical harm" to
plaintiffs arising from the use of punch cards doesn't outweigh the "real harm" that
would arise from having to implement a parallel paper system within weeks of the
election. Id. at 5-6; see also Wexler v. LePore, No. 04-80216-CIV-COHN, mem. op.
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2004) (denying challenge to process for conducting manual
recounts in counties using paperless DRE systems); Gusciora v. McGreevey, No.
MER-L-2691-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2004) (denying application for injunction
against the use of paperless electronic voting machines in New Jersey's 2004 general
election).
608. See generally Waterstone, supra note 402.
609. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 15481 (a)(3), 15481(d) (LexisNexis 2004).
610. My focus here is solely on federal law arguments, not on state law-based
claims that might be made against different voting technologies.
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Instead, Congress and state legislatures should work within the
structure provided by HAVA.611 That means providing funding that
will allow state and local entities to implement-and experiment
with-new voting technologies. It also means reexamining laws
written with paper-based systems in mind, and considering how they
should be revamped to promote security and transparency in an
election environment increasingly dependent on paperless electronic
voting technology.
Much of the post-HAVA legislative discussion has focused on
whether to require that electronic voting units generate a
contemporaneous paper replica. In Congress and several states,
legislation has been introduced to require a "voter-verified paper
audit trail." The centerpiece of these efforts has been a bill sponsored
by Representative Rush Holt (the "Holt Bill"). 612
Enactment of this legislation would likely do more harm than good.
As a practical matter, the contemporaneous paper record required by
the Holt Bill would do little to enhance election security. It is also
unclear whether it is practically feasible for voting machines to
produce a contemporaneous paper replica that the voter can see but
not touch. To enact this legislation at this stage, moreover, would
place states and counties that have not already upgraded their voting
technology in a bind. The states that received money under Title I of
HAVA and that were granted a waiver of the statute's 2004 deadline
are required to replace their punch-card and lever voting equipment
by 2006.613 If states fail to meet this deadline, they may be forced to
repay the funds already received.614 It would also complicate the
requirement that each polling place have at least one disability-
accessible unit by 2006.615 Given the unanswered questions regarding
the contemporaneous paper record, the foreseeable consequence
requiring this device is to discourage counties from moving to
electronic voting technology at all.616
Worse still, imposition of this requirement would stifle innovation.
Manufacturers forced to tailor their voting equipment to meet this
requirement would forego other potential means of enhancing
security. This would be unfortunate, as many of these show much
greater promise than the contemporaneous paper record.61 7
611. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 15301-15545.
612. H.R. 2239, 108th Cong. (2003).
613. 42 U.S.C.S. § 15302(a)(3)(B).
614. Id. § 15302(d).
615. Id. § 15481(a)(3)(B).
616. As explained supra Part III.B.3, electronic voting machines with a
contemporaneous paper record have been used on a limited basis in elections in
California and Connecticut.
617. Potential alternative means are discussed in the California Secretary of State
Kevin Shelley's report, supra note 17. That task force, as discussed below, accepted
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Legislation mandating a contemporaneous paper record at the state
level can be expected to have some of the same deleterious effects.
The Ohio legislature, for example, enacted a bill to require the
contemporaneous paper record effective 2006.618 Partly as a
consequence of that bill, Ohio's punch-card counties stuck with that
equipment in the 2004 election.6 9 With this requirement looming on
the horizon and uncertainty about whether existing DRE technology
could be retrofitted to meet the contemporaneous paper record
requirement, all of the state's remaining punch-card counties decided
to stand pat.620 Whatever the risks of electronic voting, it can scarcely
be contested that the Votomatic-style punch-card ballot is an
outmoded method of voting that ought to be replaced.
While precinct-count optical-scan equipment presents a possible
alternative, the implementation of this technology requires staff and
poll worker resources that are simply unavailable to many urban
jurisdictions. As a practical matter, then, the choice that such
legislation imposes is to either (1) implement a DRE system capable
of generating a contemporaneous paper record, despite the fact that
this equipment has yet to prove either workable or effective; or (2)
stick with the punch card and forfeit monies that have already been
provided under Title I of HAVA. If election officials are put to this
Hobson's choice, the big losers are likely to be those whose voting
rights have most often been denied: people of color, disabled voters,
and language minorities. For it is these voters who have the most to
gain from implementation of DRE systems.
From the perspective of disability and language access, a
contemporaneous paper record mandate raises especially glaring
concerns. The California Attorney General's Office has taken the
position that imposition of such a requirement would violate the
ADA, given the absence of any means by which blind and visually
impaired voters could "verify" that the choices on a printed ballot are
accurate.6 1  Although two companies are currently marketing
contemporaneous paper record systems that they claim to be
accessible, this equipment has yet to be tested in a real election of any
significant size.622 And in the only statewide experiment with the
the recommendation that an audit trail be required, but rejected the suggestion that a
paper record is the only type of acceptable audit trail.
618. H.B. 262, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
619. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
620. John McCarthy, Electronic Voting on Hold, Cincinnati Post On-Line Edition,
July 17, 2004, at http://www.cincypost.com/2004/07/17/votingO7-17-2004.html.
621. See Letter from Douglas J. Woods, Deputy California Attorney General, to
Randy Riddle, Chief Counsel, Secretary of State (July 28, 2003).
622. Those two companies are Avante and AccuPoll. See AccuPoll: The Clear
Choice, at http://www.accupoll.com/TheAccuPollAdvantage/ (last visited Jan. 26,
2005); Avante, Avante Vote-Trakker White Pages, at
http://www.aitechnology.com/votetrakker2/papers.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
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contemporaneous paper record, Nevada's 2004 election, the
equipment used was unable to print contemporaneous paper records
in languages other than English. As a result, voters in the one Nevada
county that is required to make voting materials available in both
English and Spanish (Clark County) used DRE units that do not print
out paper ballot replicas.623
These difficulties may eventually be resolved, as may the serious
questions regarding the accessibility of the proposed
contemporaneous paper record. It would be a mistake, however, for
Congress to mandate this device before it has been proven effective in
serving the core values of security and transparency. Even at the state
level, legislative bodies are ill-advised to mandate this type of device
until its workability and efficacy are established. There is little reason
to believe that paper is a magic bullet-yet the legislation
precipitously enacted in California and Ohio will effectively lock this
technology in place, at least for those counties that opt for electronic
voting.
Other states would be ill-advised to follow this example. Security
and transparency are vital democratic values and paper may turn out
to be one way of promoting them. But it need not be the only way.
624
While it is important to have a reliable means of auditing elections, it
is not at all clear that recounts of paper ballots are the best means of
achieving this goal. A major project for state legislatures in coming
years will likely be a reexamination of election code provisions, many
of which are built around recounts of paper ballots.625 These laws may
make sense in an environment where paper-based equipment
dominates. But as this equipment is replaced with paperless voting
technology, it will likely be necessary for states to rethink the means
by which audits are conducted, so as to promote the twin values of
security and transparency.
Instead of mandating a particular technological fix, legislative
bodies would do best to work within the basic structure provided by
HAVA. Although HAVA was enacted before the controversy over
electronic voting exploded into the public consciousness, Congress
was aware of the security and transparency issues surrounding
electronic voting. Not only did HAVA require a paper record with a
manual audit capacity, but it also created the EAC to serve as a
national clearinghouse for compiling information on voting systems.
626
To assist in the EAC's efforts, the legislation also created a standards
board, a board of advisors, and a technical guidelines development
committee.627 It also provides for the EAC to overhaul the standards
623. Werner, supra note 522.
624. See supra Part II.C.
625. For a chart summarizing state recount laws, see infra app. B.
626. 42 U.S.C.S. § 15322 (LexisNexis 2004).
627. Id. §§ 15343, 15344, 15361.
1804 [Vol. 73
THE PAPERLESS CHASE
6281 ehand process for certifying voting equipment. Perhaps more
importantly, it provides for the EAC to conduct research on how best
to promote secure electronic voting.629 Worthy avenues for the EAC
to explore not only include standards for those jurisdictions that
choose to require a contemporaneous paper record, but also other
ways of achieving auditability-and thereby serving the values of
security and transparency.
The EAC has now posted on its website "best practices" for
different types of voting equipment.63° While this is a start, there is
much more that the EAC can do-and must do under HAVA-to
promote accessible, secure, transparent, and accurate electronic
voting. Unfortunately, the ability of the EAC to undertake its
important responsibilities has been stymied by the late appointment of
the four commissioners and the failure to provide the commission
with full funding.631 For the EAC to do its work adequately, it is
imperative that Congress provide it with full funding.
More broadly, it is essential that both Congress and the state
legislatures alter their perspective on election reform. For far too
long, the decrepit condition of our democracy's infrastructure was
neglected. Rather than viewing the replacement of voting equipment
as a generational occurrence, to take place only when the harsh light
of public scrutiny forces alternation, legislative bodies must look upon
the refurbishment of voting technology as an ongoing responsibility.
This may require more resources, in addition to the $3 billion in
federal funding authorized for fiscal years 2003 through 2005. As
technology continues to evolve, voting systems must continue to adapt
to those changes.
C. State and Local Election Officials
Primary responsibility for implementing new voting technology
rests not with the courts, legislatures, or the EAC. For better or for
worse, that authority lies mainly in the hands of secretaries of state,
boards of election, and county registrars throughout the country.
Some commentators have decried the decentralization of our
election system.632 In addition, the partisanship of some election
officials-from Katherine Harris in Florida during the 2000 election to
Ken Blackwell in Ohio during the 2004 election-has attracted
considerable attention, much of it critical. The lack of electoral
628. Id. § 15371.
629. Id. § 15385.
630. U.S. Election Assistance Comm'n, Preparing to Help America Vote, at
http://www.eac.gov (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
631. BNA Money & Politics Report, New Commission Sees Extreme Difficulty in
Future Operation Due to Budget Woes (Sept. 14, 2004), at
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/mpr.nsf/is/AOA9Q7YlJO.
632. See Pastor, supra note 19.
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institutions capable of checking partisan self-interest is one of the
critical flaws in our democracy, 633 and commentators are beginning to
examine the means by which to remove authority over critical election
decisions from partisan players with an incentive to benefit their own
side.634 In addition, the close ties between election officials and voting
system vendors have been a subject of considerable criticism, with
some observers decrying the fact that people charged with the
administration of elections ultimately wind up in the employ of those
whom they were once charged with regulating.635 Like other aspects
of election administration, partisanship and the "revolving door"
between the public and private sectors are causes for concern when it
comes to the implementation of voting technology. Dealing with
these problems is perhaps the most serious long-term challenge that
confronts those concerned with improving the administration of
elections.636
Despite the faults of the current system, its decentralization of
authority provides some advantages. Vesting authority over voting
technology in local rather than state officials serves some useful
purposes. Certain types of voting equipment may be appropriate for
some jurisdictions but inappropriate for others. For example, a
precinct-count optical-scan voting system (or even hand-counted
paper ballots) may work well in a smaller county with few language
minorities and plentiful poll worker resources. Such a system may
work poorly, however, in understaffed, urban jurisdictions. In
addition, the decentralized character of our election system allows for
counties and townships to serve as true laboratories of democracy.
They may experiment with different types of voting equipment, and
different means of enhancing security-such as the contemporaneous
paper record, non-paper audit trails, and perhaps even open source
equipment. Decentralization may also provide some security, at least
for statewide races, by making it more difficult for a malevolent
insider to alter the results. Even if one county's election can be
rigged, the decentralization of election systems may protect the
integrity of the election since it would be much more difficult to rig
several counties' elections.
On the other hand, there is a strong argument to be made for
statewide uniformity of voting technology. Adoption of one type of
633. See Pildes, supra note 13, at 82-83 (identifying the need for the United States
to create institutions other than the courts to "check the role of partisan self-interest
in the design of democratic processes").
634. See, e.g., Christopher Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through
Advisory Commissions: The Case of Elections Law 32-92 (Dec. 4, 2004) (unpublished
draft) (proposing the creation of standing advisory commissions that would have the
power to recommend, but not to enact, laws regulating the political process).
635. On the Voting Machine Makers' Tab, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2004, § 4, at 12
(criticizing close ties between voting machine industry and election officials).
636. For one proposal, see Elmendorf, supra note 634.
[Vol. 731806
THE PAPERLESS CHASE
voting equipment throughout a state can avoid the equal protection
problems arising from the use of substantially less accurate technology
in some jurisdictions.637 It can ensure that citizens are not disfavored
by the happenstance of where they reside. Moreover, mandating a
particular type of equipment, such as DREs, can help promote
equality by ensuring that citizens throughout the state have access to
the best available voting equipment.
Two states (Maryland and Georgia) have now implemented the
same type of DRE technology throughout the state. 638  The chief
benefit of the statewide approach is that it promotes uniform
treatment of voters throughout the state. The downside is that it risks
catastrophe, if the voting system chosen fails to perform as advertised.
Maryland and Georgia have endured some criticism for moving too
quickly, although the electronic voting technology they selected has
performed well thus far. 3 9 Whether Nevada's statewide experiment
with a contemporaneous paper record system will prove equally
successful remains to be seen.
In the end, there is no clear answer to the question whether states
should implement uniform technology, or instead allow counties to
experiment with different types of equipment. What is clear is that, in
the process of upgrading technology, some problems are inevitable.
When they occur, it is imperative that state and federal legislative
bodies step in to provide funding to allow their correction rather than
allowing election officials to muddle through with bad technology.
Improving our election systems requires accepting the fact that some
mistakes will be made along the way, and committing ourselves to
righting those mistakes when they occur.
CONCLUSION
Voting technology is a moving target, and that reality is unlikely to
change any time soon. The present generation of electronic voting
has the potential to reduce the number of lost votes, while effecting
substantial improvements in racial equality, disability access, and
multilingual access. At the same time, the implementation of this
technology poses serious risks, if unaccompanied by appropriate
safeguards. There are also legitimate concerns about the transparency
of present-generation electronic voting technology. Although the
future of electronic voting is difficult to predict, next-generation
637. See supra Part II.A.4.
638. See supra Part I.B.4.
639. Schade v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, No. C-04-97297, mem. op. at 7 (Md. Cir.
Ct. Sept. 1, 2004) (finding that "[tlhe votes have been counted accurately" with the
Diebold electronic voting system used in Maryland); Stewart, supra note 223, at 3
(noting controversy over electronic voting but finding that Georgia's electronic voting
machines performed significantly better than other equipment used previously).
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technology may well do better at ensuring equal access, while also
promoting secure and transparent elections.
The difficult question for courts and policymakers alike is how best
to proceed in light of this uncertainty. This Article has argued that
certain core democratic values should inform the comparison of
different voting technologies. State-commissioned studies of
electronic voting have suggested several available means by which
electronic voting security may be improved without jeopardizing the
tremendous benefits that voters stand to gain from this technology.
Nongovernmental entities are pursuing other promising alternatives,
such as open source code and encrypted ballots. There is reason to
believe that we need not sacrifice the voting rights of people of color,
disabled voters, and non-English speaking citizens in order to achieve
the admirable goal of enhancing election security and transparency.
The courts and legislative bodies have an essential role to play in
promoting these democratic values. Courts should jealously guard the
norms of racial equality, disability access, multilingual access, and
inter-jurisdictional equality. At the same time, they should exercise
caution in fashioning remedies. Legislatures should likewise allow
state and local officials flexibility. It is a mistake to write into stone
any particular security fix-such as the "voter-verified paper audit
trail" - until it has proven workable, effective, and superior to other
methods. Such legislation can only stifle innovation, while doing little
to promote secure and transparent elections. Legislatures should
instead focus on the need for auditability in an election environment
where paperless technology increasingly predominates.
While the courts and legislative bodies have an important role to
play in the ongoing transformation of voting technology, the most
important responsibilities ultimately lie in the hands of state and local
election officials. This is an inevitable consequence of the
decentralized character of our election administration systems. But it
is also an approach that provides significant advantages, allowing for
innovation while limiting the consequences of the mistakes that
inevitably will occur.
The Help America Vote Act is a start-but it is only a start. Better
technology can mean more secure, transparent, accessible, and equal
voting systems, but only if Congress and state legislative bodies
provide the funding and oversight to make that possibility a reality. If
we are to promote the democratic values of equality, security, and
transparency, we must stop looking at election reform as a
destination, and instead view it as an ongoing process that will
continue for as long as better voting technologies continue to emerge.
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF STATE HAVA PLANS
The chart below summarizes the Help America Vote Act
implementation plans of the fifty states, as well as those of the District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico, in the area of voting equipment. It is
based on voting system information obtained from state HAVA plans.
Funding information is based on
http://www.civilrights.org/issues/voting/havachart.pdf. The column
labeled "current" indicates the type of equipment used at the time of
the HAVA plan's submission, while the chart labeled "proposed"
indicates the type of equipment to which the state planned to convert.
The last column indicates the amount, either in dollars or the
percentage of HAVA payments received, that the state planned to
devote toward new voting equipment.
State Current Proposed Amount
Alabama 53 counties (precinct- Replace mechanical $23,000,000 allocated
level tabulation optical lever voting machines
scan); 10 (central- in Bullock county;
tabulation optical scan); replace or modify
3 DRE; 1 lever machine; voting machines in
never used punch cards Mobile, Montgomery,
and DeKalb counties;
replace centralized-
ballot counting systems
in 9 counties; DRE
requirement
Alaska 163 precincts (hand- Continue to expand the $4,500,000 allocated
count paper ballots); 283 use of the optical-scan
(optical-scan paper voting system in hand-
ballots [Accu-Vote OS count precincts; DRE
2000]); no DREs requirement
Arizona 9 counties (punch cards); Replace punch-card Approximately 56% of
6 counties (no info.) voting systems in 9 funds
counties; DRE
requirement
Arkansas 5 counties (DREs); 46 Replace lever $12,000,000-20,000,000
(central-tabulation machines or punch- estimated, depending on
optical scan); 3 (precinct- card systems with federal funds
level optical scan); 8 DREs; replace all
(hand-count paper systems with DRE if
ballots); 13 (lever federal funding
machines or punch sufficient
cards)
California 3 categories of systems: Replace punch-card Funds from HAVA as
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State Current Proposed Amount
optical scan, DRE/touch voting systems; DRE well as up to
screen, punch card requirement; consider $200,000,000 in general
decertifying paper- obligation bonds
based systems authorized by the state;
funds to be allocated by
Secretary of State
Colorado Systems: paper ballots, Already meets/will $10,100,000 allocated
central-count optical meet requirements;
scan, precinct-count DRE requirement
optical scan, punch card;
only 1 county continues
to utilize punch cards but
will probably opt for
another voting system
Connecticut 3 municipalities (optical Actively considering $20,500,000 estimated
scan); 166 (lever upgrading lever
machines) machines; replacement
of all lever machines
delayed by insufficient
federal funding; DRE
requirement
Delaware DREs [electronic 1242 Replaced punch cards $5,700,000 estimated
(model 6T)] and lever machines in
1996 with DREs; DRE
requirement (DREs
that meet accessibility
requirement)
Florida Already replaced punch DRE requirement $11,740,000 from § 102
cards, lever machines, for punch-card buyouts
paper ballots, and ($24 million was spent
central-count optical- by state), $11,600,000
scan systems with expected to be spent on
precinct-tabulated DREs
Marksense voting
systems or DREs; 15
counties (DREs); 52
(precinct-level optical
scan)
Georgia 159 counties (DREs Meets all requirements, Funds already
[Diebold]) including DRE expended: $53,900,000,
requirement to replace voting
systems
Hawaii All precincts use DRE requirement Approximately
precinct-level optical 8,000,000 allocated
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scan ([ES&S Model
100])
Idaho 16 counties (paper Provide excess funds No info
ballot); 14 (optical scan); on optional grant
14 (punch card) program to upgrade
systems; DRE
requirement
Illinois 90 counties (punch card); Replace punch cards; $42,000,000 allocated
2 (precinct-level punch voter education if
card [PBC 2100]); 10 counties decide to
(precinct-level optical retain central-count
scan [Accu-Vote]); 3 systems; DRE
(precinct-level optical requirement
scan [Optical Scan
M100]); 3 (Marksense
Optech IV-C); 2
(Marksense Optech III-
PE)
Indiana 32 counties (punch card Replace punch cards Will set aside
and lever machine); 60 and lever machines; $39,200,000 to
counties (other systems) DRE requirement reimburse counties
Iowa 6 counties (lever Replace lever $42,000,000 estimated
machines); 1 (paper machines; DRE
ballots); 59 (central- requirement
count optical scan); 18
(precinct-count optical
scan); 15 (DRE)
Kansas 81 counties (optical Voter education to No info.
scan); 21 (hand-count make paper ballot and
paper ballots); 3 (DRE); central-count optical-
punch card and lever scan systems
machines are not used compliant; DRE
requirement
Kentucky 96 counties Replace lever Approximately
(ELECTronic 1242 machines; DRE $18,200,000 estimated
DRE); 17 (MicroVote requirement
MV-464 DRE); 1
(ACCU-VOTE ES
Optical Scan
Tabulation); 1 (lever
machines); 5 (mechanical
lever machines and
MicroVote MV-464)
Louisiana 50 parishes (AVM-POM Replace lever Estimated 91.8% of
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lever machines); 14 machines; DRE federal funds received
(electronic voting requirement
machines [AVC
Advantage and
iVotronic])
Maine 394 municipalities (hand- Modify current Estimated $5,000,000-
counted paper ballots); machines; DRE $10,000,000
109 municipalities requirement
(precinct-level optical-
scan ballots [Accu-Vote
ES-2000 (36
municipalities)]; [Optech
HIP (47 municipalities)];
[Optech HIP Eagle (24
municipalities)]; [ES&S
Model 100 (2
municipalities)])
Maryland 4 systems: Optical Scan In the process of $57,500,000 allocated
(ES&S Optech III-P meeting requirements;
Eagle and Diebold DRE requirement
Model ES-2000) and
DRE (Diebold
AccuVote TS and
Sequoia AVC
Advantage)
Massachusetts 392 precincts (lever Replace lever 100% of § 102 monies &
machines); 11 (Datavote machines and Datavote 15% of Title II monies
systems); 1665 (optical machines; DRE
scan [Accu-Vote (1042 requirement
precincts), Optech (176
precincts), and Optech
Eagle (447 precincts)]);
90 (paper ballots)
Michigan 445 precincts (lever Replace punch cards Estimated $55,000,000
machines); 98 (paper and lever machines; to be allocated
ballots); 866 (central- DRE requirement
count punch cards); the
rest of the 5405 total
precincts use either DRE
or precinct-level optical
scan
Minnesota 7 counties (hand-count Implement a uniform, No info.
paper ballots); 24 statewide voting
(central-count optical system with locally-
scan); 14 (precinct- owned, precinct-based,
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tabulator optical scan); optical-scan
42 (mixed systems) equipment; DRE
requirement
Mississippi 8 jurisdictions (lever Replace all non-DRE Plans to spend
systems); 11 (punch voting devices with approximately
cards); 1 (Opscan DREs if full federal $15,000,000 in federal
[combination OMR and funding provided funds
punch card]); 8
(precinct-level optical
mark reader systems); 51
(central-optical mark-
reader systems); 1
(DRE); 2 (Shouptronic
systems)
Missouri 9 counties (hand-count Replace punch cards; Unclear
paper ballots); 37 (punch DRE requirement
cards); 70 (optical scan)
Montana 6 counties (punch cards); Replace punch cards in Approximately
45 (optical scan); 5 5 counties (1 county $3,100,000 allocated
(paper ballots) already replaced their
system after the 2000
election); DRE
requirement
Nebraska Two methods: hand DRE requirement Approximately
counting of paper ballots $5,300,000 allocated
and central optical-scan
system for paper ballots
(no breakdown by
counties)
Nevada 7 counties (punch cards); Replace all punch Approximately
9 (optical scan); 1 (DRE) cards and optical-scan $8,500,000 allocated
systems with DREs, if
sufficient funding;
DRE requirement
New Hampshire 162 polling places Replaced punch cards 25% of available funds
(optical scan [Optech in 1986; DRE to be allocated
HIP (39); Accuvote OS requirement
ES-2000 (123)]); 147
(hand-count paper
ballots)
New Jersey 7 counties (lever Replace lever To be determined;
machines); 14 (no info.) machines and upgrade estimated $39,000,000
other systems; 2 for complete upgrade
counties replaced
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punch cards in 2001;
DRE requirement
New Mexico DRE and optical scan Already replaced Initial $5,000,000 in
(no info. on number of punch card and lever Title II funds to be used
counties) machines; begin for DRE purchases
replacing older
systems; DRE
requirement
New York All 62 counties (lever Replace lever $140,000,000 total
machines) machines (19,843 budgeted
systems); DRE
requirement
North Carolina 8 counties (punch card); Replace punch-card $37,200,000 allocated
5 (lever machines) and lever machines;
DRE requirement
North Dakota 44 counties (optical Replace punch-card Estimated $5,000,000-
scan); 8 (hand-count system in Williams 6,000,000
paper ballots); 1 (punch county; DRE
card) requirement
Ohio 69 counties (punch Replace punch-card Estimated $136,000,000
cards); 2 (lever and lever machines, if
machines); 6 (electronic sufficient funding;
voting devices); 11 DRE requirement
(optical scan)
Oklahoma 4 counties (optical scan); Upgrade current $33,400,000 allocated
No info. on other systems; replace all
counties precinct-level and
central-count devices
in largest counties;
DRE requirement
Oregon 3 counties (punch cards); Replace punch cards; $3,550,000 allocated
33 (optical scan) DRE requirement;
additional DREs, if
funding available
Pennsylvania 5 counties (paper Replace punch-card Approximately
ballots); 24 (lever and lever machines; $23,000,000 under § 102
machines); 11 (punch upgrade other systems; funds; state will fully
cards); 24 (central-count encourage DREs or, if reimburse DRE
optical scan); 8 (DRE) not DREs, then purchases, part for
encourage precinct- other machines
level optical scan; DRE
requirement
Rhode Island All 39 cities (precinct- Replaced entire system Approximately
level optical scan in 1998 with optical $7,000,000 allocated for
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[Optech III-PE]) scan; 2 DREs per DRE purchases
precinct
South Carolina 24 counties (DRE); 10 Replace all machines $36,600,000 allocated
(punch cards); 12 with a statewide
(MarkSense optical-scan uniform electronic
system) voting system (no info.
on which system);
DRE requirement
South Dakota Precinct-level and Utilize precinct-level Approximately
central-count optical and central-count $7,700,000 allocated
scan; hand-count paper optical-scan ballots,
ballots, punch cards (no hand-count paper
info. on number of ballots, and DREs:
counties) DRE requirement
Tennessee 41 counties (DREs Replace punch-card $19,500,000 allocated
[Electronic Danaher or and lever machines;
Microvote]); 11 (optical probably upgrade from
scan [ESS Central Count central count to
and ESS Precinct precinct-level optical-
Count]); 43 (punch cards scan systems; DRE
or lever machines) requirement
Texas 90 counties (hand-count Replace punch-card $31,800,000 allocated
paper ballot); 150 and lever machines:
(optical scan); 14 (punch DRE requirement
cards); 3 (lever
machines); 4 (DRE)
Utah 23 counties (punch Replace punch cards $20,500,000 allocated
cards); 2 (optical scan); 4 with DREs; DRE
(hand-count paper requirement
ballots)
Vermont 184 municipalities (hand- Propose one type of $6,650,000 allocated
count paper ballots); 62 optical-scan system;
(optical scan) towns will be permitted
to continue use of
hand-count paper
ballot; DRE
requirement
Virginia 28 precincts (hand-count Replace punch-card $33,100,000 allocated
paper ballots); 493 and lever machines;
(optical scan); 1065 DRE requirement
(lever machines); 275
(punch cards); 416
(DRE)
Washington 16 counties (punchlReplace punch cards; $15,700,000 allocated
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cards); 23 (optical scan); DRE requirement;
1 (mixed [optical scan note: WA encourages
and DRE]) absentee voting/voting
_by mail
West Virginia 10 counties (hand-count Replace punch-card Estimated $16,500,000
paper ballots); 3 (lever and lever machines; allocated
machines); 12 (punch DRE requirement
cards); 29 (optical scan);
1 (DRE)
Wisconsin 87% of voters (optical Develop voter $16,400,000 allocated
scan); 10% (hand-count education for central-
paper ballots); 3% (lever count optical-scan
machines); note: also counties and paper
mentions that 3 counties ballots; replace lever
used punch cards in 2000 machines; reimburse
election for replacement of
punch cards; DRE
requirement
Wyoming 3 counties (lever Replace punch cards, No info.
machines); 5 (punch central count optical-
cards); 6 (central-count scan systems, lever
optical scan); 8 (precinct- machines, and the
level optical scan); 1 Guardian Electronic
(DRE) 1242 DRE system;
DRE requirement
D.C. 142 precincts (Optical- Meets requirements; $1,700,000 allocated
scan voting systems DRE requirement met
[Optech Eagle P III]) by 2004 [Sequoia Edge
DRE]
Puerto Rico All voters use hand- Probably replace the No info.
count paper ballots current system, but no
decision
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF STATE RECOUNT LAWS
The chart below summarizes the recount laws of the fifty states.
They are broken down into four categories: (1) automatic-recounts
that take place automatically, regardless of the margin of victory, (2)
candidate initiated-recounts that may be requested by a candidate, (3)
voter initiated-recounts that may be requested by voters, and (4) close
election-recounts that take place if the margin of victory falls
beneath a prescribed numerical threshold.
Type of Recount Provided for by Law
Automatic Candidate- Voter- Close Description of
State Initiated Initiated Election State Recount Laws
Alabama X When a candidate is
defeated by no more than
one-half of one percent of
the votes cast for the
office, a recount will occur
unless the candidate
submits a written waiver.
Alaska X X A defeated candidate or
ten qualified voters may
file an application within
five days after the
completion of the state
review for a recount of the
votes for any particular
office.
Arizona X A recount is required
when the margin between
the two candidates
receiving the greatest
number of votes for a
particular office is less
than or equal to the lesser
of the following: (1) one-
tenth of one percent of the
number of votes cast for
both such candidates; (2)
200 votes in the case of an
office to be filled by state
electors and for which the
total number of votes cast
is more than 25,000; (3) 50
votes in the case of an
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office to be filled by state
electors and for which the
total number of votes cast
is 25,000 or less; (4) 50
votes in the case of a
member of the legislature;
or (5) 10 votes in the case
of an office to be filled by
the electors of city, town,
county, or subdivision
thereof.
Arkansas X Any candidate voted for
who may be dissatisfied
with the returns from any
precinct may petition for a
recount of the votes cast
therein.
California X X During the official canvass
of every election in which
a voting system is used,
the official conducting the
election shall conduct a
public manual tally of the
ballots tabulated by those
devices cast in one percent
of the precincts chosen at
random by the elections
official. In addition,
voters may file requests
seeking a recount of the
ballots.
Colorado X X A recount of any election
contest shall be held if the
difference between the
highest number of votes
cast and the next highest
number of votes cast is less
than or equal to one-half
of one percent of the
highest vote cast in that
election contest.
Whenever a recount is not
required an interested
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party (including a
candidate who lost the
election) may submit a
notarized written request
for a recount.
Connecticut X When the plurality of an
elected candidate for an
office over the vote for a
defeated candidate
receiving the next highest
number of votes is either
(1) less than a vote
equivalent to one-half of
one percent of the total
number of votes cast for
the office but not more
than 2000 votes; or (2) less
than 20 votes, there shall
be a recanvass of the
returns unless the defeated
candidate submits a
written waiver.
Delaware X Any candidate for a
statewide office in a
general election may apply
for a recount if the
number of votes
separating such candidate
and the closest opposing
candidate is less than 1000
votes or less than one-half
of one percent of all votes
cast for the two
candidates, whichever is
less.
Florida X If a candidate for any
office is defeated by one-
half of one percent or less
of the votes cast for such
office the board
responsible for certifying
the results of the vote shall
order a recount of the
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votes cast with respect to
such office.
Georgia X X A defeated candidate may
petition for a recount if
the difference between the
number of votes cast for
the candidate who has
been declared elected and
the number of votes cast
for a candidate not
declared elected is not
more than one percent of
the total votes cast for the
particular office in
question. In addition, if it
appears that there is a
discrepancy in the returns
recorded, either a
defeated candidate or
three electors of any
precinct (where voting
machines have been used)
may petition for a
recanvass of the votes.
Hawaii None found.
Idaho X A defeated candidate for
election to a federal, state,
or county office may
submit a written request
for a recount of the votes
cast when the difference
between the vote cast for
that candidate and for the
winning candidate is less
than or equal to one-tenth
of one percent of the total
votes cast for that office.
Moreover, any candidate
for federal, state, or
county office may request
a recount within twenty
days of the canvass of such
election.
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Illinois X X A defeated candidate for
election to a federal, state,
or county office may
submit a written request
for a recount of the votes
cast when the difference
between the vote cast for
that candidate and for the
winning candidate is less
than or equal to one-tenth
of one percent of the total
votes cast for that office.
Moreover, any candidate
for federal, state, or
county office may request
a recount within twenty
days of the canvass of such
election.
Indiana X A defeated candidate may
file a verified petition for a
recount with the election
division.
Iowa X The board of canvassers
shall order a recount if a
written request is made by
a candidate or any other
person who received votes
for the particular office in
the precinct where the
recount is requested not
later than 5:00 p.m. on the
third day following the
canvass of the election in
question.
Kansas X X Any candidate may
request the recount of
ballots cast in all or only in
specified voting areas for
the office for which such
person is a candidate. In
addition, any registered
elector who cast a ballot in
a question-submitted
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election may request a
recount in all or only
specified voting areas to
determine the result of the
election.
Kentucky X X As part of the official
canvass, a manual recount
of randomly selected
precincts representing
three to five percent of the
total ballots cast in each
election shall be
completed. In addition,
any candidate for election
to any state, county,
district, or city office (with
a few exceptions) who was
voted for at a regular
election may petition for a
recount of the ballots.
Louisiana None found.
Maine X X If the margin between the
number of votes cast for
the leading candidate and
the number of votes cast
for the second place
candidate is less than one
percent of the total
number of votes cast in
that race, a recount is
presumed necessary. In
addition, a losing
candidate may request a
recount in any election by
filing a written request
with the Secretary of State
within five business days
after the election.
Maryland X A candidate who has been
defeated may petition for
a recount of the votes cast
for the office sought.
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Massachusetts X X A voter-initiated petition
for a recount may be filed
on or before 5:00 p.m. on
the tenth day following an
election, provided that the
written request for the
recount is signed by the
number of voters required
by § 135 and is signed by
the candidate on whose
behalf the recount is being
conducted. Statewide
recounts may only be
authorized if the
difference between the
number of votes cast for
the two leading candidates
for the office is one-half of
one percent or less of the
total votes cast for such
office.
A candidate for any office
(with a few exceptions)
may petition for a recount
of the votes cast for that
office in any precinct,
provided that the petition
is filed not later than forty-
eight hours after the
completion of the canvass
of votes cast at an election.
A qualified, registered
elector who believes that
there has been fraud or
error committed by the
inspectors of an election
may also petition for a
recount of the votes cast in
any precinct, provided that
the petition is filed not
later than two days after
the final certification of
the canvass of votes. A
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recount of all precincts in
the state shall be
conducted any time a
statewide election shall be
certified by the board of
state canvassers as having
been determined by a vote
differential of 2000 votes
or less.
In a state general election
when the difference
between the votes of a
candidate who would
otherwise be declared
elected and the votes of
any other candidate for
that office (1) is less than
one-half of one percent of
the total number of votes
counted for that office; or
(2) is ten votes or less if
the total number of votes
cast for that office is 400
votes or less the
canvassing board shall
recount the votes. A
losing candidate may
request a recount at the
candidate's own expense
when the vote difference is
greater than the difference
stated above.
Mississippi None found.
Missouri X Any contestant in an
election contest who was
defeated by less than one
percent of the votes cast
for the office, and any
contestant who received
the second highest number
of votes cast for that office
if two or more are to be
elected and who was
1824
Minnesota
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defeated by less than one
percent of the votes cast
shall have the right to
request a recount of the
votes cast for the office by
filing the request with the
Secretary of State no later
than seven days after the
certification of the
election.
Montana X A recount must be
conducted if a candidate
for a congressional office,
or a state or district office,
voted on in more than one
county, the legislature or
judge of the district court
is defeated by a margin
not exceeding one-quarter
of one percent of the total
votes cast for all
candidates for the same
position and the defeated
candidate, within five days
after the official canvass,
files a petition with the
Secretary of State. If a
candidate for public office
is defeated by a margin
exceeding one-quarter of
one percent but not
exceeding one-half of one
percent of the total votes
cast for all candidates for
the same position, he may,
within five days after the
official canvass, file a
petition and post a bond to
cover all the costs of the
recount.
Nebraska X If a candidate failed to be
elected by a margin of (1)
one percent or less of the
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votes received by the
candidate who received
the highest number of
votes for the office at an
election in which more
than 500 total votes were
cast; or (2) two percent or
less of the votes received
by the candidate who
received the highest
number of votes for the
office at an election in
which 500 or less total
votes were cast, then such
candidate shall be entitled
to a recount by filing a
written request with the
Secretary of State. If a
candidate fails to be
elected by more than the
margin stipulated above,
the losing candidate may
submit a certified written
request for a recount at his
or her expense.
Nevada X X A candidate defeated at
any election may demand
a recount of the vote if
within three working days
after the certification of
the vote and the candidate
files his demand in writing.
Any voter may demand a
recount of the vote for a
ballot question if within
three working days after
the certification of the
vote and the voter files his
demand in writing.
New X Any person for whom a
Hampshire vote was cast and recorded
for any office at a town
election may, no later than
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the Friday following the
election, apply in writing
for a recount of the ballots
cast for such office.
New Jersey X X Any candidate at any
election may, on or before
the second Saturday
following such election,
apply for a recount of the
votes cast. Any ten voters
may, within a like time,
apply for a recount of the
votes cast at an election
upon any public question.
New Mexico X Any candidate for any
office for which the state
or county canvassing
board issues a certificate
of nomination or election
may, within six days after
the completion of the
canvass, apply for a
recount of paper ballots or
a recheck of the votes
shown on voting machines
cast in the precinct.
New York X Within fifteen days after
each general, specific or
primary election and
within seven days after
every village election
conducted by the board of
elections at which voting
machines are used, the
board of elections shall, in
each county using voting
machines, re-canvass the
vote cast upon the voting
machines according to the
standards outlined in N.Y.
Election Law § 9-208.
North X In a ballot item within the
Carolina _jurisdiction of the State
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Board of Elections, a
candidate may submit a
written demand for a
recount if the difference
between the votes for that
candidate and the votes
for a prevailing candidate
are not more than (1) for a
non-statewide ballot item,
one percent of the total
votes cast in the ballot
item or in the case of a
multi-seat ballot item, one
percent of the votes cast
for those two candidates;
or (2) for a statewide
ballot item, one-half of
one percent of the votes
cast in the ballot item, or
in the case of a multi-seat
ballot item, one-half of
one percent of the votes
cast for those two
candidates or 10,000 votes,
whichever is less.
North Dakota X X A recount must be
conducted when a person
failed to be elected in a
general or special election
by one-half of one percent
or less of the highest vote
cast for a candidate for
that office. A demand for
a recount may be made by
any person who failed to
be elected in a general or
special election by more
than one-half of one
percent and less than two
percent of the highest vote
cast for a candidate for
that office, provided that
the demand be made in
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writing within three days
after the canvass of the
votes and accompanied
with a bond in an amount
sufficient to pay for the
cost of the recount.
Ohio X X X If the number of votes cast
for the declared winning
candidate in a district
election does not exceed
the number of votes cast
for the declared losing
candidate by a margin of
one-half of one percent or
more of the total vote, a
recount shall be
conducted. If the number
of votes cast for the
declared winning
candidate in a statewide
election does not exceed
the number of votes cast
for the declared losing
candidate by a margin of
one-fourth of one percent
or more of the total vote, a
recount shall be
conducted. Any candidate
who was not declared
elected may submit an
application for a recount
of the votes. Any group of
five or more qualified
electors may also file an
application for a recount
of the votes at an election
upon any question or
issue, provided that they
either voted "Yes" or in
favor of an issue that was
defeated, or they voted
"No" or against an issue
that was adopted.
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Oklahoma X X A losing candidate may
request a recount of the
ballots cast in an election.
For elections on issues or
questions when no
candidate is involved, a
recount may only be
authorized after a
registered voter and
participant in the election
files a petition with the
election board signed by
the number of voters
required by 26 Okla. Stat.
tit. 26, § 8-111(b)-(c).
Oregon X X X A full recount of the votes
cast shall be ordered if (1)
two or more candidates
have an equal and the
highest number of votes;
or (2) the difference in the
number of votes cast for a
candidate apparently
elected to the office and
the closest defeated
opponent is not more than
one-fifth of one percent of
the total votes for both
candidates. A losing
candidate may file a
demand for a recount to
be made in specified
precincts. An elector may
file a demand for a
recount to be made in
specified precincts in
which votes were cast on
any measure that
appeared on the ballot.
Pennsylvania X The Secretary of Elections
shall order each county
board of elections to
conduct a recount, where
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unofficial returns show a
margin of one-half of one
percent or less.
Candidates may seek a
recount on their own
where the margin is
greater. Three or more
qualified electors in any
general, municipal, or
primary election may file a
petition for a recount by
alleging fraud or error in
the computation of votes
cast for any office in an
election district.
Rhode Island X Any candidate may
petition the State Board of
Elections to conduct a
recount by re-reading the
programmed memory
devices and comparing the
results with the totals
obtained on election night.
If, after the recount, the
candidate still trails the
winning candidate by less
than five percent and a
discrepancy still exists, the
candidate may request
another recount to be
performed by re-feeding
the computer ballots into
the voting equipment. If
the candidate then trails
the apparent winning
candidate by less than
three percent, the
candidate may then
request a manual recount
of the votes cast.
South X Whenever the difference
Carolina between the number of
votes received by a
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candidate who has been
declared elected to an
office in a general election
and the number of votes
received by any losing
candidate is not more than
one percent of the total
votes which were cast, a
recount shall be ordered
unless such candidates
waive a recount in writing.
South Dakota X X If any candidate for an
office, other than the
Legislature, in a state or
district election is defeated
by a margin which does
not exceed one-fourth of
one percent of the total
vote cast for all candidates
for such office, the
candidate may file a
petition for a recount
within three days after the
completion of the official
canvass. Any three
registered voters of a
precinct may also petition
for the recount of votes as
to the office or question
specified, provided that
the petition is filed within
ten days after the election.
Tennessee X A recount may be ordered
by any court or legislative
body under any of the
following circumstances:
(1) a tie vote, (2) an
indication of fraud if the
number of votes affected
would be sufficient to
change the result of an
election, or (3) in any
other instance the court
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finds that a recount is
warranted.
Texas None found.
Utah X X When any candidate loses
by not more than a total of
one vote per voting
precinct in a regular
general election, the
candidate may file a
request for a recount
within seven days after the
canvass. Any ten voters
who voted in an election
when any ballot
proposition was on the
ballot may file a request
for a recount within seven
days of the canvass.
Vermont X X A losing candidate may
petition for a recount if
the difference between the
number of votes cast for a
winning candidate and the
number of votes cast for a
losing candidate is less
than five percent of the
total votes cast for all the
candidates for an office,
divided by the number of
persons to be elected. The
result of an election for
any office, other than for
general assembly, or
public question may be
contested by any legal
voter entitled to vote on
the office or public
question to be contested,
provided that the
complaint is filed within
fifteen days after the
election in question, or if
there is a recount, within
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ten days after the court
issues its judgment on the
recount.
Virginia X X A defeated candidate may
request a recount of the
votes if there is, between
any candidate apparently
elected and any candidate
apparently defeated, a
difference of not more
than one percent of the
total vote cast for the two
such candidates. Fifty or
more qualified voters may
petition for a recount of
the votes if the difference
between the vote for a
question and the vote
against a question is not
more than fifty votes or
one percent of the total
vote cast for and against
the question, whichever is
greater.
Washington X X X If the official canvass of
votes at any election
reveals that the difference
in the number of votes cast
for a candidate apparently
elected to any office and
the number of votes cast
for the closest apparently
defeated opponent is less
than 2000 votes and also
less than one-half of one
percent of the total
number of votes cast for
both candidates, the
canvassing board shall
conduct a recount of all
votes cast on that position.
If the difference is less
than 150 votes and also
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less than one-fourth of one
percent of the total
number of votes cast for
both candidates, the votes
shall be recounted
manually. A losing
candidate may also apply
for a recount of the votes
if the margin was greater
than that specified above.
A group of five or more
registered voters may file
a written application for a
recount of the votes cast
on any question or issue.
West Virginia X X During the official canvass
and any requested
recount, at least five
percent of the precincts
are to be chosen at
random and the ballot
card cast therein counted
manually. A losing
candidate may also
demand a recount within
forty-eight hours after the
certification of the election
results.
Wisconsin X X Any candidate voted for at
an election or any elector
who voted on a
referendum question at
any election may request a
recount. The petition shall
be filed no later than 5:00
p.m. on the third business
day following the last
meeting day of the last
board of canvassers.
Wyoming X X X There shall be a recount of
the votes cast for any
office in which the
difference in the number
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of votes cast for the
winning candidate
receiving the least number
of votes and the losing
candidate receiving the
greatest number of votes is
less than one percent of
the number of votes cast
for the winning candidate
receiving the least number
of votes cast for that
office. A recount shall
also be granted if a losing
candidate files an affidavit
alleging that fraud or error
occurred in the canvassing
of the votes. In addition, a
recount for votes of a
ballot proposition will be
made if requested in an
affidavit signed by twenty-
five electors registered in a
district voting on the
question or if the
proposition receives a
number of votes, greater
or lesser, within one
percent of the number of
votes required for passage.
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